Google Scholar
Citation indices | All | Since 2012 |
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Citations | 3311 | 2338 |
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Citation indices | All | Since 2012 |
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Citations | 3311 | 2338 |
h-index | 24 | 21 |
i10-index | 60 | 44 |
Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless, purely embodied and enactive, and culturally scaffolded, content-involving forms of cognition. Hutto and Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. This book breaks new ground: It shows how how a radically enactive approach to mind be fruitfully allied with theories of cognition that appeal to predictive processing, autopoietic sense-making and ecological affordances. It further explicates the core idea of a contentless kind of Ur-intentionality and demonstrates how this form of intentionality can be understood in terms of biological proper functions, without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. Answering critics, it explains how properly contentful minds can arise in a kinky way, through socio-culturally scaffolding, with out introducing breaks into nature. Most dramatically, Hutto and Myin offer a new vision of neurodynamics, defending and developing their signature view that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In all, Hutto and Myin propose offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers the right resources for understanding the multi-faceted, and otherwise puzzling, character of quintessential cognitive phenomena.
“A growing paradigm, this theory is endorsed by an increasing number of cognitive science and neuroscience researchers …the authors present … a secure path for
satisfactorily naturalizing every human cognitive capacity, leaving nothing to metaphysical mystery or scientific inscrutability”
- Choice
“an empirically informed and admirably
clear explication ... a compelling vision of psychological evolution,
with which anyone thinking about the emergence of the different
varieties of mentality must reckon.”
- Helen Steward, Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action, University of Leeds
"The next phase of this debate in the
philosophy and sciences of cognition will be based on the substantial
development of the view embodied in this book.”
- Paul E. Griffiths, Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney
Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness
One of the most original contributions to
the already vast literature in recent philosophy of mind ... a
convincing positive theory ... No collection in modern philosophy of
mind is complete without this ground breaking book.
- Choice
a great little book ... its implications are profound
- Minds and Brains
offers so much .. Anyone with even the
slightest interest in theoretical cognitive science cannot ... ignore
the issues raised herein
- Journal of Cognitive Computing
clarity of purpose makes Radicalizing Enactivism a uniquely effective anti-representationalist manifesto
- Language Sciences
a thorough and rigorous criticism of
classical and contemporary analytical theories of content ... [shows]
in a remarkable way, the plausibility and relevance of their approach.
- Intellectica
engages philosophers on both sides of the
representationalist/anti-representationalist divide with well
structured, compelling argument
- Philosophical Psychology
Provocative ... compelling ... provides a justification for enactivist radicalism.
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
opens the door to a full new program of research within the cognitive sciences.
- The Philosophical Quarterly
a wonderful example how ‘research at the foundations' can be highly relevant 'at the surface’s many examples of daily practice
- InterAction
reshapes current philosophical thinking about embodied and extended cognition
- Evan Thompson, University of Toronto
a serious challenge to the status quo in the philosophy of mind
- Anthony Chemero, University of Cincinnati
a serious, painstaking, and genuinely hopeful book ... it identifies and methodically demolishes a key roadblock in the enactivist program.
- Shiny Pebble blog
Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans—our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons—are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In Folk Psychological Narratives, Daniel Hutto challenges this view (held in somewhat different forms by the two dominant approaches, "theory theory" and simulation theory) and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children acquire this practical skill only by being exposed to and engaging in a distinctive kind of narrative practice. Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal.
“Offers the field a promising basis from which to reorient itself”
- Science
“an instant classic in this important and relatively young field of study”
– Metapsychology
"changes the terms of this debate ...
can be read as a proposal for a rewarding empirical research programme
on the role of narratives in children’s understanding of action”
– Times Literary Supplement
"opens up new lines of empirical research
... should be read by all psychologists and philosophers interested in a
theory of mind”
– Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
“succeeds in telling a compelling
developmental and evolutionary story that integrates the available
empirical evidence from vastly different areas of research such as
developmental psychology, comparative cognition, neuroscience, cognitive
archaeology, and evolutionary psychology”
– Human Development
"brings long ignored assumptions to the
surface, and persuasively undermines them ... the debate about human
social cognition should forever be transformed in its wake.”
