This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Socialist Scholars Conference, Sydney, 28 September - 1 October 1990
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Since the Russian Revolution, most socialists have supported armed struggle to achieve or defend socialism. Yet historical events, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and war-making by socialist states, show the limitations of socialist militarism. Furthermore, there are strong theoretical objections to socialist militarism, including the undemocratic and patriarchal nature of the military. One alternative to socialist militarism is a socialism based on an organised system for popular nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression, called social defence. This alternative is built on popular participation, decentralisation and self-reliance and hence is quite compatible with democratic socialism. Importantly, the nonviolent methods of social defence are compatible with the goal of the defence, unlike military methods. Promotion of social defence seems to be a promising way to aid struggles against systems of domination.
Socialism has both an antimilitarist and a militarist tradition. Martin Shaw points out that antimilitarism was the dominant strand in the fifty years before the Russian Revolution, but since then military methods have been widely used and accepted as a means of furthering socialism. During this latter period, the problem of war received little attention from socialist scholars. It was only the rise of the 1980s peace movements that once again made war into a problematic issue .
Socialists have long attributed the problem of modern war to the workings of international capitalism. The classic work in this vein is Karl Liebknechts analysis of militarism dating from before World War I. Liebknecht also emphasised that military training serves to make proletarians act against their class interests and that the army is frequently used to repress people "at home," most notably workers.
The success of the Russian Revolution led many socialists to defend or condone socialist militarism to defend the revolution, while attributing the overall problem of war to capitalism. In addition, the success of armed struggle in a number of Third World countries, notably China and Vietnam, led many socialists to support guerrilla warfare in the name of socialism. Military methods have not generally been seen as a problem in themselves. They have been treated by socialists as a means, either to defend and promote capitalism or to defend and promote socialism. Yet the use of military methods to achieve or sustain socialism can be criticised on both historical and theoretical grounds.
Historical events certainly have shown the limitations of socialist militarism. First, guerrilla struggles have been successful only in Third World countries, usually those seeking independence from colonial rulers. There is no example of guerrilla warfare successfully challenging an established capitalist state.
Second, the development of weapons of mass destruction undermines the view that military means can be an acceptable means to any progressive end. Nuclear weapons may be used to defend socialism only at the potential cost of millions of lives.
Third, socialist states have shown themselves to be just as warlike as capitalist states. Since World War II, there have been no major wars between rich capitalist societies. On the other hand, the socialist world experienced the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, war between China and Vietnam, and continued military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union. Arguably, of course, capitalist societies have at least as bad a record in terms of military interventions and the promotion and propping up of military dictatorships . The point here is that state socialism has not provided any hint of a solution to the problem of war.
A key reason for this is that socialism developed in the mould of states, just like capitalism. Socialist states have relied on military forces to protect themselves internally and externally, just like capitalist states. Liebknechts analysis of the use of military forces for internal repression seems to apply to socialist states as well as to capitalist ones. In the face of capitalist militarism, "actually existing socialism" failed to challenge the foundations of militarism.
The rise of modern war can be linked to the rise of both capitalism and the modern state, a complex process that can only be summarised schematically here. War under feudalism in Europe was mainly carried out by mercenaries and had only an occasional impact on the peasantry. The decentralised economic system could not sustain large standing armies.
In order for the crown to develop control over recalcitrant nobles, larger and more permanent military forces were required. The developing capitalist economies provided surpluses that could be tapped to supply armies. The extraction of this surplus from the population required tax collectors and other bureaucrats. Militarisation and centralisation of power were central to the rise of the modern state, with its bureaucracy, administrative centralism and close relation to the process of economic extraction .
Looked at one way, militarism and the modern state are certainly linked to capitalism, whose surpluses can be tapped for the purposes of the state (and capitalism). But, from another point of view, capitalism is only one economic system - a convenient one to be sure - that can service the military and the state. The historical development of state socialism involved a challenge to capitalist social relations, but replaced it with another economic system that allowed central extraction to support the military and state.
The course of the Russian Revolution gives an idea of how this happened. The revolution was a largely nonviolent affair made possible by the collapse of discipline and loyalty in the Russian army resulting from the disastrous war with Germany. The early months of the revolution had a strong libertarian flavour, especially in the soviets of workers and soldiers .
Although a peace treaty was soon negotiated with the German government, the fledgling Bolshevik government had to confront an invasion supported by several capitalist states. This war of survival from 1918-1920 was crucial in the militarisation of the revolution. Trotsky took control of the disintegrating army, reappointed former Czarist officers to commands and instituted traditional military discipline.
