Hegemony: Explorations into Consensus, Coercion and Culture

A workshop at the University of Wollongong
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Panel 4
Culture and Hegemony

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Hegemony and the Sixties: observations, polemics, meanderings

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Hegemony and the Sixties: observations, polemics, meanderings

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It was in the 1960s that great interest in the work of Gramsci and specifically the theory of ideological or cultural hegemony was sown in the west.¹ Until then, the word “hegemony”, if used at all, was a synonym for imperialism. This “common sense” usage has returned with vigour more recently, reflecting both America’s status as the sole superpower and the bellicose policy drafted by the so-called “neoconservatives”.² Yet the two distinct uses of the term need not be seen as totally separate. They are, indeed, dialectically inter-related. We do not need to fall into the trap of the “internal colonialism” thesis to understand that domestic and foreign affairs are co-dependent. United States hegemony abroad is also and always about hegemony at home. Force, of course, prevails on occasion abroad and consent at home but elements of both can be found in the imperial project and domestic policies. The “hearts and minds” policy in Vietnam now being replicated in Iraq was and is insane but reflects the very way the two senses of hegemony are bound together.

Discussions of hegemony today, whether concerned with imperialism or the reproduction of capitalist social relations domestically, resonate (both consciously and unconsciously) with the politics and culture of the Sixties. It is time then to look more closely at the concept of hegemony through the lens of the Sixties. First, the scene will be set by examining the contemporary context wherein the Sixties is an ever-present force. Then various critiques of Sixties radicalism will be examined to assess whether the movements of the period were genuinely counter-hegemonic or simply prepared the way for the latest stage of consumer capitalism.

Not too far behind the surface of contemporary policy-making in America there lurks the Sixties. The first wave of neoconservatives had risen to prominence in the 1970s as part of a backlash against what they alleged to be Sixties excess, in particular libertine values which undermined the bedrocks of religion, family and community. Connected with this reaction was an attempt to reinvigorate American power abroad, highlighted most clearly in the Committee on the Present Danger and its warnings about American decline. The Kristols and the Podhoretzes sent forth their young and thus it was that a new wave of neocons took centre stage and began running the asylum. Their agenda was underpinned by the Sixties: by black and women’s and gay liberation, by alternative theories on education and social organization and everyday life, above all by Vietnam. In social policy, the neocons or their spiritual advisors want to roll back modernity in general but sixties morality specifically, while in foreign policy Vietnam is a constant haunting memory which fuels a “never again will we be defeated” mentality. In that way, Vietnam is not remembered but simply used as a bludgeon to bash a Democrat nominee for President, to discredit the antiwar movement and to set the framework for policy reversals in fields like abortion rights for women.

The attempt to construct an alternative society in the 1960s, to develop counter-institutions or to fashion a new way of life, was always regarded with scorn by conservative ideologues. It was seen as self-indulgence masquerading as social protest. Daniel Boorstin, for instance, in a 1968 essay characterised the new spirit of rebellion as one which stressed “sensation” rather than experience, and instant gratification rather than long-term vision. Similar propositions were put forward by other established scholars like Lewis Feuer and Edward Shils. Feuer’s study of student movements focussed on generational underpinnings of rebellion, with radical commitment being seen as one moment or passage in life. And like Boorstin, Feuer saw the young radicals’ commitment to community as essentially fake. Boorstin suggested they “deny any substantial community – even among their own ‘members’. Feuer noted that “it was a remarkable sociological phenomenon to watch

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a Vietnam Day Committee parade and see a Nobel Laureate in Physics marching in new found community with a nonstudent ‘drop-out’ activist” and also suggested that the young radicals would use issues as a pretext for forging a “community of the young”. For Shils, writing somewhat later, the radical commitment to “self-determination” was little more than a celebration of the individual who lived outside any traditions or conventions. Allan Bloom saw things in similar fashion and left readers of his best-seller in little doubt that Sixties radicalism was a primary factor in the decay of American higher education. This sort of perception is not confined to conservatives. More recently, Stephen Ambrose lamented the failure of radicals in the sixties to establish a political party of the left. Instead, they rushed into a series of self-destructive inducements devoted purely to pleasure. This, however, is really conservative critique with a radical pose. Others have developed a more authentic leftist analysis.

Most famously, Thomas Frank has detailed the degree to which advertising gurus and marketeers generally were hep to the jive, rendering the counterculture a moment in the growth of consumer capitalism. To some degree, Frank was specifically reacting against a turn in cultural studies towards consumption over production and the valorisation of various practices as counter-hegemonic. As interest in hegemony grew during the 1970s, there was a gradual shift in thinking away from a focus on cultural cohesion under capitalism towards resistances to it. Paradoxically, this shift reflected a left in retreat, particularly retreat to the academy. Having

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awakened from the utopian dreams of revolution in the 1960s, sections of the academic left sought solace in self-justifying theory; theory that elevated personal tastes and habits to a state of critical practice. Television-watching became an act of resistance and so, too, shopping and, indeed, anything that took one’s fancy and helped soothe the pain of dashed desires. The risk of valorising practises that sustain rather than confront hegemony is evident. In avoiding that risk, some critics have imagined that neo-liberalism is somehow an outgrowth of Sixties radicalism. This, however, is a misperception that at times reflects directly conservative critiques of the Sixties.

Clive Hamilton does detect sinister seeds in the sixties:

It is now becoming clear that the Sixties generation tilled the ground for the neoliberal reforms and ‘turbo-capitalism’ of the 1980s and 1990s. Railing against the conventions of their parents, the counter-culture tore down the social structures of conservatism that, for all their stultifying oppressiveness, held the market in check. The demands for freedom in private life, freedom from the fetters of career and family, and for freedom of sexual expression were noble in themselves, but it is now evident that the demolition of customary social structures did not create a society of free individuals. Instead, it created an opportunity for the marketers to substitute material consumption and manufactured lifestyles for the ties of social tradition.13

There is some merit in this argument but it is eclipsed by faulty reasoning. Firstly, it reduces the countercultural challenge to demands that do fit in neatly with a market mentality. Moreover, elements of almost any social tendency can be used for purposes contrary to the intention. As the Situationists understood, even protest against the society of the spectacle could be incorporated by the spectacle. And Hamilton’s argument tends towards silliness when he states that “Margaret Thatcher should be thankful to Alan (sic) Ginsberg and Timothy Leary” for their contributions to the destruction of social conventions which checked the power of the market.14 Leary, it must be acknowledged, was no radical and the same can be said of the drug culture generally. Ginsberg, however, was (at least periodically) an eloquent champion of causes and his political weaknesses flow less from his assistance (pace Hamilton, of a very limited kind) in laying the foundations of neoliberalism than from his tendency

14 Ibid., p. 111.
towards a pacifist therapeutic mode of resistance. The problem with the Frank and Hamilton propositions is that they are (or can be seen as) simple and unilinear when things do not work that neatly. Evidence to the contrary is simply missed or buried or judged irrelevant. Take, for example, the counterculture rejection of career. This, so it seems, paved the way for a flexible labour market. A nice try but the two are disconnected. There is not even much suggestion of a mirror. The fact that tendencies within the counterculture can sometimes seem to reappear in different guise, responding to different social pressures and different ideas, does not establish direct connections. It can and does reveal contradictions within cultural radicalism and it is to these contradictions that I now turn.

Cultural radicals in the 1960s formulated a living critique of bourgeois society, an at times potent critique that signified the possibilities of a creative alternative. Yet the intense subjectivity of that critique, which contributed to the dominance of style in everyday expression and social protest, generated numerous compromises with spectacular consumer culture. This sort of contradiction is not peculiar to radical subcultures but rather can be observed in subcultures generally. Thus working class youth subcultures in England post-1945 attempted to combine elements of traditional working class culture, in particular its argot and habit, with elements of the dominant culture, in particular its commodity fetishism. Traditional styles of speech and behaviour were mediated by new styles of dress, the possession of accoutrements like bikes (the function of which was partly symbolic) and the worship of celebrity heroes like Brando and Dean. Class experience was thus simultaneously reaffirmed and escaped; problems of adjustment to the social order were resolved in an imaginary way and rebellion was thus contained. This is similar to the contiguous adjustment and rebellion witnessed by Paul Willis in the classrooms of working class schools. The very adoption of rebellion in the classroom reflected an anti-intellectualism that helped confirm the pupils’ working class status. They thus learned to labour partly by rejecting schooling itself.

Cultural rebellion can function (much as Frank and Hamilton imagine regarding the Sixties) as the avant-garde of bourgeois lifestyle innovation. This was

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partly true of the 1920s, when American youth proudly challenged cultural conventions but remained politically conservative.\textsuperscript{17} Transformations in the cultural realm then suggested more a refashioning of lifestyle to accord to a new era of capitalism than it did the construction of an opposition. The increasing prominence of advertising in the 1920s helped rivet youthful experimentation to market trends in fashion.\textsuperscript{18} To some extent the way for this development had been paved by the Greenwich Village radicals whose bohemianism combined uneasily with socialism and feminism.\textsuperscript{19} Instead of prefiguring utopia, perhaps they provided lifestyle examples for the indigent bourgeois. Yet that is an overly cynical perspective because they, too, were caught up in contradictions and later developments did not negate (or simply absorb) their own significant contributions.

Cultural transformations in the period after the Second World War tended to assist a new dynamic of capital accumulation centred on consumerism. Television was significant in this (particularly through the creation of the teenager) but so, too, was the development of suburbia, This is not, however, to suggest that all manifestations of cultural change were functional, automatically, to the capitalist system but rather to place them within an overall context of shifting patterns of consumption and leisure. In reviewing Jack Kerouac’s \textit{The Dharma Bums}, a commentator for the \textit{Wall Street Journal} speculated that the Japhy Ryder character would soon settle down comfortably in middle America as “an account executive or a book-editor with too-expensive family, a white Jaguar, a collection of Maxwell Bodenheim poems, a Hammond organ, a hi-fi set and a mild delusion he is somehow shaping the world”.\textsuperscript{20} Yet the real life Japhy Ryder was beat poet Gary Snyder and he was to become a prominent participant in the Haight-Ashbury experiment and has never severed his close ties to the American radical tradition. Predicted compromises, sell-outs and capitulations do not always prove accurate. Those who fail to acknowledge the contradictions see only one side of the story. Thus folk music

aficionado Irwin Silber once argued that the capitalist system needed “the cultural revolution”. There is some truth to this. Things that might have been initially threatening to the Establishment, like rock music, very quickly became part of the Establishment. This is because they challenged the sort of decent social standards which restrained the consumerist dynamic within capitalism. More flexible social values were required by the new capitalism and it just so happens that radical subcultures helped fashion them. They engaged in other activities as well, however, ones not so easily identified with the latest stage of capital accumulation. Moreover, just because these more flexible social values were useful to capitalism or necessary to its latest stage does not mean they were intrinsically compromised. Capitalism, after all, can possess progressive characteristics. An understanding of the limitations of and contradictions within cultural radicalism historically can assist us to avoid exaggerating the potentialities of cultural radicalism today. And it can also warn against its summary dismissal.