– Philosophical Investigations
“highly original and admirably wide
ranging ... tackles head on the really hard questions about the role in
mental life of symbolization, representation and rationality”
- Language and Cognition
“cogently argued, thoroughly documented
and stylishly written ... suggests the potential for research on stories
to bring together scholars from across the arts and sciences”
– Style
“the breadth and originality of its arguments makes it a key text for researchers interested in folk psychology”
– Philosophy in Review
“a fresh, timely, and
thought-provoking... has succeeded admirably in laying out a
comprehensive alternative to ‘theory of mind’ approaches”
– Peter Hobson, Tavistock Professor of Developmental Psychopathology, UCL
“an original and compelling contribution to debates about the human capacity to understand others”
– Ian Ravenscroft, Flinders University
"This collection is a much-needed remedy
to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet
viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to
cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which
the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch
out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues:
perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development,
social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from
Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often
lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the
current cutting-edge developments in the embodied and situated sciences
of the mind will want to read this book.”
- Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK
Contains commentaries by and 6
article-length replies to: Tim Crane, Shaun Gallagher, Peter Goldie,
Peter Hobson, Erik Myin and Lars De Nul, and Anthony Rudd.
“stakes out new and exciting territory
... an enthralling exercise in constructive engagement ... takes the
debate to a whole new level ... Essential reading.”
- Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh
“a marked contribution ... I recommend it.”
Alva Noë, University of Berkeley
“essential reading”
- Evan Thompson, University of British Colombia
“succeeds in steering this debate in new and interesting directions"
- Mark Rowlands, University of Miami
What is the true worth of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? Answers to this question are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" and "therapeutic" interpretations. In their place, it seeks to establish that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein regarded clarification as the true end of philosophy. It argues that, properly understood, his approach exemplifies rather than betrays critical philosophy and provides a viable alternative to other contemporary offerings. 1st edition (2003) sold out in 2005. Second, revised edition contains an additional chapter with replies to Read (PAS 2004, PI 2006) and Hutchinson and Read (IJPS 2006).
...one of the more important
contributions to Wittgenstein studies in recent years... a helpful
corrective to various current readings of his work.
- John Koethe, Mind
... a much-needed repositioning of theory
and therapy ... [picks] out the real implications of Wittgenstein's
philosophy from its misleading look-alikes.
- Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, University of East Anglia, UK
... a rare combination of philosophical
sweep and scholarly detail ... places Wittgenstein in a larger
historical context that sheds light on the unique significance of this
way of looking at the end of philosophy.
- Barry Curtis, Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Hilo
an original and compelling interpretation
that defends the continuity thesis ... remarkable for its mastery of
the existing literature and its acuity in making sharp distinctions.
- Avrum Stroll, University of California, USA
tackles a problem that is central not
just to the understanding of Wittgenstein but also to the
self-understanding of our subject ... brings the issue to life through
his extensive knowledge not just of Wittgenstein's work, but also of
other reference-points ranging from transcendental idealism and Hegel's
conception of logic to contemporary debates about the limits of
conceptual analysis.
- Hans-Johann Glock, University of Reading, UK
mastery of the literature and
contemporary debates is remarkable... moves with clarity and erudition
... will be of particular interest to philosophers who are trying to
find points of convergence between analytic and Continental traditions
- Kevin A. Aho, The European Legacy
Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books xxvi + 328 pp
Year 2017
Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books. xxiv + 206 pp
Co-Author/s Myin, E.
Year 2013
Publisher Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford Books. xvii + 343 pp
Year 2008 (Paperback 2013)
Publisher Basingstoke: Palgrave xii + 272 pp
Year 2003 (1st Ed.) / 2006 (2nd Ed.)
Publisher Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. xvi + 306 pp
Year 2000
Publisher Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. xiv + 252 pp
Year 1999
Published In Philosophia. 43(3)
Co-Editor/s Satne, G.
Year 2015
Published In American Philosophical Quarterly 50(3)
Co-Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
Year 2013
Published In Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3)
Co-Editor/s Herschbach, M. and Southgate, S.
Year 2011
Published In Exeter: Imprint Academic +400 pp / Journal of Consciousness Studies.16: 6-8
Year 2011
Published In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. + 224 pp
Year 2007
Published In Dordrecht: Springer. +254 pp
Co-Editor/s Ratcliffe, M.
Year 2007
Published In Bristol: Thoemmes Press. xiv + 287 pp
Co-Editor/s Coates, P.
Year 1996
Published In Style (In Press)
Co-Author/s Brancazio, N. and Aubourg, J.
Year 2017 (Forthcoming)
Published In Metascience (In Press)
Note Symposium on Morag, 'Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason'
Year 2017 (Forthcoming)
Published In Philosophical Explorations. 20:2. 209-223
Co-Author/s Peeters, A. and Segundo-Ortin, M.