This same period saw the triumph of a command system in politics. The Bolsheviks moved to smash independent political forces and instituted for themselves the principle of "democratic centralism," an exact analogy to military command. The later development of Stalinism was, according to some commentators, an accentuation of "command politics" rather than a qualitatively new development .
Most other socialist states resulted either from guerrilla wars or from Soviet conquest. In most cases, successful guerrilla leaders became the subsequent political leaders. In this way, the military model of command became the model for socialist development. The net result was that state socialism challenged capitalist social relations but not militarism, the state or the necessity of an extractive economic system at the service of central managers.
Of course, "actually existing socialism" was quite different from a truly democratic socialism, with less hierarchy and bureaucracy and more participation. Is such a socialism compatible with the military? Can military methods be used to promote democratic socialism? Historical examples do not prove the case one way or another. However, there are a number of theoretical reasons why a democratic socialism cannot be based on an authoritarian guardian of society and why, by relying on military methods, socialist struggles are forged in a mould of nationalism, centralism and male domination. It should, then, be no surprise that the result, in terms of propensity to war, is little different from capitalist militarism.
The military, as a form of organisation, is the antithesis of democracy. The key principles of the military are hierarchy and command. The most important lesson in military training is obedience to orders. The democratic practice of dialogue and debate is contrary to the structure of the military.
The system of military command is linked to the command economy that is characteristic of state socialism. In both cases the key decisions are made by planners at the top and implemented by workers at the bottom.
Bureaucracy, a method of organising work based fundamentally on hierarchy and the division of labour - essentially a command system - is the central organisational form in contemporary industrial society, being especially characteristic of both the state sector and monopoly capital. Bureaucratic organisation is fundamentally antagonistic to participation and equality, and hence to democratic socialism. A bureaucracy, with its hierarchy and command, is not an administrative but a political system, and as such can best be likened to an authoritarian political system - the only difference being that the latter relies ultimately on military force for its survival.
The military is the prototypical bureaucracy. To accept the military is to import bureaucratic principles into society. Indeed, methods of social control developed in Western military forces has been taken up by civilian bureaucracies .
As noted earlier, modern state bureaucracies had their origin in the need to extract resources in order to support military expenditures, as well as the state bureaucracy itself. The state thus has a continuing interest in an economic system that allows extraction of a surplus, both for capitalists and the state itself. This is directly linked to contemporary environmental problems. Methods of organising society based on local self-reliance in food, transport and energy - such as decentralised renewable energy systems, with maximum energy efficiency - do not lend themselves to extraction of a surplus for military or other purposes. Oil supplies can be taxed or commandeered for military purposes; this is not so easy with buildings designed on passive solar principles or towns designed for pedestrians and cyclists.
Another central characteristic of military systems is male domination. Young fit men are the main recruits to most armies, and military commanders are almost always men. Only in a few guerrilla armies do women play much of a combat role, and rarer still are female guerrilla commanders. This pattern persists in modern technological warfare, where brute strength plays little role. In principle, a woman is just as capable as a man of being a jet pilot or working in a nuclear missile silo.
In practice, the power systems of patriarchy and military command mutually reinforce each other. Men use their positions in the military to exclude women and maintain a male chauvinistic psychology to reinforce the military hierarchy . The invariably patriarchal nature of militaries adds weight to the argument that the military as an institution is antagonistic to democratic socialism.
There are, then, a number of reasons why a military is inherently incompatible with democratic socialism: the military form of organisation is itself undemocratic; the economic support for military forces is linked to bureaucracy and to an extractive economy detrimental to the environment; and the military reinforces patriarchy.
But is there any alternative? How can a democratic socialism be defended from its enemies without creating pressures for authoritarian politics? One possible answer is social defence.
Social defence can be defined as nonviolent community resistance to aggression as an alternative to military defence. It relies on methods such as strikes, boycotts, noncooperation, protests and setting up alternative institutions.
Social defence is founded on the assumption that no regime, however ruthless, can survive without the support or acquiescence of a large proportion of the population (including police and military personnel). If a significant proportion of the population withdraws this support, rule is impossible.
The idea of using nonviolent methods as a method to resist military aggression dates from earlier this century. Gandhi was a key figure, and his campaigns and ideas triggered much of the thinking on this topic . The first full development of social defence as a comprehensive policy was by British ex-officer and writer Stephen King-Hall, for example in his 1958 book Defence in the Nuclear Age. King-Hall advocated abandonment of Western military forces and their replacement by organised citizen resistance as a more effective way of countering the communist threat to the British way of life. About the same time, a number of peace researchers began developing the idea of social defence, including Theodor Ebert in West Germany, Johan Galtung and Arne Naess in Norway, and Gene Sharp in the United States. Social defence is also called nonviolent defence, civilian defence, and civilian-based defence .