Silber put it well when he noted that “the capitalist system transforms the energy and vitality of the radical movement into its own social necessity”. Thus hippies ostensibly despised the culture of consumption, yet embraced some of its tendencies. A New York feminist collective singled out a glaring contradiction: “hip culture imprisons women in the name of freedom and exploits women in the name of love”. In much the same way, Marcuse once argued that the tribal focus of hippies actually tended to spawn new forms of repression and selfishness which mirrored the dominant culture. But his reported suggestion that “the community can become acute only after the advent of social change and not before” suggested a rejection of prefigurative politics. Moreover, it established a standard differentiation between before and after, a weakness in strategic thinking highlighted by Gramsci’s stressing of the need to cement counter-hegemonic processes in civil society before any revolutionary assault on the state. That should not blind us to the strengths in Marcuse’s overall analysis, strengths that partly revolve around his injection of

22 Ibid.
24 Herbert Marcuse, quoted from a seminar at the Institute for Policy Studies, Berkeley Barb, August 4-10, 1967.
25 Ibid.
psychoanalytic theory into Marxism. Thus it was Marcuse more than Gramsci who understood that repression was not simply an institutional phenomenon and that consequently every revolution historically had been betrayed because it threw up structures of control similar to those dispensed with. Yet, Marcuse was to rethink his early negative perspective on the counterculture, as evidenced by both An Essay on Liberation and Counter-Revolution and Revolt.

Regular genuflection at the altar of commodity fetishism mediated the hippie critique of plastic, pre-fabricated, fast-frozen society. Yet the critique persisted. Processes of incorporation and negation did not always succeed in blunting the critical edge of cultural radicalism. Susan Krieger has studied the way in which San Francisco’s hip radio station KMPX was coopted in the late 1960s. Yet KMPX was never particularly radical and simply programmed the new music that other stations shunned. Experiments at the edges of mainstream culture should not be confused with projects that do offer genuine challenges. Nonetheless, Marcuse’s warnings about sexual rebellion can be applied more generally to radicalism. Desublimation can be repressive rather than liberating and so, too, the smashing of tradition can simply foster insidious new means of control and regulation. Hippies did arguably help unleash a process of “profound cultural disintegration and transformation” but perhaps the final terms of their endeavour could be set by the society of the spectacle. Antagonism towards the dominant culture was accompanied by the furtive embrace of that culture. While their celebration of leisure signalled an escape from bourgeois order and discipline, Christopher Lasch argued it also endorsed a bourgeois vision of utopia. He did not point out that this bourgeois vision had its own strengths as well as weaknesses – these days, indeed, such a vision seems almost inspired.

All youth subcultures resist, albeit often incoherently, the process which makes them part of the parent culture and, in that way, they reveal and act upon

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30 Richard Flacks, Youth and Social Change, Markham, Chicago, 1971, p.72.
contradictions in that culture. The social world confronted by the counter-culture was itself suffused with contradictions: there was the glamour of the spectacle and the turgid sameness of life itself; the idolisation of the individual and the triumph of mass society; the pursuit of happiness and the reification of pleasure; the reliance upon collective will (expressed cogently by the ideology of consensus) and the replacement of that will by images of politics and life manufactured by the mass media. The subcultural response to the contradictions was conducted primarily on the level of style and symbol. Style was a key fact because it enabled “the communication of significant difference” (even, if at times, an illusory difference) and thus of a group identity. As Stuart Hall once suggested, to some extent hippies “made the question of style itself a political issue”. Their lifestyle politics partly involved an endeavour to both reclaim urban community and strike out for the wilderness. This was prefaced by a critique of the Faustian ideals of progress which had increasingly ruptured human community and distanced people from the natural environment. The fact that this critique was somewhat incoherent does not lessen its significance and reaffirms the oppositional trajectory of much countercultural thought and practice.

John Sanbomatsu has developed a critique of what he calls “the expressivist aesthetic” in Sixties radicalism. It is this aesthetic (or, following Russel Jacoby, what could be called “the politics of subjectivity”) which supposedly underpinned both radical activism and radical theory in the period. Sanbomatsu reveals little interest in the activism, preferring to focus on the ideas. This, however, is problematic as for many there was a dialectical relation between the two. Thus the stress on feeling, on personal authenticity, on moral commitment, arose directly out of experiences within the civil rights movement. Without that movement connection, it can seem like therapeutic babble. Along with Julie Stephens, Sanbomatsu sees

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33 Dick Hebdige, Subculture: the meaning of style, Methuen, London, 1979, p. 102 (his emphasis).
37 Russel Jacoby, Social Amnesia: conformist psychology from Adler to Laing, Beacon press, Boston, 1975, pp. 101-118
postmodernism emerging out of Sixties radicalism. Unlike Stephens, however, he is not concerned specifically with the protest activity. This is peculiar, given his overall project of resuscitating Gramsci. You cannot hope to assess the legacy of the Sixties from a Gramscian perspective without confronting the many attempts to develop counter-institutions, alternative communities, the underground press, “free spaces” generally. These could be seen as concrete elements in a somewhat underdeveloped “war of position”, elements arguably weakened by an “expressivist aesthetic” but still ones which offered a challenge to the dominant culture. So where Stephens reports glowingly about the playful politics of subversion in groups like the Diggers, Sanbomatsu fails to address particular projects in any detail and thus tends to rely upon generalisation. The Diggers do not rate a mention but in a telling passage the Yippies do:

The expressivist aesthetic enabled a qualitative deepening of commodity logics in the lifeworld. Foucault’s call for an ethic of ‘care of the self’ would become the rallying cry of global capitalism, which was happy to oblige by engineering new desires and products for individuals in multiple niche markets. The Yippie cry “Do It!” had been transformed by the Nike Corporation’s detournement into “Just Do It!” while banks put up expressivist billboard ads like “Use your American Express Card. Win prizes. Scream uncontrollably.”

Dastardly clever thing, this capitalism, and to think that Sixties radicals furnished it with new slogans and styles, spectacularising the very spectacle they sought to overthrow. Sanbomatsu recognises that this is only one side of the story (in actuality it is much less than that) for a slightly earlier passage brings out the strengths of “the expressivist cultural habitus”, its unleashing of potent forces of imagination, and its exposure of systems of control and regulation in the fabric of everyday life. It did this and it ushered in a new stage of hyper-capitalism? Not quite.

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41 Ibid., p.49.
While Sanbomatsu is right to point to links, they are neither direct nor causative but rather indicative of consumerism’s power to incorporate almost anything. Take this ad for a retirement village:

In the sixties your generation championed some mighty causes. The Vietnam War, women’s rights, racism, the environment…you challenged each and changed the world for the better in the process. Now as you hit 50 you realise that there is one last wrong that needs to be righted.

The Retirement Village.

This publicity for Aurora developments does not constitute proof that Sixties radicalism opened the way for Retirement villages. Old age and the entrepreneurial spirit might have had something to with that. Yes, the ad is tongue-in-cheek with a dash of surrealism and a splice of merry pranksterism – advertising copyrighters can be clever and can even draw on oppositional (or sometimes pseudo-oppositional) currents to sell their concepts. A slogan like “Do It!” was less a call to arms than the title of a book by Jerry Rubin and Nike’s use of it (if there is, indeed, a direct connection) proves nothing but the capacity of spectacular society to transform any image or concept into something functional. Did the anti-globalisers create the dynamic whereby even images of shops being trashed could be used as selling points by the shops themselves? Here we are dealing with processes over which oppositional movements can exert no real power. There are, however, instances where such movements do directly compromise their opposition or exhibit contradictory tendencies. Compromise can be seen in the Sixties hippie marketplace. Ron Thelin, proprietor of the Haight-Ashbury Psychedelic Shop, once made the following plea on behalf of Zen finance capital:

What we are talking about is the evolution of a new culture, a new civilization. We have to find new means of exchange…I understand that money is energy and it has to flow, it’s a matter of channelling.42

Needless to say, Thelin and other hip proprietors did little to galvanise a counter-hegemonic spirit in the hippie communities. This was left to groups like the Diggers

but even they were suffused with contradictions. Thus the Digger ideology and practice of “free” (including its free stores) did on one level prefigure a society less obsessed with material wealth, less voracious in its appetite to turn everything into a commodity. Yet the free-store or free food in the park or the rituals of money-burning (also used by Yippies) were activities fuelled by the boom–time economic conditions. Moreover, these counter-institutions and rituals could display a marked insensitivity to the needs of the poor. One day some black women from the Fillmore District came into the Free Store and were surprised to hear everything was free and that they could take what they need. The women began to carry out piles of clothes from the racks until a worried Digger stressed they should only “take what they need”. One woman responded tartly “We can sell it to make money. We need the money.”

Evidence of aesthetic expressivism does abound in Digger ideology: “So a store of goods or clinic or restaurant that is free becomes a social art form. Ticketless theater”. Nonetheless, the Diggers’ Free City programme resonated with the spirit of counter-hegemonic practice, including free schools, hospitals and housing. Actual and projected counter-institutions were a vital part of Sixties radicalism and not all of them tilled the soil for rampant consumerism. Many were significant breeding-grounds for activists in the civil rights, antiwar, women’s liberation and environment movements. They failed in their revolutionary endeavours but their dreams of revolution kept alive a sense of utopian possibilities; and it was this sense that encouraged experimentation with the idea of the good society. As noted, the ideas and the activism often reflected contradictions. This is but one reason why generalisations about sixties radicalism have to be treated carefully. Critics of the movements tend to ignore, slide past or reconstruct the actual histories of political and cultural dissent, and end up providing a caricature. Sanbomatsu at times runs that risk, if only because his source material on the period is rather narrow. Thus when he writes of the privileging of “expression over strategy and practical outcome”, he certainly does capture one element of the Movement. There were those, however, very concerned to think strategically. An awareness of battles within the new left around 1965 and 1966, and specifically Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), over what might be termed

44 “Trip Without a Ticket”, The Digger Papers, p.3.
the Berkeley tactic – spontaneity, ad hoc committees, big protests – might have alerted him to the risks of sweeping pronouncements.\textsuperscript{46}

Certain forms of cultural radicalism, in particular, were susceptible to distorted characterisation partly because of their internal contradictions. Political radicalism was itself subject to media hype, whipped-up sloganeering and personality fetishism. Tendencies towards subjectivity and therapeutic consciousness were present in the New left, even in early treatises like the Port Huron Statement. It needs to be understood, however, that the subjectivity explored by the New Left was mostly of a different order from that mulled over within the various cults and therapies that flourished in the 1970s. It had a definite political framework and was not simply a quest for personal development. Parallel, counter- or alternative institutions were central to this framework but not as units of a grand theory. The escape from ideology and strategy was signalled early on. In 1961, Tom Hayden advocated a “radicalism of style” and a little later encouraged his fellow new radicals to “leave the isolated world of ideological fantasy” and “allow your ideas to become part of your living and your living to become part of your ideas”. \textsuperscript{47}Here, of course, is one crucial source for the later slogan “the personal is political.” Hayden himself owed a huge intellectual debt here to C. Wright Mills (who was, indeed, the subject of Hayden’s graduate thesis). Mills’ eloquent exploration of the dialectical relation between the personal and the political can be found in the first chapter of his 1959 book \textit{The Sociological Imagination}. And it is here we can find a still pertinent warning:

In every intellectual age some one style of reflection tends to become a common denominator of cultural life. Nowadays, it is true, many intellectual fads are widely taken up before they are dropped for new ones in the course of a year or two. Such enthusiasms may add spice to cultural play, but leave little or no intellectual trace.\textsuperscript{48}

One thinks immediately of sections of the Sydney left moving from Lukascianism to Althusserianism via Gramsci only to end up with Foucault or Derrida. Yet there is also that point about “one style of reflection” tending “to become a common

\textsuperscript{46} See the correspondence between those who ran the SDS Bay Area office and the SDS National Office in 1965, \textit{SDS Papers}, series 2A.


denominator of cultural life”. Here Mills, apart from sounding somewhat Gramscian, was predicting the triumph of “the sociological imagination”, an imagination which promises “an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connexion with larger social realities”.