Year 2017
Published In Synthese (DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1385-0)
Year 2017
Published In Synthese. 194:3. 827-846
Year 2017
Published In Argumenta (In Press)
Co-Author/s Satne, G.
Year 2017 (Forthcoming)
Published In Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology. 24:2. 157-167
Co-Author/s Gallagher, S.
Year 2017
Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 15:1. 21–41
Year 2016
Published In Constructivist Foundations. 11:2. 346-353
Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.
Year 2016
Published In Constructivist Foundations 11:2. 370-374
Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.
Year 2016
Published In Mind and Language Symposium, The Brain’s Blog
Note Helming, Strickland, and Jacob, 'Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief-Ascription
Year 2016
Published In Frontiers in Psychiatry (DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2016.00012)
Year 2016
Published In Philosophia. 43:3. 521–536
Co-Author/s Satne, G.
Year 2015
Published In Philosophia. 43:3. 505–519
Co-Author/s Satne, G.
Year 2015
Published In The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 53. 68–89
Year 2015
Published In Cognitive Systems Research. 34-35. 5-17
Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M
Year 2015
Published In Topoi (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-015-9358-8)
Year 2015
Published In Educational Psychology Review. 27:3. 371-389
Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M.D. and Abrahamson, D.
Year 2015
Published In Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric. 41:54 (DOI: 10.1515/slgr-2015-xxxx)
Co-Author Myin, E
Year 2015
Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 14:2. 309-331
Co-Author/s Sánchez-García, R.
Year 2015
Published In Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00706)
Co-Author/s Kirchhoff, M. and Myin, E.
Year 2014
Published In Sensoria: A Journal of Mind, Brain and Culture. 10:1 (DOI: 10.7790/sa.v10i1)
Co-Author/s Röhricht, F., Geuter, U., and Gallagher, S.
Year 2014
Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 13:2. 241-256
Co-Author/s Myin, E.
Year 2014
Published In American Philosophical Quarterly. 50:3. 281-302
Year 2013
Published In The Monist. 96:4. 585–607
Year 2013
Published In Consciousness and Cognition. 22:3. 1142–1151
Year 2013
Published In Adaptive Behaviour. 21:1. 142-150
Year 2013
Published In Review of General Psychology. 17:2. 174-178
Year 2013
Published In Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 36:4. 421-422
Co-Author/s Gallagher S., Slaby J. and Cole J.
Year 2013
Published In Emotion Review, 4:1. 176-181
Year 2012
Published In Emotion Review, 4:1. 66-67
Year 2012
Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18:5-6. 44-64
Year 2011
Published In American Philosophical Quarterly. 48:2. 129-145
Reprint Translated into French and reprinted in a special issue of Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage)
Year 2011
Published In Style. 45:2. 276-282
Year 2011
Published In Consciousness and Cognition. 18:2. 543–546
Year 2009
Published In Psyche. 15:1. 24-30
Co-Author/s Myin, E.
Year 2009
Published In Philosophia, 37:4. 629–652
Year 2009
Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies. 16:6-8. 9-39
Year 2009
Published In New Ideas in Psychology. 27. 197–212
Reprint Translated into Italian and reprinted (2010) in Un Filosofo Senza Trampoli: Saggi sulla fi losofi a di Ludwig Wittgenstein. Perissinotto, L. (ed) Mimesis Edizioni Milan: Udine. 147-178
Year 2008
Published In Philosophical Explorations. 11:3. 175-191
Year 2008
Published In International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 16:3. 419-444
Year 2008
Published In Linguagem, Mente e Ação, 10–19
Year 2008
Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 5:1. 75–88
Year 2006
Published In International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14:4. 561–567
Year 2006
Published In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 4:4. 389–405
Year 2005
Published In The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 13:1. 149–161
Year 2005
Published In Mind and Language. 19:5. 548-73
Year 2004
Published In Philosophical Papers. 32:3. 345-361
Year 2003
Published In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59:2. 381–401
Reprint Reprinted in (2013) Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. D’Oro, G. (ed). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 49-74
Year 1999
Published In Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy: Special Issue on Gareth Evans
Year 1998
Published In Dialectica, 52:1. 45–61
Year 1998
Published In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. XCVIII(III). 265–286
Co-Author/s Lippitt, J.
