Impact & Engagement

Google Scholar

Citation indices All Since 2012
Citations 3311 2338
h-index 24 21
i10-index 60 44


  • 3 AM Magazine (June 2017)  
  • American Philosophical Association Blog (June 2017)  
  • Interview with Mark McKergow and Kirsten Dierolf for Interaction, 8(2) (2017)  
  • Interview about Radical Enactivism, Olympia Loop Rollercoaster, The Vienna Prater Park (Sept 2016)  
  • ABC The Philosopher’s Zone: Can You Trust Your Memory? (June 2016)  
  • Philosophy Now Radio interview – The Linguistic Wizardry of Ludwig Wittgenstein (June 2014)  
  • The Reasoner (March 2013)  
  • BBC Three Counties Radio (July 2010)  

Public Lectures

  • UOW Big Ideas festival (August 2015)
    • Pre-lecture interview   
    • Lecture: You Can’t Handle the Truth  
  • Graduate School of Education Colloquia, UC Berkeley - Imagining the Unimaginable: An (overly) Enactive Imagination (April 2015)  
  • ARCUS Foundation Roundtable
    • Intersubjectivity Without Theory of Mind (Aug 2011)  
  • The Politics of Species
  • Making Sense of Ourselves and Others: Narratives not Theories – March 2011  
    • Further details  
    • Philosophical Rethink Inspires New Clinical Applications  
  • Discussion with Daniel C. Dennett, Considering Consciousness, University of Antwerp (Sept 2008)  
  • Free iTunes Collection  

Keynote Presentations

  • Understanding One Another, Breaking of the Fast Iftar, Illawarra People for Peace (June 2017)  
  • International Association for the Philosophy of Sport conference: Dynamic Minds in Performance, Natal, Brazil (September 2014)  
  • Hessian Orientating Solutions conference
    • Enactive and Narrative Practices: How and Why They Matter to Therapy (May 2013)  

Selected Major Publications

Evolving Enactivism

Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless, purely embodied and enactive, and culturally scaffolded, content-involving forms of cognition. Hutto and Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. This book breaks new ground: It shows how how a radically enactive approach to mind be fruitfully allied with theories of cognition that appeal to predictive processing, autopoietic sense-making and ecological affordances. It further explicates the core idea of a contentless kind of Ur-intentionality and demonstrates how this form of intentionality can be understood in terms of biological proper functions, without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. Answering critics, it explains how properly contentful minds can arise in a kinky way, through socio-culturally scaffolding, with out introducing breaks into nature. Most dramatically, Hutto and Myin offer a new vision of neurodynamics, defending and developing their signature view that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In all, Hutto and Myin propose offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers the right resources for understanding the multi-faceted, and otherwise puzzling, character of quintessential cognitive phenomena.

Critical acclaim

“A growing paradigm, this theory is endorsed by an increasing number of cognitive science and neuroscience researchers …the authors present … a secure path for satisfactorily naturalizing every human cognitive capacity, leaving nothing to metaphysical mystery or scientific inscrutability”
- Choice

“an empirically informed and admirably clear explication ... a compelling vision of psychological evolution, with which anyone thinking about the emergence of the different varieties of mentality must reckon.”
- Helen Steward, Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action, University of Leeds

"The next phase of this debate in the philosophy and sciences of cognition will be based on the substantial development of the view embodied in this book.”
- Paul E. Griffiths, Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney

Radicalizing Enactivism

Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness

  • A Choice Outstanding Academic Title
  • Honourable mention - 2013 PROSE Awards
  • 519 citations (Google Scholar)

Critical acclaim

One of the most original contributions to the already vast literature in recent philosophy of mind ... a convincing positive theory ... No collection in modern philosophy of mind is complete without this ground breaking book.
- Choice

a great little book ... its implications are profound
- Minds and Brains

offers so much .. Anyone with even the slightest interest in theoretical cognitive science cannot ... ignore the issues raised herein
- Journal of Cognitive Computing

clarity of purpose makes Radicalizing Enactivism a uniquely effective anti-representationalist manifesto
- Language Sciences

a thorough and rigorous criticism of classical and contemporary analytical theories of content ... [shows] in a remarkable way, the plausibility and relevance of their approach.
- Intellectica

engages philosophers on both sides of the representationalist/anti-representationalist divide with well structured, compelling argument
- Philosophical Psychology