Instead, of course, our time has been marked by the steady infiltration of neoliberal ideas and assumptions into the very texture of daily life, The connection between personal and political is thereby severed, except inasmuch as personal aggrandisement becomes a guiding principle of life. Despite an abiding interest in the Sixties, it has become a whipping-boy responsible for the breakdown of the family, the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, the proliferation of drugs, the general decay of morality and the decline of patriotic sentiment. The Sixties underpins the war on political correctness and the so-called culture wars. It underpins war in another sense, because in the wake of defeat in Vietnam the culture warriors also turned their attention to American power in the international arena. War in future, they implied or just argued, was to be won. No More Vietnams was stolen from the antiwar movement and turned into its opposite. Guevara’s call for “one, two, three, many” Vietnams now seems somewhat chilling. The world has been turned upside down and become so Orwellian that the Australian Prime Minister can use the term “Orwellian” with no sense of irony, just as Philip Ruddock likes to purchase cartoons that depict him in a scathing fashion. The narcissistic personality predominates in politics today and prospers by condemning sixties-inspired narcissism. Loyalty to god and country was trampled on in the Sixties and is in need of revival today – thus it is that the Iraqis must pay for the sins of the Vietnamese and the antiwar movement internationally. Iraq is not Vietnam – hardly a surprising geographical fact. It reverberates, however, with memories of Vietnam, something the Rumsfelds of this world and their supporters in journalism and academe do not want brought into focus. Vietnam amnesia sustains hegemony today, as do negative characterisations of Sixties radicalism.

In struggling for civil rights and against war, radicals in the 1960s also developed ideas about the good society. Such ideas tend to evoke at best a tolerant nostalgia. Yet, as Gramsci understood, they are the stuff of politics:
What ‘ought to be ‘ is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics.  

These days pessimism of the intelligence feeds pessimism of the will. Dreams of the good society have melted before a barrage of claims that no alternative exists. The task of confronting hegemony is also the task of reviving dreams and resuscitating memory.

The Tyranny of Victor’s Memory of War: Contesting legitimacy from Ground Zero

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The Tyranny of Victor’s Memory of War: Contesting legitimacy from Ground Zero

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Introduction
On the 6th and the 9th of August 2004, Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively held annual memorial services to commemorate the victims of atomic bombs dropped by the United States 59 years ago. Peace declarations by mayors of both cities and events related to the ceremonies did not gain much attention from foreign media nor raise much discussion in the international arena. The event which took place in Japan in 1945 was the first occasion in which “weapons of mass destruction” were used on human beings. Recalling this fact and also considering the popularity of the term around the world in the beginning of this new century, the absence of discussion linking Hiroshima, Nagasaki, atomic bombs, weapons of mass destruction, Iraq and the United States of America is quite peculiar.

The United States bombed Iraq on 20 March 2003 and launched a military operation in the country as a part of its so-called “war on terror”. They conducted the operation without United Nation’s consent by insisting on the danger posed by the Iraqi regime having “weapons of mass destruction” and the means to deliver them which threatened the whole world. Two months later, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations. Saddam Hussein’s “evil” regime was overthrown and at the very end of that year, the dictator was finally captured. Despite this, Iraq is far from a stable and secure country. Moreover, the existence of “weapons of mass destruction”, which supposedly provided legitimacy to the invasion, is yet to be confirmed and it seems it is unlikely to be ever found. Nevertheless, countries like Japan or Australia still firmly supports the Bush Administration’s policy without questioning its legitimacy. Why is that so?

The purpose of this paper is to show how the rhetoric used by the United States to legitimise and justify their policy of the “war on terror”, specifically the operation in Iraq, was constructed from a “victor’s memory” of the Pacific War. It also considers how voices contesting that rhetoric, especially from the defeated side of the Pacific War, were undermined. First, the paper demonstrates how the Bush Administration has tried to classify the world into two groups – good and evil – and tried to put the United States into a leading figure on the “absolute good” position. Secondly, how terms and events related to the Pacific War were appropriated by the Administration and by the media in its portrayal of the “war on terror” to enhance the legitimacy of the United States’ position is discussed. Thirdly, issues related to the Pacific War which were overlooked or ignored in the rhetoric of the United States are explained. Finally, the paper examines the reaction of Japan, the defeated country in the former war, to the now dominant victor’s rhetoric concerning the war in Iraq.

Strategy of “war on terror” campaign
The now on-going global war – “war on terror” – led by the United States of America is said to have started on September 11th 2001. Since that day up until the US Presidential Election in 2004, the Bush Administration has heavily promoted a campaign on the war to legitimise and justify its military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The strategy was simple. The United States tried to divide the world into two sides – good and evil – and to place themselves in “absolute good” and “absolute right” position.
One day before the strike on Afghanistan, President Bush made a Radio Address and stated:

The United States is presenting a clear choice to every nation: Stand with the civilized world, or stand with the terrorists. And for those nations that stand with the terrorists, there will be a heavy price (2001a).

The next day, 7 October 2001, he asserted “[e]very nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground” (2001b). Since then, statements delivered by the Bush Administration were firmly based on rhetoric aimed at dividing the world into two categories – good and evil. In order to imprint the image on people’s mind, some specific terms were chosen and statements were studded with those terms. On the one hand, positive terms such as peace, free, freedom, liberty, just, stability, prosperity, civilised and democracy were attached to the “good” half of the world. On the other hand, terror, terrorists, violence, enemy, intimidate, threat, fear, dictator, tyranny, oppressed and weapons of mass destruction, terms with negative image were used to describe the “evil” side of the world. These terms were used repeatedly in different speeches and repeatedly within speeches much like an incantation. The Presidential Address to the Nation on 7 October 2001 said:

I’m speaking to you today from the Treaty Room of the White House, a place where American Presidents have worked for peace. We’re a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it. We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfil it. The name of today’s military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear. (2001b) (emphases added)

This use of terms has persisted since then in messages delivered by the Bush Administration.

Along with this trend, the United States’ government started to base their legitimacy and justification of their past concerning international affairs. The Secretary of State Colin Powell who appeared at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 26 January 2003, about a month before the Iraq invasion, boldly addressed an audience of business leaders from around the world in a speech based on this rhetoric of US benevolence. He started the speech by referring to America’s “responsibilities in the world” and listing up their past “good deeds” in the world. He mentioned:

Afghanistan’s leaders and Afghanistan’s people know that they can trust America to do just this, to do the right thing. The people of Bosnia, the people of Kosovo, of Macedonia – they too know that they can trust us to do our jobs and then leave. We seek nothing for ourselves other than to help bring about security for people that have already suffered too much. (2003a)

And Powell’s “good deeds list of America” continues. Kuwait, Africa and Latin America were on the list and Europe which was helped by the United States “to rescue” itself “from the tyranny of fascism” was also listed. Later in the question time, the Secretary proudly answered “… I don’t think I have anything to be ashamed of or apologize for with respect to what America has done for the world.”

Two days later in Washington, President Bush delivered the State of Union Address at the US Congress. After pointing out “the gravest danger” the world is facing is the possibility of terrorists to possess “weapons of mass destruction” and use them, he echoed Powell’s aggressive line.

This threat is new; America’s duty is familiar. Throughout the 20th century, small groups of men seized control of great nations, built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate the weak and intimidate the world. In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and murder had no limit. In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism were defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of the United States of
peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of the United States of America. (2003a)

Before concluding his speech the President asserted;

Americans are a resolute people who have risen to every test of our time. Adversity has revealed the character of our country, to the world and to ourselves. America is a strong nation, and honourable in the use of our strength. We exercise power without conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers. (2003a)

As Christian Reus-Smit points out “[p]olitical elites invoke select moments in the past to license their preferred policies and strategies” (2004, p. 71). “Political elites” in Washington have shown their absolute confidence in their record in the past and this rhetoric still continues. This is functioning to forge the heroic image of the United States domestically and internationally and a question “has the US really always done a right thing?” hardly comes into a mainstream discourse.

Reflection of a memory of the Pacific War on “war on terror”

In order to strengthen the Bush Administration’s simple but overwhelming rhetoric on the “war on terror”, terms and phrases which remind people of the Pacific War, the war when the United States was on the victor’s side, are repeatedly used by the Administration. First, it was the media which picked up those words. Then, the Bush Administration took advantage of its victor’s heroic image at the war and tried to reflect the image on itself facing a “new war”.

Observing the media reports in the United States right after the September 11th attacks, John Dower pointed out “the immediate reaction to the terror of the September 11th in America was to recall the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on 7th December 1941” (Dower 2001, p. 8). The term “Pearl Harbor” and “a day of infamy”, which was a term mentioned by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his speech on the next day of the Pearl Harbor attack to describe the day (1941), were seen in almost every where in the media. Taking examples from “Pearl Harbor”, on 12th September, editorial of The Wall Street Journal put its title as “A Terrorist Pearl Harbor” and asserted “[t]he world is a different place after the massive terrorist attacks on the United States yesterday, much as it was after the bombing of Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years ago …” (2001). Tom Shales of The Washington Post reported “… it may have left the nation feeling more vulnerable and victimized than any single day since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941” (2001).

This symbolic term immediately spread into the public. A person who was interviewed on the street by CBS News told the reporter “[i]t’s another Pearl Harbor for this country” (Osgood File 2001). The media outside the United States also followed this trend. In Australia, The Sydney Morning Herald wrote “[t]he US was at war, as every official noted, just as it was when Japan bombed Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941” (Alcorn 2001) and The Australian recorded “[l]ike the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbour, this will irrevocable change the national psyche, and the consequences for America’s world view cannot be known” (Eccleston 2001). CNN correspondent in London reported “[h]ere in England talking to taxi drivers, people on the streets, people are using the analogy to Pearl Harbor” (Live at Daybreak 2001)

Then, in the State of Union Address in 2002 (Bush 2002), Bush used the term “axis” of evil which recalls the “evil” side of the former world war (Chomsky 2003, p.128). Late in that year, came the “implementing democracy in Iraq in the post-war Japan’s style” rhetoric. First it was about the

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1 This comment of Dower appeared in the forward to the re-published Japanese version of War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War and is my translation. Texts in this paper originally in Japanese are all translated by myself if not mentioned.
strategy of occupation in Iraq after a military operation which was under discussion then. Later, it became the most favoured parable of the White House. *The New York Times* revealed a story of senior administration officials of the Bush Administration on 11 October saying “[t]he White House is developing a detailed plan, modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an American-led military government in Iraq if the United States topples Saddam Hussein …” (Sanger and Schmitt 2002).

Immediately after this report, several critiques of the plan appeared in the media. In the *Los Angeles Times*, “[t]his plan won’t work for the simple reason that Iraq is not Japan” said Chalmers Johnson (2002). John Dower wrote “[d]oes America's successful occupation of Japan after World War II provide a model for a constructive American role in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq? The short answer is no” (2002). Ian Buruma in *The Guardian* asserted “[i]t has been suggested that General Tommy Franks would govern Iraq, just as MacArthur had once governed Japan. The merits or demerits of “regime change” aside, this strikes me as an absurd comparison” (2002). The *Boston Herald* was kind enough to suggest to the administration “[i]nstead of the archives of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s Tokyo headquarters, U.S. planners should be consulting with experts on Iraq, the Arab world and the Middle East” (2002). All critics equally pointed out unlike Iraq, democracy pre-existed in Japan, the head of the nation, Emperor Hirohito, was supporting MacArthur and there was no severe ethnic and religious conflicts in Japan.