Year 1998
Published In Journal of Consciousness Studies. 5:3. 328–343
Year 1998
Published In Bradley Studies. 4:1. 82-96
Year 1998
Published In The Monist. 78:4. 464-478
Year 1995
Published In Philosophia, 21:1-2. 61-80
Year 1992
Published In Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge. (In Press)
Editor/s Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In The Routledge Handbook of The Computational Mind. London: Routledge. (In Press)
Co-Author/s Myin, E, Peeters, A. and Zahnoun, F.
Editor/s Colombo, M. and Sprevak, M.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (In Press)
Co-Author/s Myin, E.
Editor/s Newen, A. Gallagher, S. and de Bruin, L.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In Mental Representation. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press. (In Press)
Co-Author/s Myin, E.
Editor/s Schilct, T.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In New Directions in Memory. London: Routledge. (In Press)
Co-Author/s Peeters, A.
Editor/s Michaelian, K. and Debus, D
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind and Naturalism. London: Routledge. (In Press)
Co-Author/s Satne, G.
Editor/s Raleigh, T. and Cahill, K.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Co-Author/s Renshaw, I. and Kirchhoff, M.
Editor/s Cappuccio, M.L.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In Embodied Perspectives in Psychotherapy. London: Routledge.
Co-Author/s Gallagher, S.
Editor/s Payne, H., Tantia, J., Koch, S. and Fuchs, T.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In The SAGE Handbook of Theoretical Psychology. California: Sage. (In Press)
Editor/s Stam, H. and Looren de Jong, H.
Year 2018 (Forthcoming)
Published In Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press. (107-128)
Co-Author/s Satne, G.
Editor/s Durt, C, Fuchs, T and Tewes, C.
Year 2017
Published In Time and the Philosophy of Action. London: Routledge. (141-158)
Co-Author/s McGivern, P.
Editor/s Altshuler, R. and Sigrist, M.J.
Year 2016
Published In The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy of the Social Mind. London: Routledge. (208-221).
Co-Author/s Fiebich, A. and Gallagher, S.
Editor/s Kiverstein, J.
Year 2016
Published In Memory in the Twenty-first Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (229-237)
Editor/s Groes, S.
Year 2015
Published In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. London: Routledge. (291-301)
Editor/s Carroll, N and Gibson, J.
Year 2015
Published In Wittgenstein and Perception. London: Routledge. (64-84)
Editor/s O’Sullivan, M and Campbell, M.
Year 2015
Published In Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. (35-53)
Editor/s Garvey, J.
Year 2015
Published In Sexual Fantasies: At the Convergence of the Cultural and Individual. Hamburg: Peter Lang. (179-204)
Editor/s Larsson, M. & Johnsdotter, S.
Year 2015
Published In Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Dordrecht: Springer. (211-227)
Editor/s Scarinzi, A.
Year 2014
Published In Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (240-257)
Editor/s Fulford, KWM, Davies, M., Graham, G. Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G. and T. Thornton
Year 2013
Published In Encyclopaedia of the Mind. California: Sage. (320-321)
Editor/s Pashler, H.
Year 2013
Published In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave Macmillan. (55-74)
Editor/s N, Nottelmann
Year 2013
Published In Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (126-140)
Editor/s Lanjouw, A. and Corbey, R.
Year 2013
Published In Conceptual Analysis in Psychology: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (28-50)
Editor/s T. P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney
Year 2013
Published In The Hand – An Organ of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (227-258)
Editor/s Radman, Z.
Year 2013
Published In Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (49-74)
Editor/s D’Oro, G.
Note Reprint of 1999 PPR article with slight changes and a new afterward
Year 2013
Published In Knowing without Thinking: The Background in Philosophy of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (37-56)
Editor/s Radman, Z.
Year 2012
Published In Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (307-341)
Editor/s Seemann, A.
Year 2011
Published In Sehen und Handeln. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. (21-44)
Editor/s Bredekamp, H. and Krois, J. M.
Year 2011
Published In Coherence and Disorders of the Embodied Self. Stuggart, Schattauer. (43-66)
Editor/s Fuchs, T., Henningsen, P., Sattel, H.
Year 2010
Published In Against Theory of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (221-238)
Editor/s Costall, A. and Leudar, I.
Year 2009
Published In Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Vol. 2. Elsevier. (19-32)
Editor/s Banks, W.
Year 2009
Published In Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (357-9)
Editor/s Bayne, T., Cleeremans A., Wilken, P.
Year 2009
Published In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (17-38)
Co-Author/s Gallagher, S
Editor/s Zlatev, J., Racine, T., Sinha, C. and Itkonen, E.