Provocative ... compelling ... provides a justification for enactivist radicalism.
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

opens the door to a full new program of research within the cognitive sciences.
- The Philosophical Quarterly

a wonderful example how ‘research at the foundations' can be highly relevant 'at the surface’s many examples of daily practice
- InterAction

reshapes current philosophical thinking about embodied and extended cognition
- Evan Thompson, University of Toronto

a serious challenge to the status quo in the philosophy of mind
- Anthony Chemero, University of Cincinnati

a serious, painstaking, and genuinely hopeful book ... it identifies and methodically demolishes a key roadblock in the enactivist program.
- Shiny Pebble blog

Folk Psychological Narratives

Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans—our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons—are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In Folk Psychological Narratives, Daniel Hutto challenges this view (held in somewhat different forms by the two dominant approaches, "theory theory" and simulation theory) and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children acquire this practical skill only by being exposed to and engaging in a distinctive kind of narrative practice. Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal.

  • 515 citations (Google Scholar)

Critical acclaim

“Offers the field a promising basis from which to reorient itself”
- Science

“an instant classic in this important and relatively young field of study”
– Metapsychology

"changes the terms of this debate ... can be read as a proposal for a rewarding empirical research programme on the role of narratives in children’s understanding of action”
– Times Literary Supplement

"opens up new lines of empirical research ... should be read by all psychologists and philosophers interested in a theory of mind”
– Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

“succeeds in telling a compelling developmental and evolutionary story that integrates the available empirical evidence from vastly different areas of research such as developmental psychology, comparative cognition, neuroscience, cognitive archaeology, and evolutionary psychology”
– Human Development

"brings long ignored assumptions to the surface, and persuasively undermines them ... the debate about human social cognition should forever be transformed in its wake.”
– Philosophical Investigations

“highly original and admirably wide ranging ... tackles head on the really hard questions about the role in mental life of symbolization, representation and rationality”
- Language and Cognition

“cogently argued, thoroughly documented and stylishly written ... suggests the potential for research on stories to bring together scholars from across the arts and sciences”
– Style

“the breadth and originality of its arguments makes it a key text for researchers interested in folk psychology”
– Philosophy in Review

“a fresh, timely, and thought-provoking... has succeeded admirably in laying out a comprehensive alternative to ‘theory of mind’ approaches”
– Peter Hobson, Tavistock Professor of Developmental Psychopathology, UCL

“an original and compelling contribution to debates about the human capacity to understand others”
– Ian Ravenscroft, Flinders University

Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto

"This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the current cutting-edge developments in the embodied and situated sciences of the mind will want to read this book.”
- Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK

Contains commentaries by and 6 article-length replies to: Tim Crane, Shaun Gallagher, Peter Goldie, Peter Hobson, Erik Myin and Lars De Nul, and Anthony Rudd.

Critical acclaim

“stakes out new and exciting territory ... an enthralling exercise in constructive engagement ... takes the debate to a whole new level ... Essential reading.”
- Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh

“a marked contribution ... I recommend it.”
Alva Noë, University of Berkeley

“essential reading”
- Evan Thompson, University of British Colombia

“succeeds in steering this debate in new and interesting directions"
- Mark Rowlands, University of Miami

Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory Nor Therapy

What is the true worth of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? Answers to this question are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" and "therapeutic" interpretations. In their place, it seeks to establish that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein regarded clarification as the true end of philosophy. It argues that, properly understood, his approach exemplifies rather than betrays critical philosophy and provides a viable alternative to other contemporary offerings. 1st edition (2003) sold out in 2005. Second, revised edition contains an additional chapter with replies to Read (PAS 2004, PI 2006) and Hutchinson and Read (IJPS 2006).