Whether the Bush Administration was convinced by those critiques or not, they took a different strategy in its occupation of Iraq after its successful invasion in March 2003. However, the idea that the United States’ occupation had resulted in Japan being democratised and becoming a “good” friendly nation became a favourite parable for Bush specifically during his Presidential Campaign in 2004.

In his remarks at the Victory 2004 Rally, President Bush repeatedly presented this parable (Moriyasu 2004, Sanger 2004, *Sankei* 2004b). It went as follows:

I believe in the power of liberty because I have worked closely with Prime Minister Koizumi, who I also will be working with today. Think about this for a minute. When you hear the sceptics and doubters talk about our policies, think about the fact that I sit down with the Prime Minister of Japan as a friend. And it wasn’t all that long ago that my dad and your dads and grandfathers were fighting the Japanese as a sworn enemy. And after that war was over, fortunately, Harry Truman, and other American citizens believe that liberty could transform an enemy into an ally, and work with Japan to develop a Japanese style democracy. And as a result of that faith in the power of liberty, today I sit down with Prime Minister Koizumi – tomorrow I actually sit down with him – and talk about keeping the peace, talking about the peace that we all yearn for. Liberty is powerful. Someday an American President is going to be sitting down with the duly-elected leader of Iraq talking about the peace. (Bush 2004)

It is doubtful whether Koizumi became more famous in the United States because of this parable (Moriyasu 2004) or whether any detail of this story was remembered by US citizens. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to believe that the parable left a slight memory within the public that the United States did something good in the past somewhere in the “savage” Orient by implementing democracy as a result of the war they had won. This will enhance the country’s image of “always doing the right thing”.

**Erasure of an incident in the victor’s memory of the Pacific War**

There exists an event in the Pacific War which was overlooked or almost ignored in the campaign for the “war on terror”. Although the terms “ground zero” and “weapons of mass destruction” which are strongly connected to the Pacific War appeared in the media and in the Bush Administration’s
messages through the the campaign, the connection was hardly mentioned. In the victor’s memory of the war, incidents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were invisible.

Right after the September 11 incident, the term “ground zero” became capital lettered “Ground Zero” without notice and became a term particularly referring to the site of the World Trade Center. The shocking scene of the twin tower’s fall was watched worldwide on live television. It was shown repeatedly afterwards and the sentiment of the people around the world integrated into that very site. Reports from the site flooded the media. Reporters said that they were at “Ground Zero” (Evening News 2001, Special Report 2001, All Things Considered 2001). The term “Ground Zero” was imprinted on people’s mind. In the shadow of this creation of memory, the fact that the term “ground zero” initially meant Hiroshima, Nagasaki and other nuclear explosion sites was almost forgotten (Chikushi 2004a). Noam Chomsky commented:

The interesting thing is that here, almost nobody thinks of it (ground zero meant Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Check around. I mean, I’ve never seen a comment in the press or the massive commentary on this that points that out. It’s just not in people’s consciousness. (2003) (inside brackets added)

Thus, “ground zero” was disconnected from the original sites. This disconnection also weakens the connection between “ground zero” in the past and the United States.

Another peculiar disconnection was recognised between Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the now famous term “weapons of mass destruction”. As it was voted as “2002 word of the year” in the United States by the American Dialect Society (APN 2003), the term was widely used in the political field, in the international arena, in the media and in everyday discourse since the Bush Administration had insisted on legitimacy to attack Iraq was this Middle East country to have a deadly “weapons of mass destruction” which may handed to terrorist groups. In the famous “axis of evil” speech, President Bush insisted “[b]y seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger” (2002). He added “The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” One year later, the intensity of the message from the President was enhanced. His address was focused clearly on Iraq, Saddam the dictator and disarmament of the evil regime (2003a). About a week later, the most crucial remark concerning “weapons of mass destruction” from the United States was made by Colin Powell at the United Nations Security Council. “Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction” said the Secretary of the State (2003b). One and a half year later. Powell told the Senate Committee “it’s unlikely that we will find any stockpiles” (Mohammed 2004) and “some of the sourcing that was used to give me the basis upon which to bring forward that judgement to the United Nations were flawed, were wrong” (AFP 2004). Thus, it is indeed highly important to contest the legitimacy and justification for the United States to invade Iraq from this aspect.

At the same time, the operation should be contested from another important perspective that is the connection between the United States and their “weapons of mass destruction”. When the United States refer to disarmament of “rogue states”, it is necessary for the international community to recall the United States was the first state to use “weapons of mass destruction” on human beings. Moreover, it is the state which is still holding and producing nuclear weapons (Akiba 2004, Chikushi 2004a, Itoh 2004). Then, is there any legitimacy for a country with such a record to discipline other “rogue sates”? (Asahi 2004a, Mainichi 2004, Nikkei 2004) This fact is merely raised in the discussion of “weapons of mass destruction” in the present discourse. It is partly because what had happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki nearly 60 years ago was ignored in the victor’s memory of the Pacific War. The United States has always been reluctant to inform the devastated situation of grounds zeros in Japan to the public as it is obvious in the case of exhibition of Enola Gay, a B-29
bomber which dropped atomic bomb on Hiroshima, at the National Air and Space Museum of Smithsonian. Fully reassembled Enola Gay was put to exhibition in 2003. The display raised an anger of the atomic bomb survivors, since it neither mentioned the number of casualties nor showed pictures of ground zero (ABC 2003, Asahi 2003, BBC 2003). For the museum, this was the second time it was involved in a controversial circumstance regarding the display of the Enola Gay. In 1995, a part of the bomber was displayed and it was planned to coincide with an exhibition concerning atomic bomb. However, because of the harsh response from veterans, the plan was put aside and the then director of the museum had to resign (Asahi 2003).

The incidents in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are interpreted as “the act hastened the war’s end and saved thousands of lives”, whereas some people say it was the act “one of the world’s worst war crimes” (BBC 2003). In spite of this fact that the legitimacy of the use of “weapons of mass destruction” nearly 60 years ago is undecided yet, for those who advocates the victor’s memory of the war the debate has never existed.  As Chomsky remarks “defeated countries are forced to pay some attention to what they did. Victors never are” (2003).

Reaction from the defeated side – Japan
Ironically, the only country, Japan, which is in the position to raise the question of “weapons of mass destruction” relating them to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and then to ask the legitimacy of war in Iraq appears to be very ambiguous in this matter. Very little discussion has occurred within the country concerning the United States’ use of victor’s memory of the Pacific War. Its almost passive behaviour towards the phenomenon gives the impression that Japan was passively accepting the rhetoric and perhaps even supporting it.

First, it is appropriate to bring up again the parable which President Bush was so attached to. A few Japanese newspapers reported that the President had been referring to Prime Minister Koizumi frequently during his Presidential campaign in the context of democratising the Middle East (Asahi 2004b, Moriyasu 2004, Sankei 2004b). However, none of them argued the legitimacy of the analogy between Japan 60 years ago and Iraq in this new century. Articles rather sounded quite excited that their Prime Minister’s name was mentioned by the President of the United States – the only super power in the world – and seemed delighted to achieve recognition in the United States and maybe in the international arena. The Prime Minister himself, in the meantime, seemed to be very happy about this incident. He was asked by Bush at the summit meeting in September if it was all right for the President to keep mentioning Koizumi’s name during his campaign and Koizumi consented willingly (Sankei 2004b).

This passive and somewhat obedient behaviour of Japan towards the United States cannot be explained without mentioning its close relation to the United States. It is true, as President Bush kept insisting on in his campaign, that under the United States’ supervision Japan had adopted a new democratic constitution. However, what they left in Japan was not only democratic constitution and parliament as he said. The legacy of the United States still lingers on in various aspects of Japanese society. The most significant area is national defence and security. President Bush proudly said “[a]fter defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies” (2003b). But this is not true. In Japan, the occupation by the General Headquarters lasted for 6 years and it was not until 1972 that Okinawa was restored to Japan. Moreover, even today in the 21st century, US military forces are stationed in the country. Also, the course of Japan’s rearmament in 1950s took place in the will of the United States which was then under the circumstance of the Cold War (Furukawa 2003). This is highly ironical considering the fact that Japan was disarmed by the United States right after the war. As tone of the “war on terror” advocated by the United States rises, Japan’s Self Defence Force’s capability is increased and now Japan is facing a very controversial moment whether to amend their pacifist constitution – and the United States is supporting this movement (Furukawa 2003, McCormack 2004).
Indeed, in this structure, including the “nuclear umbrella”, Japan was protected during the Cold War. However, because this structure and the rhetoric based on this structure have deeply penetrated into Japanese society, even a voice from ground zeros is now seen as controversial. In the summer of 2004, the Peace Declaration released by the mayor of Hiroshima city, Tadatoshi Akiba, was criticised in editorials of two major newspapers in Japan. Sankei Shim bun editorial said that the mayor should have stressed the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program more strongly rather than just accusing the United States’ unilateral behaviour or its production of smaller nuclear weapons (Sankei 2004a). It also mentioned that Japan should cooperate with the United States and put more pressure on North Korea to dismantle the program. Another newspaper, Yomiuri Shim bun, more intensely accused the Mayor who expressed his stance to protect the pacifist constitution and required the present Japanese government not to amend it. The newspaper demanded “do not involve politics in anti-nuclear appeal” (Yomiuri 2004). The latter is following the path towards the amendment of the pacifist constitution and level up their self defence force, the idea which synchronise with the will of the United States. Referring to the point indicated by Sankei, it should consider why North Korea started to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. Since it took the course in order to gain attention of the United States (Lee 1999, p. 53), the fear of nuclear crisis in the North East Asia will not be solved just by accusing North Korea. Both editorials were speaking in the rhetoric of the United States. Considering the fact that these two newspapers stand on a very nationalistic and conservative point of view, it emphaisises how deep the rhetoric of the United States has rooted in the society. Maybe they are not aware of themselves to be that much pro-America and creating contradiction in their rhetoric.

On the other hand, there is another very controversial issue for Japan concerning Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Asian countries, mainly China and both Koreas, which suffered severely under Japanese colonisation and occupation are criticising Japan to protest against the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Referring to “weapons of mass destruction” The China Post wrote:

But WMD is not necessarily a dirty word. For example, it was the atomic bomb that brought an end to World War II. Without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the war could have dragged much longer and more lives would have been lost. (2003).

They understand the incident as “the Allies’ nuclear retaliation” (SCMP 2003). Japan deserved the devastation and it freed them from Japan’s invasion, they believe. This total lack of sympathy from neighbouring countries towards atrocity that happened in Japan is partly resulted in post-war relationship between the two parties. Dower describes:

One of the most pernicious aspects of the occupation was that the Asian peoples who had suffered most from imperial Japan’s depredation – the Chinese, Koreans, Indonesians, and Filipinos – had no serious role, no influential presence at all in the defeated land. They became invisible. Asian contributions of defeating the emperor’s soldiers and sailors were displayed by an all-consuming focus on the American victory in the “Pacific War.” By this same process of vaporization, the crimes that had been committed against Asian peoples through colonization as well as were all the more easily put out of mind. (1999, p. 27)

The process of setting reparation between Japan and other Asian countries, for example, was significantly affected by the United States’ will (Kitaoka 2000). In that sense, Japan has not yet directly faced those countries for reconciliation.