To many people, the idea of nonviolent resistance to military aggression sounds nice but completely impractical. How could it possibly work? One of the prime tasks of the social defence researchers has been to mobilise both arguments and examples.
Gene Sharp is the most important figure in the study of nonviolent action. He has identified and classified 198 different types of nonviolent action, giving historical examples of every one, and has integrated this mass of data with a comprehensive theory . Only some of the historical examples of nonviolent action are relevant to defence against military aggression.
In 1923, French and Belgian military forces occupied the Ruhr due to Germanys failure to pay reparations. Military resistance was impossible, but a number of groups - especially trade unions - advocated nonviolent resistance to the occupiers, and soon the German government supported this. Civil servants, transport workers, shopkeepers, trade unions, the Social Democratic Party, and the press participated in the resistance, which was maintained for many months in spite of bloody repression. Although the German government, due to acute financial crisis, called off the resistance, outrage in France, Belgium and other countries over aspects of the occupation meant that its original aims were not achieved .
In 1961, French generals in Algeria staged a revolt in order to halt French government moves towards Algerian independence, and there was a possibility of an invasion of France. The revolt quickly collapsed in the face of massive nonviolent resistance. In France, ten million workers joined a one-hour general strike demonstrating opposition to the coup. Vehicles were placed in airport runways to block any invading force. Even controlling Algeria became impossible for the generals. Over half the transport planes and many fighters were flown out of Algeria by pilots who disobeyed their officers; others simulated mechanical problems. Many troops resisted simply by staying in their barracks. Other actions included losing orders and files and delaying messages. The rebel forces gave up without a single shot being fired on them .
In Poland in 1981 there was a military coup, staged with the tacit support of the Soviet government, to stem the growing challenge, spearheaded by Solidarity, to bureaucratic rule. In the aftermath of the coup, nonviolent resistance continued in the form of strikes, underground publishing and cultural events, and noncooperation. The continued resistance to military rule contributed to the eventual easing of martial law and to the 1989 changes throughout Eastern Europe .
Historical examples can only point to the potential for nonviolent resistance and certainly cannot prove the case for social defence. It is important in this regard that the popular resistance in every case was spontaneous. Social defence, it can be argued, has never been tried because proper preparations for it have never been undertaken. Nonviolent resistance to an invasion or coup can no more be expected to succeed without preparation than can an improvised army in which the soldiers have no training, no stock of weapons, and no plan.
What, then, would a prepared social defence system look like? It would involve setting up communication systems that would be difficult to shut down, such as a supply of short-wave radios for every member of the population. It would involve constructing factories so that they could be disabled by destruction of difficult-to-replace pieces of equipment (replacements could be kept in another country), so that even torture could not get production going again. It would involve considerable decentralisation and self-reliance in the production of energy, food and transport, so that aggressors could not readily control these vital functions by destroying a few vital facilities. It would involve widespread training in nonviolent techniques, including large-scale simulations. It would involve widespread learning of foreign languages and cultures, in order to facilitate fraternisation. It would involve developing links with opposition groups in countries from which aggression might stem.
A social defence system clearly could involve massive changes. It might well require just as large a social investment as now made in military defence. Thus, historical examples of nonviolent resistance only hint at what might be possible with a fully prepared social defence system.
But could even such a system succeed against the Nazis or against Stalinist repression? It is impossible to know for sure. Nonviolent methods were used against the Nazis, especially in Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, sometimes with success . But more important is the fact that there was a massive degree of collaboration with the Nazis. Resistance, whether violent or nonviolent, was the rare exception until victory by the Allies became a likely prospect. Again it can be said, social defence has not yet been tried. Similar comments apply to Stalinism except that, unlike Nazism, its collapse owed little to military methods.
There are some historical examples that show that nonviolent methods can succeed against severe repression. The Iranian revolution is a good example. The Shahs regime was supported by all the major powers, had a massive military arsenal, and employed secret police and torture on a large scale. Tens of thousands of peaceful protesters were shot dead by troops, but eventually the troops joined the revolution . Needless to say, the subsequent course of the revolution is not a victory for the principles of nonviolence. But the revolution itself shows that severe repression does not always win out against nonviolent methods. The key in this and many other cases is the loyalty of the regimes troops . This loyalty is more likely to be undermined when they are faced by nonviolent protesters than by partisans trying to kill them.