Critical acclaim of the more important contributions to Wittgenstein studies in recent years... a helpful corrective to various current readings of his work.
- John Koethe, Mind

... a much-needed repositioning of theory and therapy ... [picks] out the real implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy from its misleading look-alikes.
- Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, University of East Anglia, UK

... a rare combination of philosophical sweep and scholarly detail ... places Wittgenstein in a larger historical context that sheds light on the unique significance of this way of looking at the end of philosophy.
- Barry Curtis, Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Hilo

an original and compelling interpretation that defends the continuity thesis ... remarkable for its mastery of the existing literature and its acuity in making sharp distinctions.
- Avrum Stroll, University of California, USA

tackles a problem that is central not just to the understanding of Wittgenstein but also to the self-understanding of our subject ... brings the issue to life through his extensive knowledge not just of Wittgenstein's work, but also of other reference-points ranging from transcendental idealism and Hegel's conception of logic to contemporary debates about the limits of conceptual analysis.
- Hans-Johann Glock, University of Reading, UK

mastery of the literature and contemporary debates is remarkable... moves with clarity and erudition ... will be of particular interest to philosophers who are trying to find points of convergence between analytic and Continental traditions
- Kevin A. Aho, The European Legacy


  • Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content

    Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books xxvi + 328 pp
    Year 2017

  • Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

    Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books. xxiv + 206 pp
    Co-Author/s Myin, E.
    Year 2013

  • Folk Psychological Narratives: The Socio-Cultural Basis of Understanding Reasons

    Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books. xvii + 343 pp
    Year 2008 (Paperback 2013)

  • Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory Nor Therapy

    Publisher Basingstoke: Palgrave xii + 272 pp
    Year 2003 (1st Ed.) / 2006 (2nd Ed.)

  • Beyond Physicalism

    Publisher Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. xvi + 306 pp
    Year 2000

  • The Presence of Mind

    Publisher Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. xiv + 252 pp
    Year 1999

Edited Books/Special Issues

  • The Natural Origins of Content: Special Issue

    Published In Philosophia. 43(3)
    Co-Editor/s Satne, G.
    Year 2015

  • Wittgenstein and Enactivism

    Published In American Philosophical Quarterly 50(3)
    Co-Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
    Year 2013

  • Mindreading and Its Alternatives

    Published In Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3)
    Co-Editor/s Herschbach, M. and Southgate, S.
    Year 2011

  • Narrative and Folk Psychology

    Published In Exeter: Imprint Academic +400 pp / Journal of Consciousness Studies.16: 6-8
    Year 2011

  • Narrative and Understanding Persons

    Published In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. + 224 pp
    Year 2007

  • Folk Psychology Re-assessed

    Published In Dordrecht: Springer. +254 pp
    Co-Editor/s Ratcliffe, M.
    Year 2007

  • Current Issues in Idealism

    Published In Bristol: Thoemmes Press. xiv + 287 pp
    Co-Editor/s Coates, P.
    Year 1996

Journal Articles

  • Narrative Practices in Medicine and Therapy

    Published In Style (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Brancazio, N. and Aubourg, J.
    Year 2017 (Forthcoming)

  • Enactive Emotions and Imaginative Associations: A Multi-Layered Account

    Published In Metascience (In Press)
    Note Symposium on Morag, 'Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason'
    Year 2017 (Forthcoming)

  • Cognitive Ontology in Flux: The Possibility of Protean Brains

    Published In Philosophical Explorations. 20:2. 209-223
    Co-Author/s Peeters, A. and Segundo-Ortin, M.
    Year 2017

  • Getting Into the Great Guessing Game of Predictive Processing: Bootstrap Heaven or Hell?

    Published In Synthese (DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1385-0)
    Year 2017

  • Basic Social Cognition without Mindreading

    Published In Synthese. 194:3. 827-846
    Year 2017

  • Davidson Demystified: Radical Interpretation meets Radical Enactivism

    Published In Argumenta (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Satne, G.
    Year 2017 (Forthcoming)

  • Re-authoring Narrative Therapy: Opening the Way for Future Developments

    Published In Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology. 24:2. 157-167
    Co-Author/s Gallagher, S.
    Year 2017

  • Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal

    Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 15:1. 21–41
    Year 2016

  • Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

    Published In Constructivist Foundations. 11:2. 346-353
    Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.
    Year 2016

  • Mind Never The Gap, Redux

    Published In Constructivist Foundations 11:2. 370-374
    Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.
    Year 2016