Reus-Smit remarks “[l]egitimacy is a social phenomenon; an actor or action is not legitimate unless other members of society deem it so” (2004, p. 5). Looking at Japan’s behaviour since the defeat in 1945, Japan is one prominent country giving the former victor the legitimacy to the past incident and
also to the present issue happening in the Middle East. Unintentionally and also rather intentionally, Japan has relied on the victor’s rhetoric. “Much that lies at the heart of contemporary Japanese society … derives from the complexity of the interplay between the victors and the vanquished” (Dower 1999, p. 28). Thus, it is failing from the position to link Hiroshima, Nagasaki, weapons of mass destruction, Iraq and the United States of America and contest the legitimacy of the Bush Administration’s rhetoric.

Conclusion
On September 11th 2004, a “flame of peace” collected from both Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s Peace Memorial Parks was delivered to New York City (Jiji Press 2004). One of the organisers of this event, September Eleventh Family for Peaceful Tomorrows, is “an organization founded by family members of those killed on September 11th who have united to turn our grief into action for peace” (SEFPT). “Ground zero” of the 21st century met “ground zeros” of 1945, which turned emotion of retaliation into a starting point for the future – dismantling nuclear weapons (Chikushi 2004b). This was a significant moment when the present and the past were connected on the common ground of aspiring peace on earth.

At the same time, this encounter showed an explicit contrast. On the one hand, the “ground zero” in New York was created by manipulating a memory of the Pacific War from the victor’s point of view and it is now a symbol of legitimacy for the United States to pursue the “war on terror”. On the other hand, “ground zeros” in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are forgotten elements in the victor’s memory of the former war. Along with the “weapons of mass destruction” 60 years ago, they are ignored and have not appeared in the discourse of the present war in Iraq.

The situation in Iraq shows no sign getting better. Without doubt, it is important for the international community to examine the present situation and consider how to deal with the country’s future. Nevertheless, it should not forget to question why this atrocity started and why it is continuing. How overwhelming the rhetoric delivered by the United States’ government is and how counter-arguments are drowned out by it, the legitimacy of this war should be contested consistently by recalling a memory of the defeated side of the Pacific War. Restoration of elements lacking in the United States’ rhetoric in the mainstream discourse is essential.
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2 This title is an original English title of the book. Not a direct translation from the Japanese title.


SPECIAL REPORT WITH BRIT HUME (2001). Television program, Terrorism Hits America, Fox News, 12 September.


## ABBREVIATION

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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
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<td>APN</td>
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<td>Nikkei</td>
<td>Nippon Keizai Shimbun</td>
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<td>SCMP</td>
<td>South China Morning Post</td>
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<td>SEFPT</td>
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Reverse Racism:
Maintaining Anglo Cultural Hegemony in Australia

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Introduction

Racism in Australia is reverse racism, a cultural cringe where we are criticised from within for standing up for ourselves and our identity, and even the Government acting against those entering illegally is criticised.¹

– Brian Hannah, a reader of the Herald Sun, Melbourne

The letter writing columns of mainstream newspapers have become a major forum for debate engaging in New Right hegemonic discourses. These discourses include the notion of “reverse racism”. This paper explores a period in which reverse racism – and its socio-political connotations (blame, envy, and grievance) – became popularised throughout Australia. In 1996, Pauline Hanson began a campaign to put racial politics “back on the agenda” for the Anglo-majority. With the New Right’s success in gaining a governmental mandate in the years since, the Howard government also fanned the flame of the anti-progressive movement by eventually incorporating the crux of Hanson’s policies. The politics of blame, envy and grievance consolidated the dominance of the New Right in mainstream politics. It saw the dismantling of progressive institutions such as ATSIC in more recent times, and allowed the government to implement tough refugee policies, a laissez faire economic agenda and the emancipation of progressive racial politics from parliament. This paper, however, mainly addresses the discourses employed at the basic socio-political

¹ Hannah, B., 'Racism Call is Backwards' (letter), Herald Sun, Melbourne, 17th June 2003, p. 17
level, and the linguistic devices used to enhance the New Right agenda in Australia. Reverse racism is one of these linguistic devices. The concept pertains strong emotional and social ties for the working and middle classes, aligning with notions of personal interest rather than class allegiance.

What is “reverse racism?”

In Australia, affirmative action, the right to free speech and Hanson’s “Please Explain” had all become, by the late-1990s, concepts relative to the term “reverse racism”. Use of the term can be viewed in many ways, but none less than a discourse exploited by the Anglo New Right to maintain class hegemony. Reverse racism can be viewed as coming from two very different areas in social discourse - the blue-collar class, and the white-collar class. Each pertain their own set of values, so it is not surprising that both classes have their own distinct grievance with non-Anglo minorities.

Reverse racism is the assumption by its advocates (the Anglo majority) that it is a counter-hegemonic force against a perceived dominant, anti-Anglo other. However, such advocates have merely reinforced New Right ruling class hegemony, by supposedly “reclaiming” the rightful place of Anglo hegemony in the workplace, in politics and in spheres of public interaction. The sanctity of the suburban shopping centre or children’s park – of not being isolated in it by non-Anglo linguistic and racial groups – have been equally as relevant to the debates over indigenous land-rights amidst the use of reverse racism in recent years.

Reverse racism is predominantly based upon a psychology of blame, envy and grievance. For the white-collar middle class, reverse racism became a popular approach for blaming minorities in the workplace for perceived occupational limitations through affirmative action. David Wellman (1997) aligns American middle-class grievance in this area with a decline of normalcy in the working lives of white males. For these men, affirmative action has meant a decline in the sense of privilege. Equal opportunity and affirmative action has since come to mean “reverse
discrimination” for white middle class males. This not because they literally experienced discrimination, but because “equal opportunity” has historically meant that white male Americans faced virtually no competition from blacks and women. Wellman says, ‘That was “normal”. Normal used to mean exclusivity; it meant white and heterosexual male. Affirmative action has disturbed that notion of normalcy’. Given their historic-sociological experience, it is impossible for white males to register affirmative action as “fair”. Wellman suggests, ‘It is beyond their comprehension. It must, therefore, have been produced by unfair practises or reverse discrimination… That is why talk about quotas and reverse discrimination is such a crucial component in anti-affirmative action discourse.’ Wellman also argues that anti-affirmative action campaigners often disregard facts about racial segregation, the experience of black Americans and other areas. Like Australia, the rhetoric of anti-affirmative action campaigns suggest that an epidemic of “reverse discrimination” has raged across America, that quotas have ravaged the job market, and that the economic playing field has been tilted against white males. The most common argument in both countries is that policies that recognise race are unnecessary because racial discrimination is rare. The debate over affirmative action as reverse racism is outlined in the examples below in the form of letters-to-editor.

Blue-collar class discourse, on the other hand, has shown a different (though there are some similarities) approach to reclaiming hegemony through reverse racism. Blue-collar workers were quick to employ a similar set of grievances popularised by Pauline Hanson, in a campaign against back-yard tent embassies, land rights, non-Anglo immigration and racial and linguistic isolation in “your own” town. Blue-collar discourse also engages in the debate over public space. Hanson gained vast support by purporting a blue-collar sense of entitlement and explanation – through her now famous statement, “Please Explain” - over Anglo isolation in public space. Freedom of speech, as discussed below, is also one aspect of Hanson’s use of reverse racism.

4 Ibid
5 see also ibid, p. 313. Here, Wellman argues that ‘the “scholarship” of affirmative action’s major intellectual critics (Nathan Glazer, Christopher Jenks, Glenn Loury … [and others]) is not “scholarly” in any serious sense of the term. The data they use are outdated and flimsy. Assertion substitutes for argumentation; anecdotes pretend to be systematic evidence; mystification masquerades as social science; and fantasy is treated as truth.’
6 Ibid
and in terms of ownership of the public space. In terms of employment, the blue-collar approach is different to the white-collar mentality of career opportunism. The focus is more so upon lowering the rate of pay, collective bargaining, outsourcing, the cheapening of their own labours and insulting working class cultural practices or values, rather than a set of limits to promotion. Wellman suggests that white working-class males in America have felt embittered, beleaguered and besieged by “equal opportunity” policies, which often form resentment and develops through a discourse of reverse racism. However, like white middle-class males, the blue-collar class are not anti-black racists. Rather, Wellman suggests, they are defending their sense of normalcy and routine institutional practices which, in their experience, are racially neutral.6

The discourse of reverse racism also engages debate in terms of the right to freedom of speech by white-Australians. Ever present since the introduction of anti-discrimination policies in Australia, free speech advocates have consistently criticised a perceived exploitation of the term by the politically correct, progressive and multicultural lobbies. M. Nourbese Philip (1992) argues that free speech advocates and anti-censorship campaigners in Canada merely engage an ‘Argument by the white-middle class, for the white-middle class, about the white-middle class.’7 Censorship debate has been the privileged discourse, Philip argues, and is based upon Western liberal values including democracy and the pursuit of individual “freedom”.8 However, racism has never been central to Western values, and has never been as privileged a discourse as censorship. Philip argues, that ‘Racism [in Canada] against Africans … remains a relatively unimportant issue… One very effective way of ensuring that this type of racism remains marginal to the dominant culture is to have another issue that is more privileged, such as censorship or freedom of speech.’9 In Australia, freedom of speech has been heavily defended by commentators such as Alan Jones, Andrew Bolt and Piers Ackerman in support of their wider conservative ideals. Public discourse in relation to freedom of speech is further discussed below in letters-to-the-editor.

6 Ibid, p. 321
9 Ibid, p. 271
A theoretical dilemma that faces use of the term reverse racism is the simple question of whether or not it is just another description of racism. Where race-based antagonism or discrimination is purported by both non-whites and whites alike against whites, it is, of course, racism. But the difference is that racism in reverse pertains a subjective value for its white owners. The subjective value lies in the discourse through a sense of entitlement and ownership of the discourse of racism itself. Australian society – traditionally dominated by the Anglo majority - has been reminded through multicultural policies over the last three decades that it is white people who discriminate against non-Anglo people. A comfortable concept, multiculturalism was intended to tolerate different foods and customs in a controlled time and space, and little else. It also enabled the ruling class to defeat any widespread allegiance between races. The ruling class was able distil a sense of ownership and responsibility within the lower classes to control “racism” through multiculturalism, a comforting, non-confronting event that rarely used public space in any obvious way.¹⁰

Decades on, when non-white communities have grown in both their size and economic power, white ownership of the term “racism” has been undermined by non-white groups gaining access to office and other positions of power. Or, where they have not been able to, white-advocates on their behalf have taken on positions of power. The sense of ownership – and thus control of the terms’ use - is now distributed amongst both Anglo and non-Anglo communities. Control of its meaning has been transformed by minority advocates into a set of meanings far more active than the initial white intentions of systematic tolerance. In an attempt to maintain control of the meaning of racism, Anglo society has perverted the term by constructing a counter discourse based on fear and insecurity, and constant reflections upon terrorists, refugees and other untried non-whites. The reinvention of this discourse has created a sense that individuals of Anglo descent are vulnerable to loss

of power. These fears have been a reaction against flaws within the initial intentions of anti-racism policies. For whites, this is alarming, particularly since white society assumed they were indeed the owners of the language of racism from the beginning. White society has, then, felt an ever-increasing need to reclaim their hegemonic position as owners of the limits and distribution of “racism” itself. Reverse racism has thus been a development of that ownership, and in some cases a reclaiming of the meaning and limits to official multiculturalism.