It spite of these arguments, it is natural to have reservations about the effectiveness of social defence. To keep things in perspective, it is useful to make comparisons with the strengths and weaknesses of military defence.
Military defence is basically defence of a territory, and protecting borders is crucial. Social defence, by contrast, is basically defence of the social fabric. It is designed to protect key features of a society, such as freedoms, justice and participation. Social defence is not very good at guarding borders; military defence is not very good at protecting freedoms.
Military forces can be called out by governments; popular participation in military decision making is limited. Social defence depends on popular participation. It can only be effective with widespread popular support, and is difficult to use to support oppressive features of society.
Military preparedness often triggers off military preparedness in other countries, thus justifying itself. Social defence provides no threat, in the traditional sense, to the security of other societies. It may, though, provide a threat to repressive regimes by encouraging nonviolent resistance by their populations.
Military defence provides no protection against nuclear attack; nor does social defence. But there is much less justification for using nuclear weapons against a society without arms.
Military forces are essential for military coups and military regimes. Social defence cannot be used for purposes of repression, but can be used against military coups and regimes. Given that military regimes prevail in many countries throughout the world, in open or veiled form, this is a crucial difference. While social defence may have limitations, these must be weighed up against the undoubted disadvantages of military defence.
Whereas the idea of social defence has been moderately well developed, there has been less development of experience in how to promote the alternative. A good portion of "promotion" has taken the form of raising the idea in various forums. Due to the efforts of committed individuals, several governments - including Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands - have sponsored studies of social defence. But government interest has been difficult to arouse. The Netherlands government planned to fund a series of ten studies into social defence, but ended up funding only one of the proposals made by an expert committee . In the United States, Gene Sharp and associates have made persistent efforts to interest government and military officials in social defence, with some success at the level of individuals but very little at the level of policy.
Another approach is to promote social defence at the grassroots, namely among peace activists, trade unions, community groups, feminists, and so forth . Efforts in this direction have been made in a number of countries, especially in Europe. Unlike the English-speaking countries, social defence has long had considerable salience in most Western European peace movements. For example, social defence is on the platform of the German Green Party. In October 1989, a social defence conference with over one thousand participants was held at Minden, West Germany. In the Netherlands, different groups in the social defence network focus on women, research, government officials and so forth. In Austria, pressure from social defence advocates led to introduction of a social defence component in the alternative service provided for conscientious objectors. In Australia, community-based research projects have been carried out on communication and social defence.
Initiatives so far must be considered small and tentative compared to what is required to bring about a substantial challenge to military methods. Nevertheless, both theoretical developments and practical experience are sufficient to show the radically different implications of social defence for the nature of society.
Social defence is inherently participatory. Unless a substantial fraction of the population joins the nonviolent resistance, it has little chance of success. This is quite different from military methods, which can succeed even without popular support.
All sectors of the population can contribute to social defence, irrespective of gender, age, knowledge or ability. Because the methods used are nonviolent, there is no premium on fitness or masculinity. The participation of groups marginalised by the military increases the total number of those directly involved in the resistance and also increases its effectiveness. It is difficult enough for commanders to get their soldiers to use violence against nonviolent men, and more difficult still against women and children.
A society that makes decisions in a participative manner can offer more effective nonviolent resistance. A society dominated by a set of elites is vulnerable, because the elites may be intimidated or coopted. The first thing an aggressor will do is to undermine leaders, for example by arresting them or winning their cooperation. A social defence system must be able to survive this sort of attack, and this is best done by use of networks, sharing of responsibility and skills, and use of participatory planning.
As noted earlier, nonviolent resistance to aggression will be more effective when workers have greater control over production and when there is greater decentralisation and self-reliance. Factories where workers can shut down production or easily tool up to produce alternative products are much more difficult to use by an aggressor.
Communications are crucial to social defence, both to coordinate resistance, to alert supporters in other countries, and to communicate to the people and soldiers of the country from which the attack stems. The most effective communication system for a military dictatorship is one-directional, and this is why military coups often start with occupation of central television and radio facilities. The most effective communication system for social defence is many to many, with numerous alternative methods of communication and high redundancy. Face-to-face meetings and electronic mail are models. The connection with democratic socialism should be obvious.
In summary, military systems, with their hierarchy, command and limited participation, are most compatible with authoritarian political and economic systems. By contrast, community-based social defence, with wide participation, decentralisation and self-reliance, is highly compatible with egalitarian political and economic systems.