  • Dissolving the Puzzle of Early Belief Understanding

    Published In Mind and Language Symposium, The Brain’s Blog
    Note Helming, Strickland, and Jacob, 'Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief-Ascription
    Year 2016

  • A Reconciliation for the Future of Psychiatry: Both Folk Psychology and Cognitive Science

    Published In Frontiers in Psychiatry (DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2016.00012)
    Year 2016

  • The Natural Origins of Content

    Published In Philosophia. 43:3. 521–536
    Co-Author/s Satne, G.
    Year 2015

  • Searching for the Natural Origins of Content: Challenging Research Project or Benighted Quest?

    Published In Philosophia. 43:3. 505–519
    Co-Author/s Satne, G.
    Year 2015

  • Overly Enactive Imagination? Radically Re-Imagining Imagining

    Published In The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 53. 68–89
    Year 2015

  • Looking Beyond the Brain: Social Neuroscience meets Narrative Practice

    Published In Cognitive Systems Research. 34-35. 5-17
    Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M
    Year 2015

  • REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification

    Published In Topoi (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-015-9358-8)
    Year 2015

  • The Enactive Roots of STEM: Rethinking Educational Design in Mathematics

    Published In Educational Psychology Review. 27:3. 371-389
    Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.D. and Abrahamson, D.
    Year 2015

  • REC: Just Radical Enough

    Published In Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric. 41:54 (DOI: 10.1515/slgr-2015-xxxx)
    Co-Author Myin, E
    Year 2015

  • Choking RECtified: Enactive Expertise Beyond Dreyfus

    Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 14:2. 309-331
    Co-Author/s Sánchez-García, R.
    Year 2015

  • Extensive Enactivism: Why Keep it All in?

    Published In Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00706)
    Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M. and Myin, E.
    Year 2014

  • Embodied Cognition and Body Psychotherapy: the Construction of New Therapeutic Environments

    Published In Sensoria: A Journal of Mind, Brain and Culture. 10:1 (DOI: 10.7790/sa.v10i1)
    Co-Author/s Röhricht, F., Geuter, U., and Gallagher, S.
    Year 2014

  • Neural Representations Not Needed: No More Pleas, Please

    Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 13:2. 241-256
    Co-Author/s Myin, E.
    Year 2014

  • Enactivism: From a Wittgensteinian Point of View

    Published In American Philosophical Quarterly. 50:3. 281-302
    Year 2013

  • Fictionalism about Folk Psychology

    Published In The Monist. 96:4. 585–607
    Year 2013

  • Action Understanding: How Low Can You Go?

    Published In Consciousness and Cognition. 22:3. 1142–1151
    Year 2013

  • Exorcising Action Oriented Representations: Ridding Cognitive Science of its Nazgûl

    Published In Adaptive Behaviour. 21:1. 142-150
    Year 2013

  • Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology to Radical Enactivism

    Published In Review of General Psychology. 17:2. 174-178
    Year 2013

  • The Brain as Part of an Enactive System (commentary)

    Published In Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 36:4. 421-422
    Co-Author/s Gallagher S., Slaby J. and Cole J.
    Year 2013

  • Truly Enactive Emotion

    Published In Emotion Review, 4:1. 176-181
    Year 2012

  • Understanding Reasons without Re-Enactment

    Published In Emotion Review, 4:1. 66-67
    Year 2012

  • Philosophy of Mind’s New Lease on Life: Autopoietic Enactivism meets Teleosemiotics

    Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18:5-6. 44-64
    Year 2011

  • Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale

    Published In American Philosophical Quarterly. 48:2. 129-145
    Reprint Translated into French and reprinted in a special issue of Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage)
    Year 2011

  • Understanding Fictional Minds without Theory of Mind!

    Published In Style. 45:2. 276-282
    Year 2011

  • Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis?