Theoretically, this area of discourse analysis is part of an emerging field of investigation called Whiteness. The term, Angela Pratt (2003) suggests, is ‘broadly defined as a system of power which privileges and normalises certain values, interests and systems of knowledge, and which is maintained by a series of discursive strategies and practices. By ordering power relations in Australia, Whiteness is able bestow privilege and other benefits to White people that are unmarked, unacknowledged, and unearned.’¹¹ Some of these practices include the discourses employed to maintain white hegemony; reverse racism is one part of such discourse. In the wider social context, Ghassan Hage (2003) also argues that, ‘People who go to see a hospital doctor, for instance, are as likely – if not more likely – to be treated by a non-white doctor… This has made people less secure about what their whiteness can yield for them. This is why we have – since … [Pauline] Hanson – the popular idea that there is really reverse racism against white people… that they are treated like strangers in their own country… Such people feel that the value of whiteness is declining.’¹² Here, whiteness and reverse racism are linked in a discourse fearful of losing white hegemony.

Historical Context

Constructions of reverse racism can be viewed as part of a wider historical movement by the New Right to construct its hegemonic discourse as normal throughout society. It is argued, then, that the New Right utilised popular language,

¹² Hage, G., cited in Lane, B., ‘Middle class blanches at white studies growth’, The Australian, 28th June 2003, p. 3
including the term “reverse racism”, to reinforce its own standing in Australian power relations. The New Right began to emerge as a powerful force in the mid-1980s, but made its most significant gains beyond 1996 and into the present. As a starting point for the context at hand, it is useful to examine Pauline Hanson’s election to the Federal Senate.

An excerpt from Hanson’s maiden speech in Federal Parliament in 10th September 1996 states:

“We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to mainstream Australian by those who promote political correctness and those who control the various taxpayer-funded ‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups.”

A striking and significant moment for a great number of Australians, Hanson’s policy issues were voluminous, argues Sean Scalmer (1999). Hanson’s speech has since been represented as the founding event in the birth of a powerful new, grass roots political movement between 1996 and the earlier years of the twenty first century - Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. The speech, with its inherent discourse of grievance, granted Hanson notoriety through the style of a declaration of independence. It also focussed heavily on the notion of freedom of speech.

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14 Ibid. Scalmer also cites that Hanson’s speech also addresses, apart from “reverse racism,” welfare payments to Aboriginal Australians, multiculturalism, bureaucracy, immigration, unemployment, foreign debt, living standards, family law, privatisation of government assets, foreign aid, the United Nations, government investment in large-scale development projects, national military service, interest rates, and the (apparently threatening) status and size of Asian nations surrounding Australia.

15 Ibid. Scalmer also outlines that, by 1997, One Nation had been formed and by 1999 was represented in two State Parliaments and in the Senate of the Australian Federal Parliament. Results of the Queensland State Elections in June 1998 gave the party 11 seats in the lower house, and 22.7% of the state-wide vote. Since that time, electoral support for the organisation has flagged, and earlier predictions that the Party threatened the stability of the two-party system now appear overstated. Hanson eventually resigned from the Party, and has failed to win seats in more recent NSW and Federal elections. Nonetheless, between 1996 and 1998, One Nation clearly represented a powerful new force in Australian politics - populist, anti-immigration, anti-market, anti-multiculturalism, anti-political. As Scalmer argues, through the Party's burgeoning presence, the politics of race and of opposition to globalisation have attained an increasing prominence within political life.

Hanson’s maiden speech became the basis of a new anti-hegemonic discourse from which the working class could rectify their emotions through a politics of grievance. Hanson and her supporters saw the media, academics and the “multicultural lobby” as the target of their grievances. Although Hanson often misquoted or misrepresented official figures on immigration and land rights legislation, any attempt by the media or academics to suggest otherwise served to fuel the overwhelming antagonism of Hanson supporters.\(^7\) Reverse racism discourse popularized by Hanson also engaged a sense of entitlement. This is exemplified by Hanson’s famous quote, “Please Explain”, first aired on Channel Nine’s 60 Minutes program in 1996 as a simple response to the journalist’s question.\(^8\) Lawrence M. Bogad (2001) explains,

"Please explain?" resonated as a [favourite] quote throughout Australia for months. But this sort of coverage angered her supporters, further galvanizing them against what they perceived as an elitist, intellectual media.\(^9\)

Whilst the program (and the media in general) encouraged Hanson’s supporters by ridiculing her simple-minded response to political issues, “Please Explain” became a simple but effective summary of Hanson’s political views. White hegemony was to be maintained by an inherent (entitled) right to explanation of all racial challenges, an entitlement of white society to maintain “checks” upon non-Anglo political and economic power. Relating to the discussion earlier in this paper on white control of the meaning of racism, linguistic “checks” within the hegemonic discourse have been

\(^7\) Scalmer, op. cit. Scalmer goes on, ‘Hanson's maiden speech has been constructed by her supporters as the founding moment when the ruling elites of the media demonstrated their bias and evil by their vicious and unprovoked attacks upon her. It is therefore a founding event in the battle between the ruling elites and the mainstream Australians that Hanson represents.’

\(^8\) see Bogad, op. cit., p. 72. Part of the journalist’s (Tracy Curro) interview with Hanson is also provided here, in which Hanson rejects the Department of Immigration’s official figures on Asian immigration to Australia. Hanson also fails to understand the term, “Xenophobic”. Curro argues that Hanson should have a greater understanding of these issues, stating, “…you are a federal politician. We’re not just sitting around in a pub, talking about things…”

\(^9\) Ibid, p. 74
vital to controlling non-Anglo organizational capabilities. These “checks” are very much located in the language of entitlement undertaken by Hanson.

The movement seemingly lead by Hanson post-1996 was not without context, however. Reverse racism and political discourses of grievance began to make headway in the mid-1980s in academic circles. In 1984, the New Right produced the concept, “Black Armband” history, and an intellectual champion – Geoffrey Blainey - which significantly affected schools of academia, and progressive thought generally.20 Blainey’s contribution has since been regarded as having spurred the national “history wars” over the past two decades. Growth in the anti-multiculturalism movement accelerated in the 1990s. Former Labor MP for Kalgoorlie Graeme Campbell was elected to Federal Parliament in 1996 as an independent, along with Hanson, advocating similar themes. These forces were able to draw support away from the progressive lobby and policies of government before the 1996 election. The pre-election race debate was not to fade away quickly, making huge gains under the newly elected, and conservative, Howard Government. The combined media focus on Howard, Hanson and Campbell policies, and the intellectual stronghold of right-wing academia conjured great appeal in line with the interests Anglo-Australia. After all, they each advocated a politics of grievance mentality on behalf of the white working class, defending "mainstream" Australians against the politically-correct and the "multicultural industry."21

More generally, the New Right ultimately exploited social grievance for its own ends. It engaged economic and political dislocations of the early 1990s, in combination with changes in national and personal identity that were surfacing

20 For more information, see Bottomley, G., and de Lepervaunche, M., (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Race, Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, p. 2. Academically, Gillian Bottomley argues, 'Blainey ignored the structural inequalities of class as well as differences in social power between various other segments of the population, for example, gender divisions. Even so, this prescription for cohesion and social harmony makes common sense to some people; while Australians compete for jobs with 'ethnics', and Australian children compete for University places with Asians who work hard and win entry to tertiary institutions, and while new arrivals who look different from us live in hostels located in areas of high immigrant settlement, then, physical difference and cultural divisions are easily held up as the sources of social anxiety about threats to our national way of life. Blainey’s intervention tends to legitimate these fears and, despite all the rhetoric of multiculturalism, the possibility of a constantly changing Australian culture, or cultures, is ignored. The quest for homogenous identity also excludes the Aboriginal presence… [F]or some Europeans and Australians, white superiority is a fact of life.'

21 Scalmer, op. cit.
through long term adherence to multiculturalism. Political-economic troubles were being increasingly experienced as racial and gendered, rather than class, grievances.\(^2\) The New Right in Australia also exploited resistance to its hegemony - the empowering of women and ethnic minorities in Australia - by utilising the discourse available through popular racial grievance. Reverse racism is one aspect of that discourse.

The Letters

The letters below demonstrate some of the uses of reverse racism. They discuss some of the issues linked to reverse racism, in the following order: outsourcing and blue-collar grievances; free speech; affirmative action; Indigenous rights; anti-political correctness and special treatment of Aboriginal people; Black Armband history; and, the perceived attack on Anglo identity. Some of the letters demonstrate a “fight back” mentality on behalf of more conservative values. They also show at times merely disillusionment with political correctness and social progressivism “gone mad”.

In the context of blue-collar grievances, Peter Jewett (1997) of Brahma Lodge in South Australia argued against the reverse racism of the state government’s employment policies for the engineering and computer industries. He suggests that the paradox between unemployment and immigrant workers is the reason for One Nation’s success, and perhaps why National Action had gained momentum amongst young people. Writing to The Advertiser, Jewett states:

[What] an appalling situation with our unemployed youth - the highest in the nation. What is even more appalling is that the Premier, Mr Olsen, while visiting our Asian neighbors, is asking, or should I say begging, for people with computer and engineering skills to migrate to SA and is willing to give them $5000 towards accommodation. Surely common sense must dictate that our unemployed youth should and must be looked after first. Why not train our unemployed youth by using the $5000 for proper training schemes? Mr Olsen's idea is plain discrimination and reverse racism. It's little wonder that Pauline Hanson's new political party is gaining support among ordinary Australians and it's the very reason that National Action is becoming acceptable with our

\(^2\) Wellman, op. cit., p. 320-321. Moreover, Wellman suggests, this is because, in the US experience, at the very moment when the political-economic landscape was being radically reconfigured in disturbing directions, whiteness and maleness became increasingly visible and marked.
In references to employment and future prospects for young people in this letter, Jewett engages the blue-collar understanding of reverse racism in terms of outsourcing and job opportunities.

In another example, Jack O’Connor (2001) of Newtown perpetuates blue-collar grievances alongside the notion of free speech. He also utilizes the reverse racism discourse to denounce apparent offences against Caucasians, and multiculturalism in general. O’Conner responded to the article, ‘Ethnic crime survey thwarted - Gangland: Sydney’s Secret’, published on August 6th 2001 in the Daily Telegraph. The article analyzed a report by the Community Relations Commission (CRC) on ethnic related crime, suggesting that political correctness had stopped the release of the report, which linked ethnicity and crime. O’Conner responded by stating reverse racism was the reason why authorities (and, hence, society) had great difficulty in controlling crime, with restrictions in place that restrict racial descriptions of criminals. This is also very similar to Hanson’s arguments on freedom of speech, as outlined earlier. O’Conner’s letter to The Daily Telegraph is as follows:

The concept of multi-culturalism is, in theory, an honourable one. But in the hands of the racial-equality lobby it has become an anti-Caucasian weapon, wheeled out whenever the good name of a specific ethnic group comes under fire for any misdemeanour.

As in Britain, racism has become the bugbear of this era. Whenever race is mentioned, the protective barricades go up and the perceived racists are vilified.