In industrialised capitalist societies, few on the left today even endorse violence, much less plan for serious use of it. The reason is simple: the power of the state is so overwhelming that violent resistance is futile. That is certainly the experience of urban guerrillas, who have been singularly unsuccessful .
One of the reasons for this is the increasing power and sophistication of the technology of repression. Only a couple of centuries ago, the rifle, a technology used to control a population, could also be used to liberate it. It was, in a sense, a peoples weapon. Liebknecht pointed out that democracy flourishes when everyone can obtain weapons of equal value. But modern states underwrite research and development of technologies that are essentially weapons for the state alone. It is difficult to imagine liberation via tanks and saturation bombing, not to mention nuclear weapons. These are not peoples weapons in any sense. Their main use is inevitably against people, whether in the name of reaction or liberation.
It is partly an awareness of the futility of violence to topple industrialised states that is behind the renunciation of violence by many left groups today. But many still have an emotional attachment to violence. One reason for this is the apparent effectiveness of Third World guerrilla struggles.
In considering this issue, it is important to note at the outset that there has never been a systematic comparison of violent and nonviolent liberation struggles in terms of effectiveness or costs and benefits. Indeed, there is not a single comprehensive argument for violence available in the literature: Gene Sharps classic treatment, The Politics of Nonviolent Action , has no equivalent dealing with violent methods. Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that support for violent liberation struggles occurs largely in the absence of rigorous relevant evidence.
Those supporting these struggles can point to undoubted victories in countries such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, and Nicaragua. What are often forgotten are the losses such as Malaya, Uruguay, Bolivia, South Africa and Palestine. Also often forgotten are the massive human costs of violent struggles. In Algeria, for example, there were as many as one million deaths in the war for independence from France.
Supporters of nonviolence are not in a position to dictate to others who live under oppression what they should or should not do. Gandhi said that it was better to resist oppression violently than not to resist at all. The key point here is examination of alternatives. Nonviolence deserves just as much attention and development as violence, especially considering the tarnished record of violent liberation struggles and their connection with centralisation and male domination.
It is often said that violence must be used because nonviolence was tried and failed. This claim cannot be sustained. In fact, nonviolent struggle has seldom been tried to its utmost. Unlike military methods, its dynamics are relatively unstudied and undeveloped. No nonviolent struggle has yet been carried to the scale of suffering one million casualties, as in Algeria.
One seldom hears the claim that nonviolence must be used because violence was tried and failed. Yet that is the reality as often as not. In Palestine, the intifada succeeded in a way never achieved by violent methods. The multifaceted unarmed struggle mobilised the entire population . All could participate, women and men, shopkeepers and consumers, teachers and students, young and old. Previous violent actions had been the prerogative of small groups of men, with planning carried out in secret and much greater opportunity for misrepresentation and counterproductive results. The PLO, which was as surprised as everyone else by the intifada, reaped a credibility from its success never achieved through violent methods.
The other thing to remember is that guerrilla struggles are, first and foremost, political struggles. The classic liberation struggles involved many nonviolent methods, including providing services to communities, building of political networks, development of skills, setting up communication systems, and a full range of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and other forms of protest. Without these nonviolent methods, and especially the building of support from local communities, guerrillas have little chance of success and are seen simply as terrorists.
It is for this reason that social defence has been called the nonviolent equivalent of guerrilla warfare . Indeed, these two methods of struggle are very similar except for the use of violence. This is, of course, a big difference. The risk with violence is that the social organisation and weapons of liberation will turn into the social organisation and weapons of repression, as in Cambodia and elsewhere. The possibility of nonviolent liberation struggles is one of a search for alternatives that are participative, effective, and respectful of human life.
In a world in which numerous wars are being fought and in which there continue to be vast arsenals of weapons designed for mass destruction, it is illusory to imagine that violent struggles provide salvation. Violence is not simply a means to an end, but shapes the end. It is associated with secrecy, hierarchy, male domination, and systems of command. In almost every way it is antagonistic to the widespread participation, dialogue, and equality that are central to a democratic socialism.
There are nonviolent alternatives to the military, as yet quite undeveloped, but deserving of attention, experimentation, and improvement. The introduction of social defence, arguably, requires complementary changes in the economy, state, communication and technology, all in the direction of greater participation, autonomy, and self-reliance. The promotion of social defence cannot be treated as an isolated campaign, but needs strong links to other campaigns against systems of domination.