    Published In Consciousness and Cognition. 18:2. 543–546
    Year 2009

  • Enacting is Enough

    Published In Psyche. 15:1. 24-30
    Co-Author/s Myin, E.
    Year 2009

  • Philosophical Clarification: Its Possibility and Point

    Published In Philosophia, 37:4. 629–652
    Year 2009

  • Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice

    Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies. 16:6-8. 9-39
    Year 2009

  • Lessons from Wittgenstein: Elucidating Folk Psychology

    Published In New Ideas in Psychology. 27. 197–212
    Reprint Translated into Italian and reprinted (2010) in Un Filosofo Senza Trampoli: Saggi sulla fi losofi a di Ludwig Wittgenstein. Perissinotto, L. (ed) Mimesis Edizioni Milan: Udine. 147-178
    Year 2008

  • The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and Implications

    Published In Philosophical Explorations. 11:3. 175-191
    Year 2008

  • Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions

    Published In International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 16:3. 419-444
    Year 2008

  • Articulating and Understanding the Phenomenological Manifesto. Symposium on The Phenomenological Mind

    Published In Linguagem, Mente e Ação, 10–19
    Year 2008

  • Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads

    Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 5:1. 75–88
    Year 2006

  • Misreadings, Clarifications and Reminders: Reply to Read and Hutchinson

    Published In International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14:4. 561–567
    Year 2006

  • Knowing What? Radical versus Conservative Enactivism

    Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 4:4. 389–405
    Year 2005

  • Voices to be Heard

    Published In The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 13:1. 149–161
    Year 2005

  • The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology

    Published In Mind and Language. 19:5. 548-73
    Year 2004

  • Folk Psychological Narratives and The Case of Autism

    Published In Philosophical Papers. 32:3. 345-361
    Year 2003

  • A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations

    Published In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59:2. 381–401
    Reprint Reprinted in (2013) Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. D’Oro, G. (ed). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 49-74
    Year 1999

  • Nonconceptual Content and Objectivity

    Published In Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy: Special Issue on Gareth Evans
    Year 1998

  • Davidson’s Identity Crisis

    Published In Dialectica, 52:1. 45–61
    Year 1998

  • Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

    Published In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. XCVIII(III). 265–286
    Co-Author/s Lippitt, J.
    Year 1998

  • An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness

    Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies. 5:3. 328–343
    Year 1998

  • Bradleyian Metaphysics: A Healthy Scepticism

    Published In Bradley Studies. 4:1. 82-96
    Year 1998

  • Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project

    Published In The Monist. 78:4. 464-478
    Year 1995

  • Prins Autos Herredomme: Psykologi I Naturbidenskabens Tidsalder. (The Reign of Prince Auto: Psychology in an Age of Science)

    Published In Philosophia, 21:1-2. 61-80
    Year 1992

Book Chapters

  • Memory and Narrativity

    Published In Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge. (In Press)
    Editor/s Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place

    Published In The Routledge Handbook of The Computational Mind. London: Routledge. (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Myin, E, Peeters, A. and Zahnoun, F.
    Editor/s Colombo, M. and Sprevak, M.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Going Radical

    Published In The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Myin, E.
    Editor/s Newen, A. Gallagher, S. and de Bruin, L.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Deflating Deflationism about Mental Representationlism

    Published In Mental Representation. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press. (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Myin, E.
    Editor/s Schilct, T.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • The Roots of Remembering. Extensively Enactive RECollection.

    Published In New Directions in Memory. London: Routledge. (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Peeters, A.
    Editor/s Michaelian, K. and Debus, D
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Naturalism in the Goldilock’s Zone: Wittgenstein’s Delicate Balancing Act

    Published In Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind and Naturalism. London: Routledge. (In Press)
    Co-Author/s Satne, G.
    Editor/s Raleigh, T. and Cahill, K.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Emotions on the Playing Field

    Published In Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
    Co-Author/s Renshaw, I. and Kirchhoff, M.
    Editor/s Cappuccio, M.L.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • What's the Story with Body Narratives? Philosophical Therapy for Therapeutic Practice

    Published In Embodied Perspectives in Psychotherapy. London: Routledge.
    Co-Author/s Gallagher, S.
    Editor/s Payne, H., Tantia, J., Koch, S. and Fuchs, T.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Wittgenstein and Psychology

    Published In The SAGE Handbook of Theoretical Psychology. California: Sage. (In Press)
    Editor/s Stam, H. and Looren de Jong, H.
    Year 2018 (Forthcoming)