Your report headed ‘Ethnic crime survey thwarted’ (Daily Telegraph, August 6) shows how an initiative planned with the best possible intentions has gone awry because it has dared to challenge

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24 Morris, R., ‘Ethnic crime survey thwarted - Gangland: Sydney’s Secret’, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 6th August 2001, p. 5. An excerpt from the article states: ‘[An Attempt] to research links between ethnicity and crime has been thwarted by the Community Relations Commission because it could lead to “racial stereotyping”. The Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research had planned to record the ethnic background of all people who are arrested and appear in NSW courts but was stopped on the intervention of senior ethnic leaders… The Daily Telegraph has learned the plan was shelved after the government agency (formerly the Ethnic Affairs Commission) objected -- held a public meeting and other consultations on the issue… But the ban has been challenged by Ethnic Communities Council chief Salvatore Scevola -- whose organisation is one of the largest ethnic lobby groups in NSW -- who said opposition to it was “politically correct” and accused the commission of “inciting” opposition to the plan.'
the politically correct views of the leading racial-equality leaders and activists. Never mind that all received evidence points to ethnically controlled drug and vice gangs -- the Community Relations Commission has stated that crime is not a consequence of a person's ethnicity and that birth location should only be stated as Australia or overseas.

This sort of reverse racism will eventually turn ordinarily tolerant citizens into racial bigots. And it is the reluctance of the CRC to admit to and to address the ethnic gang problem that is exacerbating the already tense situation.25

In line with Hanson rhetoric, progressive lobby-groups are at the root of this injustice, O’Conner argues, due to political-correctness-gone-mad. More urgent, O’Conner argues, is that the survey produced on ethnic crime rates actually reconfirms that ethnic gangs are at the root of drug and other offences. O’Conner views as more urgent the policy of authorities not being able be identify gangs as ethnic. This hinders Anglo communities’ abilities to rationalize the root of crime and injustice as an “ethnic problem”. Like Hanson, O’Conner purports that it is the right (through free speech) of the Anglo community to be able to reproduce its stereotypes, with the ethnic crime survey being proof of Anglo suspicions. It is this freedom that allows the Anglo community to reproduce stereotypes. By doing this, the Anglo community is able to reproduce hegemony and continue the displacement of racial groups as an evil, lesser and deviant group of human beings.26 The process of categorizing individual groups into races reinforces the ability of Anglo hegemony by the simple divide-and-rule principle. However, displacing groups into a race as crime category provides even greater reason for Anglo authorities to be quick at the helm when regulating racial groups vying for greater economic and political opportunities.

The following letter by Ziggy Malter (2004) from Dural in Sydney’s west denounced calls by ATSIC for the Federal Government to enforce quotas in the private business sector for Aboriginal people. In line with white-collar discourse on affirmative action, Malter does not use the term “reverse racism” but implies its existence, arguing the employees should be hired on their abilities, not race. Malter completely ignores the purpose of affirmative action, that is, in this instance, assisting persons that have not had opportunities to reach their full economic potential either

26 see also Jakubowicz, op. cit., p. 106. Here, Jakubowicz discusses the ways in which the media also reproduces stereotypes of ethnic minorities as a lesser, deviant and bizarre from of life.
through historical race inequalities or institutionalized racism in the business sector. Nonetheless, Malter complies with the definition above of white-collar *grievance* and *workplace envy*. Affirmative action is also viewed by Malter as the main reason for creating even greater race divisions in workplaces in the United States. Malter’s letter reads,

> ATSIC is again demanding that the Federal Government enforce a 2per cent quota for Aboriginal employees in the private business sector. Thankfully a similar call for the public service was rejected out of hand by the government, and rightly so.

Employees in both the private and public sectors should gain their positions by only one yardstick, that is their ability, certainly not their race or colour. Affirmative action laws -- as shown in America -- have failed miserably in the workplace and, in fact, caused more racism and division than there was before their implementation.

Instead of lobbying for a system of enforced racism in the workplace, ATSIC would be better served if it explored and rectified the reasons why so many companies will not employ Aborigines.  

Relating to the analysis earlier by Wellman, anti-affirmative action views are more so based on a fear of losing the “natural” hegemony of patriarchal whiteness in society. Moreover, Wellman suggests, affirmative action has ‘inadvertently increased the market value of people of color and women, driving down the historic premium paid to whiteness and maleness.’ Malter’s stand against affirmative is common amongst the wider discourse that deplores reverse racism and preferential treatment of minority groups in the workplace, but is more so based upon the white male fears of losing hegemony.

Robert Picone (2000) from Sydney City responded in *The Daily Telegraph* to the possibility of a new Aboriginal tent embassy to be erected near Homebush Olympic Stadium. With the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games looming, public space was to become a tough battle-ground over national meaning and history for everyday Australians. A tent embassy in view of Olympic visitors had the potential of

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28 Wellman, op. cit., p. 232
questioning the hegemonic meaning of the nation, to the embarrassment of mainstream Australia and its reputation on the world stage. Picone said:

I do not in any way agree that this new embassy of racism should be erected near the Homebush Olympic Stadium. In my opinion this group of activists are using reverse racism to further their own individual interest, and they do not represent the views of the vast majority of the aboriginal population.29

Without any indication of whether this author’s background is Aboriginal or not, the possibility poses a new light upon the ownership of the language of racism. Assuming, however, that Picone is not of Indigenous descent, it is easily assumed that reverse racism takes its place in this context as an example in which hegemonic understandings of national identity are challenged. In an attempt to maintain ownership of the discourse of racism, Picone clearly points to the embassies owners – Aboriginal Australia – as the most prominent advocates of racism and social divide. As an “embassy of racism”, Picone indicates this form of Indigenous politics is the metaphorical embodiment of national divide. Picone criticizes embassies as serving nothing more than “individual interest”. Using “reverse racism”, Picone views the embassy as a deliberate attack on non-Indigenous society for little else than the self-interest of one economic group. However, it is Picone that appears concerned about his own personal interests. This act is, after all, a challenge to non-Indigenous economic strength, and the ideological structures that support its economic and political growth - the racist discourse. Ownership of this discourse is thus extremely important, and symbols such as embassies in public space challenge white ownership. Moreover, reverse racism in this example becomes a linguistic device to mobilize mainstream Australia against the eroding of white ownership.

Yolande Freed’s letter, entitled ‘Racism in reverse’, was printed in the Herald Sun on 1st March 2001, and relates to the analyses of free speech in this paper above. Freed’s letter states:

[There] is, in this country, an introverted racism that says indigenous groups are allowed to say whatever they like about Anglo-Saxons.

29 Picone. R., Letter to The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 22nd May 2000, p. 27
There have been atrocities in the past, but labels such as "stolen" are offensive to those who have never been racist.

If everyone who has been caused trauma by separation expected compensation instead of getting on with their lives, what sort of a country would Australia be?

I feel sorry for Lowitja O'Donoghue, not because she feels misled by Andrew Bolt (Herald Sun, February 23) but because she has to face the wrath of her own people.

Ms O'Donoghue is in for a rough time because she has taken away the credibility of the few genuine cases that may have deserved compensation.  

Angered by her perceived loss of authority in the discourses of racism, Freed attempts to reclaim her position by endorsing the reverse racism rhetoric. In deploring Indigenous use of racist discourse against white-Australia, she argues that Aboriginal Australians receive preferential treatment and exploit generous white anti-racism policies. Angered by this, Freed makes a stand against a perceived hypocrisy regarding what whites and non-whites are “allowed” to say in the race debate. The one-standard-for-all Hanson rhetoric is utilized once again to support New Right notions of class and racial hegemony. This is made even more prominent by endorsement of right-wing columnist Andrew Bolt.

In March 2002, Chris Winzar responded in the Advertiser to the reverse racism that abound the Adelaide Festival. His letter reads:

[Among] the mishmash of uncohesive ideas and events that was supposed to be the 2002 Adelaide Festival was a much lauded central theme of reconciliation through community exposure to "indigenous culture". This fine and noble principle was basically flawed.

Aboriginal "culture" in SA is all but extinct, the indigenous traditions that were encountered by early European colonists have just about disappeared, hijacked as surely as the "stolen generation". What festival patrons saw during the past 10 days was a "boys own" white view of Aboriginal culture invented by well-meaning outsiders.

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30 Freed, Y., 'Racism in reverse' (letter), Herald Sun, Melbourne, 1st March 2001, p. 16
So desperate are we to assuage feelings of guilt for past ethnic cleansing that we have been seduced into a kind of reverse racism where we have imposed our own western material values to create a series of events that serve to provide "warm, fuzzy feelings" about the "noble savage". This is nothing short of Disneyland on the Torrens.

These artistic interludes do not begin to address a major issue for our mostly westernised Aboriginal people, which is to rediscover their culture for themselves and for their own future generations before it is too late.31

In line with principles of the New Right, in terms of the history wars, Winzar maintains firm opposition to Black Armband versions of history through discourses such as reverse racism. One can read from the letter standard, anti-progressive patterns of thought. Historians, festivals and policies that reflect upon the idea of a "stolen generation", suggests Winzar, are patronising to Indigenous peoples. This is because, Winzar goes on, such groups have a responsibility to explore their roots in "their own" time and space, but not in "ours". The "our" time and space mentality represents one major point of contention in terms of public space. This is because hegemony is played out through public space, with public space reflective of an overarching social policy. Winzar is essentially arguing, then, that public festivals – i.e. where the discourses of public values are played out – have no such role in perpetuating the myths of Black Armband history. Moreover, further demonstrating the hegemonic intentions of the New Right through public space discourse, Winzar denies the existence of Indigenous links to traditional culture in contemporary South Australia. Reverse racism, its seems, is the cause of all ‘guilt’ holding back further Anglo cultural and economic development. In an attempt to undermine Indigenous themes in public space, by playing the “guilt” card in reverse, Winzar aims to reclaim hegemony through discourses of racism.

As a final example of the public discourses surrounding the concept of reverse racism, Brian Hannah from Emerald in Victoria responded to The Herald Sun in June 2003, stating racism in Australia only exists in reverse. This is where, he says, “Aussie culture” – mateship, larrikinism and Anzac spirit - is shunned. The point of analysis here is not whether racism exists, but why it is assumed to be a reverse form of racism. Hannah writes:

[A letter] to the Herald Sun on Friday alleged Australia is racist. Melbourne and Sydney are world leaders in the percentage of non-English speaking migrants who come willingly to an Australia that values and rewards them.

For those not seeking assimilation to our culture, we assist their "home" cultures to flourish. Taxpayers fund equal opportunity and diversity programs, and give millions of dollars to our indigenous population.

Our shopping centres carry signs in many languages. What we eat represents cultural diversity. Many have partnered those who came here from overseas. Racism?

Criticising Australia as racist is also criticising the many former foreigners who are now part of our Aussie culture.

In fact, the cop-out notion that people are helpless victims of the past, race, or gender, strikes at the very notion of human dignity and free will to define one's own destiny.

Racism in Australia is reverse racism, a cultural cringe where we are criticised from within for standing up for ourselves and our identity, and even the Government acting against those entering illegally is criticised.