Year 2008
Published In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (245-276)
Editor/s Zlatev, J., Racine, T., Sinha, C. and Itkonen, E.
Year 2008
Published In Narrative and Understanding Persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (43–68)
Editor/s Hutto, D.
Note also appears as Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 82: 60, 2007
Year 2007
Published In Folk Psychology Reassessed. Doredrecht: Springer. (115–135)
Editor/s Hutto, D. and Ratcliffe, M.
Year 2007
Published In Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (299–322)
Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
Year 2007
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (13-38)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Note Target Paper
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (45-64)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (81-105)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (121-149)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (157-177)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (185-221)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Radical Enactivism. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (231-247)
Editor/s Menary, R.
Year 2006
Published In Other Minds. New York: Guilford. (56–72)
Editor/s Malle, B. and Hodges, S.
Year 2005
Published In The Third Wittgenstein. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (25-41)
Editor/s Moyal-Sharrock, D.
Year 2004
Published In Post-Metaphysical Tractatus. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (127–49)
Editor/s Stocker, B.
Year 2004
Published In Understanding Emotions. Aldershot/Brookfield: Ashgate. (37–53)
Editor/s Goldie, P.
Year 2004
Published In Dimensions of Conscious Experience. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (15–43)
Editor/s Pllykkänen, P.
Year 2001
Published In Understanding Representation in Cognitive Science. New York: Plenum Press. (57–74)
Editor/s Riegler, A. and Peschl, M.
Year 1999
Published In Critical Studies, Vol. 8. Ethics and the Subject. Amsterdam/Alanta, GA: Editions Rodopi. (61-75)
Editor/s Simms, K.
Year 1997
Published In Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. (121–153)
Editor/s Coates, P. & Hutto, D.
Year 1996
Published In New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence. (201-211)
Editor/s Pyllkkänen, P. and Pyllkkö, P.
Year 1995
Published In Australasian Journal of Philosophy (DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1274769)
Year 2017 (Forthcoming)
Published In Topoi. 35:617-626
Year 2016
Published In The Philosophical Quarterly. 65:260. 572-576
Year 2015
Published In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Year 2014
Published In Philosophy in Review. 33:2. 142-145
Year 2013
Published In Philosophy, 87:02. 298-306
Year 2012
Published In Analysis, 71:4. 785-787
Year 2011
Published In Times Literary Supplement, 4 March
Year 2011
Published In Philosophy, 86:303-308
Year 2011
Published In Philosophical Psychology, 24:1. 135-139
Year 2011
Published In Mind, 119:476. 1141-1145
Year 2010
Published In Philosophical Investigations, 33:2.1 87–191
Year 2010
Awarded by Australian Research Council (ARC)
Funding Scheme Discovery Projects
Collaborating With Linfield College USA, University Of Memphis
Year 2017
Awarded by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
Year 2015
Awarded by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)
Collaborating With Radboud University Nijmegen (Lead investigator: Prof. Marc Slors); University of Amsterdam
Year 2015
Awarded by Academy of Finland
Collaborating With University of Tampere (Lead investigator: Dr. Mari Hatavara); University of Jyväskylä; University of Helsinki
Year 2015
Awarded by Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Research
Collaborating With University Carlos III, Madrid (Lead investigator: Prof F. Broncano); University of Granada; University of Sevilla
Year 2012
Awarded by Marie Curie Initial Training Network, FP7
Collaborating With University of Heidelberg (Lead investigator: Prof Thomas Fuchs); University of San Sebastian (Lead investigator: Prof Ezequiel Di Paolo); University of Aarhus; University of Copenhagen; University of Munich; University of Parma; University of Portsmouth
Year 2011
Awarded by Australian Research Council (ARC)
Funding Scheme Discovery Projects
Collaborating With Macquarie University
Year 2010
Awarded by European Science Foundation (ESF)
Collaborating With University of Memphis; University of Copenhagen
Year 2008
Awarded by European Science Foundation (ESF)
Collaborating With University of Memphis
Year 2007
Awarded by Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK
Year 2005
Awarded by Royal Institute of Philosophy, UK
Year 2005
Awarded by Mind Association UK
Year 2004
Awarded by National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), USA
Collaborating With University of Missouri
Year 1999
Awarded by Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRC), UK
Year 1998
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2016
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2015
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2013
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2013
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2012
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2010
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2006
Degree Doctor of Philosophy
Awarded 2005
Degree Master of Philosophy
Awarded 2004