  • Continuity Scepticism in Doubt: A Radically Enactive Take

    Published In Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press. (107-128)
    Co-Author/s Satne, G.
    Editor/s Durt, C, Fuchs, T and Tewes, C.
    Year 2017

  • Updating the Story of Mental Time Travel: Narrating and Engaging with Our Possible Pasts and Futures

    Published In Time and the Philosophy of Action. London: Routledge. (141-158)
    Co-Author/s McGivern, P.
    Editor/s Altshuler, R. and Sigrist, M.J.
    Year 2016

  • Pluralism, Interaction, and the Ontogeny of Social Cognition

    Published In The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy of the Social Mind. London: Routledge. (208-221).
    Co-Author/s Fiebich, A. and Gallagher, S.
    Editor/s Kiverstein, J.
    Year 2016

  • Remembering without Stored Contents: A Philosophical Reflection on Memory

    Published In Memory in the Twenty-first Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (229-237)
    Editor/s Groes, S.
    Year 2015

  • Narrative Understanding

    Published In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. London: Routledge. (291-301)
    Editor/s Carroll, N and Gibson, J.
    Year 2015

  • Contentless Perceiving: The Very Idea

    Published In Wittgenstein and Perception. London: Routledge. (64-84)
    Editor/s O’Sullivan, M and Campbell, M.
    Year 2015

  • Consciousness

    Published In Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. (35-53)
    Editor/s Garvey, J.
    Year 2015

  • Just Faking It? Pretend Theory meets Sexual Fantasizing

    Published In Sexual Fantasies: At the Convergence of the Cultural and Individual. Hamburg: Peter Lang. (179-204)
    Editor/s Larsson, M. & Johnsdotter, S.
    Year 2015

  • Enactive Aesthetics: Philosophical Reflections on Artful Minds

    Published In Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Dordrecht: Springer. (211-227)
    Editor/s Scarinzi, A.
    Year 2014

  • Interpersonal Relating

    Published In Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (240-257)
    Editor/s Fulford, KWM, Davies, M., Graham, G. Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G. and T. Thornton
    Year 2013

  • Emotion and Consciousness

    Published In Encyclopaedia of the Mind. California: Sage. (320-321)
    Editor/s Pashler, H.
    Year 2013

  • Why Believe in Contentless Beliefs?

    Published In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave Macmillan. (55-74)
    Editor/s N, Nottelmann
    Year 2013

  • Intersubjective Engagements without Theory of Mind: A Cross-Species Comparison

    Published In Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (126-140)
    Editor/s Lanjouw, A. and Corbey, R.
    Year 2013

  • Psychology’s Inescapable Need for Conceptual Clarification

    Published In Conceptual Analysis in Psychology: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (28-50)
    Editor/s T. P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney
    Year 2013

  • Radically Enactive Cognition in Our Grasp

    Published In The Hand – An Organ of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (227-258)
    Editor/s Radman, Z.
    Year 2013

  • Still a Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations

    Published In Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (49-74)
    Editor/s D’Oro, G.
    Note Reprint of 1999 PPR article with slight changes and a new afterward
    Year 2013

  • Exposing The Background: Deep and Local

    Published In Knowing without Thinking: The Background in Philosophy of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (37-56)
    Editor/s Radman, Z.
    Year 2012

  • Elementary Mind Minding, Enactivist-style

    Published In Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (307-341)
    Editor/s Seemann, A.
    Year 2011

  • Enactivism: Why be Radical?

    Published In Sehen und Handeln. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. (21-44)
    Editor/s Bredekamp, H. and Krois, J. M.
    Year 2011

  • Radical Enactivism and Narrative Practice: Implications for Psychopathology

    Published In Coherence and Disorders of the Embodied Self. Stuggart, Schattauer. (43-66)
    Editor/s Fuchs, T., Henningsen, P., Sattel, H.
    Year 2010

  • ToM Rules, but it is not OK

    Published In Against Theory of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (221-238)
    Editor/s Costall, A. and Leudar, I.
    Year 2009

  • Mental Representation and Consciousness

    Published In Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Vol. 2. Elsevier. (19-32)
    Editor/s Banks, W.
    Year 2009