Nonviolent struggle has the advantage of being prefigurative: unlike military methods, its ends are embodied in its means. Many pacifists, for example, have emphasised individual resistance to militarism at the expense of structural factors, and this may make some on the left feel uncomfortable. The challenge is to develop nonviolent struggle into a truly revolutionary method .
1. Shaw, Martin, Socialism and Militarism: Remaking a Tradition, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Nottingham, 1981. See also Shaw, Martin (ed.), War, State and Society, Macmillan, London, 1984.
2. Liebknecht, Karl, Militarism, B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1917.
3. Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S., The Political Economy of Human Rights - Volume I: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979.
4. Jacobsen, Carl Gustav, "Arms Build-ups under Socialism: The USSR and China," in Gleditsch, N. P. and Njølstad, O. (eds.), Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics, Sage, London, 1990, pp. 285-294.
5. Jacoby, Henry, The Bureaucratization of the World, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973; Krippendorff, Ekkehart, "The State as a Focus of Peace Research," in Papers XVI, The Rome Conference, Peace Research Society, 1970, pp. 47-60; Porter, Bruce D., War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics, Free Press, New York, 1994; Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975; Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 , Blackwell, Cambridge MA, 1992.
6. Anweiler, Oskar, The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 1905-1921, Pantheon, New York, 1974.
7. Albert, Michael, What Is to Be Undone: A Modern Revolutionary Discussion of Classical Left Ideologies, Porter Sargent, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974.
8. Weinstein, Deena, Bureaucratic Opposition, Pergamon, New York, 1979.
9. Radine, Lawrence B., The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army, Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut, 1977.
10. Enloe, Cynthia, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives, Pluto, London, 1983.
11. On the history of social defence, see Keyes, Gene, "Strategic Non-violent Defense: The Construct of an Option," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 125-151. Early interpreters of Gandhi's methods include Gregg, Richard B., The Power of Nonviolence, Schocken, New York, 1966 and Shridharani, Krishnalal, War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and its Accomplishments, Victor Gollancz, London, 1939.
12. King-Hall, Stephen, Defence in the Nuclear Age, Victor Gollancz, London, 1958.
13. Important English-language treatments include Boserup, Anders and Mack, Andrew, War Without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defence, Frances Pinter, London, 1974; Burrowes, Robert J., The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1996; Galtung, Johan, Peace, War and Defense. Essays in Peace Research, Volume Two, Christian Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1976; Geeraerts, Gustaaf (ed.), Possibilities of Civilian Defence in Western Europe, Swets and Zeitlinger, Amsterdam, 1977; Randle, Michael, Civil Resistance, Fontana, London, 1994; Roberts, Adam (ed.), The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression, Faber and Faber, London, 1967; Sharp, Gene with Jenkins, Bruce, Civilian-based Defense: A Post-military Weapons System, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.
14. Sharp, Gene, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1973. Sharp's theory is open to criticism that it ignores social structures: see Martin, Brian, "Gene Sharp's Theory of Power," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 26, 1989, pp. 213-222.
15. Sternstein, Wolfgang, "The Ruhrkampf of 1923: Economic Problems of Civilian Defence," in Roberts, op. cit., pp. 106-135.
16. Roberts, Adam, "Civilian Resistance to Military Coups," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 19-36.
17. Randle, Michael, People Power: The Building of a New European Home, Hawthorn Press, London, 1991.
18. Semelin, Jacques, Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe 1939-1943, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1993.
19. Albert, David H. (ed.), Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution, Movement for a New Society, Philadelphia, 1980; Hoveyda, Fereydoun, The Fall of the Shah, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980.
20. The classic and still unsurpassed treatment is Chorley, Katherine, Armies and the Art of Revolution, Faber and Faber, London, 1943.
21. See de Valk, Giliam, Research on Civilian-Based Defence, SISWO, Amsterdam, 1993.
22. Martin, Brian, Social Defence, Social Change, Freedom Press, London, 1993.
23. The best source of ongoing information about such initiatives is the periodical Civilian-based Defense.
24. Oppenheimer, Martin, The Urban Guerilla, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1969.
25. Sharp, 1973, op. cit.
26. Rigby, Andrew, Living the Intifada, Zed Books, London, 1991.
27. Boserup and Mack, op. cit.
28. Lakey, George, Strategy for a Living Revolution, Grossman, New York, 1974; Martin, Brian, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984; Oppenheimer, op. cit.; Ostergaard, Geoffrey, Nonviolent Revolution in India, Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1985.