  • Idealism

    Published In Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (357-9)
    Editor/s Bayne, T., Cleeremans A., Wilken, P.
    Year 2009

  • Understanding Others through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice

    Published In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (17-38)
    Co-Author/s Gallagher, S
    Editor/s Zlatev, J., Racine, T., Sinha, C. and Itkonen, E.
    Year 2008

  • First Communions: Mimetic Sharing without Theory of Mind

    Published In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (245-276)
    Editor/s Zlatev, J., Racine, T., Sinha, C. and Itkonen, E.
    Year 2008

  • The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology

    Published In Narrative and Understanding Persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (43–68)
    Editor/s Hutto, D.
    Note also appears as Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 82: 60, 2007
    Year 2007

  • Folk Psychology without Theory or Simulation

    Published In Folk Psychology Reassessed. Doredrecht: Springer. (115–135)
    Editor/s Hutto, D. and Ratcliffe, M.
    Year 2007

  • Getting Clear about Perspicuous Representations: Wittgenstein, Baker & Fodor

    Published In Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (299–322)
    Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
    Year 2007

  • Unprincipled Engagements: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (13-38)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Note Target Paper
    Year 2006

  • Impossible Problems and Careful Expositions: Reply to Myin and De Nul

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (45-64)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Both Bradley and Biology: Reply to Rudd

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (81-105)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Against Passive Intellectualism: Reply to Crane

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (121-149)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Embodied Expectations and Extended Possibilities: Reply to Goldie

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (157-177)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Four Herculean Labours: Reply to Hobson

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (185-221)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Narrative Practice and Understanding Reasons: Reply to Gallagher

    Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (231-247)
    Editor/s Menary, R.
    Year 2006

  • Starting without Theory

    Published In Other Minds. New York: Guilford. (56–72)
    Editor/s Malle, B. and Hodges, S.
    Year 2005

  • Two Wittgensteins Too Many: Wittgenstein’s Foundationalism

    Published In The Third Wittgenstein. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (25-41)
    Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
    Year 2004

  • More Making Sense of Nonsense: From Logical Forms to Forms of Life

    Published In Post-Metaphysical Tractatus. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (127–49)
    Editor/s Stocker, B.
    Year 2004

  • The World is Not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds

    Published In Understanding Emotions. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (37–53)
    Editor/s Goldie, P.
    Year 2004

  • Consciousness and Conceptual Schema

    Published In Dimensions of Conscious Experience. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (15–43)
    Editor/s Pllykkänen, P.
    Year 2001

  • Cognition without Representation?

    Published In Understanding Representation in Cognitive Science. New York: Plenum Press. (57–74)
    Editor/s Riegler, A. and Peschl, M.
    Year 1999

  • The Story of the Self: Narrative as the Basis for Self-Development

    Published In Critical Studies, Vol. 8. Ethics and the Subject. Amsterdam/Alanta, GA: Editions Rodopi. (61-75)
    Editor/s Simms, K.
    Year 1997

  • Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?

    Published In Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. (121–153)
    Editor/s Coates, P. & Hutto, D.
    Year 1996

  • The Mindlessness of Computationalism: The Neglected Aspects of Cognition

    Published In New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence. (201-211)
    Editor/s Pyllkkänen, P. and Pyllkkö, P.
    Year 1995

Book Reviews

  • Andy Clark’s Surfing Uncertainty

    Published In Australasian Journal of Philosophy (DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1274769)
    Year 2017 (Forthcoming)

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

    Published In Topoi. 35:617-626
    Year 2016

  • Anthony Chemero’s Radically Embodied Cognitive Science

    Published In The Philosophical Quarterly. 65:260. 572-576
    Year 2015

  • S. Mulhall’s The Self and its Shadows

    Published In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
    Year 2014

  • Edouard Machery’s Doing without Concepts

    Published In Philosophy in Review. 33:2. 142-145
    Year 2013

  • David Chalmers’s The Character of Consciousness

    Published In Philosophy, 87:02. 298-306
    Year 2012

  • Richard Menary’s The Extended Mind

    Published In Analysis, 71:4. 785-787
    Year 2011

  • Gregory Currie’s Narratives and Narrators

    Published In Times Literary Supplement, 4 March
    Year 2011

  • Christopher Hill’s Consciousness

    Published In Philosophy, 86:303-308
    Year 2011

  • William Ramsey’s Representation Reconsidered

    Published In Philosophical Psychology, 24:1. 135-139
    Year 2011

  • Radu J. Bogdan’s Predicative Minds

    Published In Mind, 119:476. 1141-1145
    Year 2010

  • Aaron Preston’s Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion

    Published In Philosophical Investigations, 33:2.1 87–191
    Year 2010

Funded Projects

  • Minds in Skilled Performance: Explanatory Framework and Comparative Study

    Awarded by Australian Research Council (ARC)
    Funding Scheme Discovery Projects
    Collaborating With Linfield College USA, University Of Memphis
    Year 2017

  • Narrative Practices in Therapy

    Awarded by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
    Year 2015

  • Management of the Self: A Humanities Approach to Self-Management in Psychiatry and Psychosomatic Medicine

    Awarded by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)
    Collaborating With Radboud University Nijmegen (Lead investigator: Prof. Marc Slors); University of Amsterdam
    Year 2015

  • Literary in Life: Exploring the Boundaries between Literature and the Everyday project

    Awarded by Academy of Finland
    Collaborating With University of Tampere (Lead investigator: Dr. Mari Hatavara); University of Jyväskylä; University of Helsinki
    Year 2015

  • Agency, Normativity and Identity

    Awarded by Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Research
    Collaborating With University Carlos III, Madrid (Lead investigator: Prof F. Broncano); University of Granada; University of Sevilla
    Year 2012

  • Towards an Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity

    Awarded by Marie Curie Initial Training Network, FP7
    Collaborating With University of Heidelberg (Lead investigator: Prof Thomas Fuchs); University of San Sebastian (Lead investigator: Prof Ezequiel Di Paolo); University of Aarhus; University of Copenhagen; University of Munich; University of Parma; University of Portsmouth
    Year 2011

  • Embodied Virtues and Expertise

    Awarded by Australian Research Council (ARC)
    Funding Scheme Discovery Projects
    Collaborating With Macquarie University
    Year 2010

  • Social Cognition and Social Narrative

    Awarded by European Science Foundation (ESF)
    Collaborating With University of Memphis; University of Copenhagen
    Year 2008

  • Narrative Alternatives to Theories of Mind

    Awarded by European Science Foundation (ESF)
    Collaborating With University of Memphis
    Year 2007

  • Folk Psychological Narratives

    Awarded by Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK
    Year 2005

  • Narratives and Understanding Persons

    Awarded by Royal Institute of Philosophy, UK
    Year 2005

  • Composing Ourselves

    Awarded by Mind Association UK
    Year 2004

  • Mental Simulation

    Awarded by National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), USA
    Collaborating With University of Missouri
    Year 1999

  • Beyond Physicalism

    Awarded by Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRC), UK
    Year 1998

Research Supervision: Current

  • Enriching Radical Embodied Cognition: Can Radical Enactivism and Ecological Psychology Work Together to Explain Adaptive Behavior?

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

  • Phenomenal Perceptual Experience: The Case of Colour

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

  • Interactionist Moral Character

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

  • Investigating and Social Cognition: Is Inference Central to the Best Explanations of Cognition?

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

  • It is Possible to Unify Dynamical Modeling and Mechanistic Explanation?

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

  • Rethinking the Cogs of Cognition: A Critical Assessment of Functionalism in light of Cognitive Science's Interactive Turn

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Research Supervision: Completed

  • Methods, Goals and Metaphysics in Contemporary Set Theory

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2016

  • Pretence: Role of Representations and Intersubjectivity?

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2015

  • Born Again: Natality, Normativity and Narrative in Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2013

  • The Epistemology of Know How

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2013

  • Information-Theoretic Models of Social Interactions

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2012

  • Re-Thinking the Extended Mind

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2010

  • Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2006

  • Subjectivity and Consciousness

    Degree Doctor of Philosophy
    Awarded 2005

  • Pyrrhonism: Philosophy or Therapy?

    Degree Master of Philosophy
    Awarded 2004