Fortunately, there still remains an underlying Aussie culture -- mateship, larrikinism and Anzac spirit -- yet it will be lost for ever if we listen to those who want us swallowed by the cultures coming to join us. Let us merge, but retain some individuality.32

This letter explores reverse racism very much in line with New Right discourse. As well, most of the underlying discourse here reflects similar understandings as perpetuated by Hanson. This is particularly in terms of the right to free speech, where Hannah draws on the idea of ‘cultural cringe’ – the apparent habit of Australians to dislike who they are – and the ways in which the free expression of personal and national identity has become unfashionable and non-politically correct. This is again linked to the history wars, and the issue of recognising pre-Black Armband history as a legitimate expression of Anglo history. Reverse racism is also expressed by Shelton under the guise of western liberal traditions. This is particularly where he links ‘free

32 Hannah, B., op. cit
will’ and ‘dignity’ with the ‘cop-out’ of Indigenous interpretations of Australian history.

**Conclusion**

Letters such as these are but a few examples of the ways in which discourses of reverse racism have been played-out by the Australian public since 1996. In this social atmosphere, it is no coincidence that conservative forces have made a triumphant re-emergence into federal politics since that time, both planting the seeds of new racist discourse and, in turn, gaining social, political and economic benefits from its ramifications. The discourses surrounding the use of reverse racism suggest widespread grievances with non-Anglo groups in Australian society, based on fears and an increasing antagonism to official multiculturalism. In historical context, it is clear that the language of the race debate post-1996 was to be overtly dominated by anti-politically correct and anti-progressive rhetoric. Pauline Hanson became the voice of the white working class through grievance, and popular consensus – with a conservative government now in power – enabled the New Right to implement rollback strategies aimed at greater economic freedoms, and consolidation of class hegemony. The language of the debate – including reverse racism - was a side-issue to the greater picture that would develop, but was nonetheless a significant factor in producing a positive result for conservative groups.
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Hegemony: Explorations into Consensus, Coercion and Culture

A workshop at the University of Wollongong
14 & 15 Feb 2005

Culture, Place and Space:
hegemonic Whiteness, the technological bluff and consent theories of power

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Introduction
Approximately 15 km north of Wollongong on the NSW south coast, located between the coastal villages of Thirroul and Bulli, is an area known as Kuradji/Sandon Point. Stockland Trust Group currently proposes to convert this area from open space into a residential estate with a population estimated to be in the vicinity of 6000 people. The Significance of the area to Aboriginal Australians, alongside its environmental and European heritage values, has lead to the future of the area being embroiled in what has become a very public dispute.

In contrast to the proposed residential estate, the local (non-Aboriginal) community has put forth an alternative proposal for the area. Encompassed within this alternative proposal are calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre to be established at Kuradji/Sandon Point. It is this aspect of the community’s alternative proposal that forms the empirical basis for this discussion paper.

In drawing on theoretical approaches initiated by Antonio Gramsci, Jaques Ellul, Gene Sharp and Michel Foucault, this paper aims to consider the applicability and effectiveness of these approaches through analysing this case study. In contrast to the apparent diversity of these works, this paper focuses on their significant cross-over. This specific focus enables a consideration of the hidden assumptions that shape the discourse within which the community proposal is located: the notion of technology as progress and the normalising effects of Whiteness as hegemonic.
To enable such a consideration, an awareness of the context surrounding the community’s alternative proposal is crucial. This is reflected in the structure of this paper: a brief introduction to the basis for the dispute over the future of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area – and my participation in the current dispute – is provided before introducing and discussing the cross-over in theoretical approaches. The application of questions raised through discussing this cross-over to the case study then follows. This raises a number of issues that, whilst specifically forthcoming through the consideration this case study, are of a broad nature and could contribute to the process of ‘theorising ways in which White race power and privilege might be undone’.¹

**Participation as beneficial...**

Through my involvement in this dispute – as being that of a participant observer – I have had a long and substantial involvement in the current dispute over the future of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area and have an explicitly partisan view of the overall dispute. This involvement has also fostered a research advantage: I have gained an insight into community actions and responses – specifically discussions surrounding (and prior to the public announcement of) these – that an outside observer would not necessarily gain. Such an observer would also not have the opportunity, nor the ability, to fully appreciate the entire discussion, or the specific contexts, of the decisions made. Thus, I have gained an insight not often achieved and I am able to effectively draw upon it in consideration, and discussions, of these actions.

With the focus of this paper being a discussion on the hidden assumptions mediating the strategies and tactics on the local (non-Aboriginal) community, my partisanship, within this context, is aimed at increasing the cultural appropriateness of the actions of the local community in supporting the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Implicit in this aim is one also shared by many others who have undertaken works on Whiteness: to expose the authority given to white ways of seeing, knowing and representing the world ‘in order to help undermine it’.² The outcomes of this paper may then ‘contribute to the process of theorising ways in which White race power and privilege might be undone’.³

**The Kuradji/Sandon Point area**

Kuradji/Sandon Point is part, and located at the end, of an Aboriginal Dreaming Trail. It is a meeting place for Aboriginal peoples from the north, south and west being used since the Dreaming. The Kuradji/Sandon Point area:

...was and still is a very significant place... [It] was the meeting place where the Chief of the Illawarra would meet the Chief of the Gundagarra People to trade and tell their stories.
Sandon Point is a very significant area… it is of spiritual significance and part of our cultural heritage. Every Aboriginal that occupied these lands used these tracks to move throughout their territory and meet with our people… stories have been passed down orally. This land is not unsung land it is of ancient and sacred significance…

Sandon Point to us means Ngurumbaan = The Past = The Present = The Future: Bulli Pass: was an Aboriginal Dreaming Track = today it serves everyone.4

The Significance of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area extends well beyond it comprising part of an Aboriginal Dreaming Trail. The (only partial) awareness of the Significance of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area to non-Aboriginal people is something that has continued to expand since white settlers first arrived in the northern Illawarra in 1817. The first documented indication of this dates back to 1887 when two settlers described the area as ‘a Black burying ground’.5

Though awareness of the Significance of the Kuradji Sandon Point area has increased with the evolution of the current dispute, the magnitude of its Significance may never be known to non-Aboriginal people. One of potentially many reasons for this is apparent in a response by Uncle Guboo Ted Thomas, Senior Yuin Loreman, following criticism regarding another site of Significance:

These are sacred matters which must be kept quiet… We only talk about these things when we are forced to do so in order to protect our sacred sites from ignorant white people to whom only the dollar is sacred.6

Awareness of the Significance of the area increased significantly following the exposure of an intact ceremonial burial in 1998 in beach fore-dunes.7 This burial was archaeologically investigated in-situ. It was determined that the burial site was that of a Kuradji (loosely translated as ‘clever fella’) and of up to 6 000 years of age.8,9 The existence of this ceremonial burial, in itself, indicates the Significance of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area.10,11

Within two years of the Kuradji surfacing, Stockland released its first ‘masterplan’ for the area. The Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy (SPATE) was established in December 1999 as a direct response. Coals from the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra were used to start a sacred fire. Three months later, a South Coast Labor Council endorsed picket (the Community Picket) was established with SPATEs permission.12

Other archaeological studies, and a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) initiated as a direct response to the
dispute (and its political context), have led to an increased (non-Aboriginal) awareness of the Significance of the area. The report prepared from the CoI hearings summarised the ‘Aboriginal Heritage’ of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area as follows:

Aborigines have lived on the south coast of NSW for probably in excess of 40,000 years. Archaeological evidence in the south coast region has established that Aborigines were using the animal resources of the estuarine environments from at least 20,000 years ago. The Kuradji or ‘clever fella’ buried at Sandon Point is thought to be up to 6,000 years old and the nearby tool-making site about 4,000 years old.\(^\text{13}\)

At the CoI hearings, there was a recurrent theme in the submissions given by local Aboriginal people.\(^\text{14}\) This theme reflected the comments made by (Senior Elder) Uncle Guboo Ted Thomas when he renamed Sandon Point as Kuradji in 2000: no houses. The construction of any house would detrimentally affect the cultural Significance of the area. This is the context in which (non-Aboriginal) community calls for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre are situated – alongside the larger alternative proposal for the entire area to remain public space.

**hegemonic Whiteness, the technological bluff and consent theories of power**

Having now provided a brief introduction to the basis for the dispute over the future of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area, and the context of the community calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre, I will outline and discus the cross-over in the theoretical approaches initiated by Antonio Gramsci, Jaques Ellul, Gene Sharp and Michel Foucault.

**Whiteness as descriptor**

Many discussions regarding race, colonisation and nationalism adopt the term ‘Whiteness’ as a descriptor of race. For example, Fiona Nicoll defines Whiteness as a ‘set of institutionalized practices which legitimate and privilege specific ways of knowing, seeing... and being at home in Australia’.\(^\text{15}\)

A number of criticisms have emerged regarding the use of Whiteness as descriptor. For example, in response to both the oft-problematic nature of this term and criticisms of it, many writers have adopted *otherness* as a descriptor. It should be noted that implicit in the actions associated with/described by Whiteness, is the construction of the *other*. Many of the concerns raised with the use of Whiteness as a descriptor stem from its homogenising nature, especially the variability and historical flexibility required for such a term. Specifically, Whiteness is very distinct from actual skin colour: ‘the problem with the ethnic category “White” is that it is constantly shifting’.\(^\text{16}\) The ability of this ‘category’ to shift is clearly illustrated in the following example of Donna Haraway’s:
The Irish moved from being perceived as coloured in the early nineteenth century in the United States to quite white in Boston’s school busing struggles in the 1970s, or how U.S. Jews have been ascribed white status more or less stably after WWII, while Arabs continue to be written as colored in the daily news.¹⁷

This constant shifting of White as an ethnic category clearly illustrates an ability to maintain and reinforce its position as legitimate, privileged and normal (i.e. counterpoised to all else as other). This, alongside the ability of Whiteness to be redefined, further illustrates its privileged position, dominance, efficacy and power.

**Whiteness as hegemonic**

These abilities indicate that Whiteness can be hegemonic. Angela Maree Pratt, in her dissertation entitled “Indigenous Sovereignty – Never Ceded”: Sovereignty, Nationhood and Whiteness in Australia, considers it as such because it functions to normalise existing sets of power relations. The normativity of Whiteness is what allows it to become invisible to those White people who inhabit and benefit from it¹⁸.

Whether White ways of knowing and seeing the world can be invisible to those who inhabit and benefit from it is one notion that will be considered and examined for its applicability to (non-Aboriginal) community calls for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre to be established at Kurrajji/Sandon Point.

Through an ability to normalise existing sets of power relations – the normalisation of White people, White knowledge and White ways of seeing and knowing the world (i.e. ‘other people as raced, we are just people’¹⁹) Whiteness

[mostly] not deliberately and maliciously… reproduces itself regardless of intention, power differences and goodwill, and overwhelmingly because it is not seen as whiteness, but as normal.²⁰

This is clearly indicated in the ability of non-Aboriginal Australians to either ignore, or be completely unaware of, cultural impropriety and/or act under a misguided assumption that their actions are in the interests of Aboriginal people. This is another aspect of hegemonic Whiteness that will be considered and examined in the context of community calls for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre to be established.

Such actions can become considered as common sense – i.e. they appear obviously correct/appropriate.
based on their normalness/naturalness. Alongside this, and also deeply intertwined within them being unquestioningly considered common sense, the outcomes of such actions can also be viewed as inevitable. The apparent (read believed) inevitability of certain non-Aboriginal beliefs (in regards to the future of Aboriginal Australians) over the short history of Australia, following initial attempts at colonisation, clearly illustrate Whiteness as being hegemonic.

Of specific relevance to this discussion paper are the ways in which Whiteness (even when considering its variability and historical flexibility) is hegemonic: how it functions as defining what is normal, even inevitable, through paradigmatic western (i.e. white) notions of scientific and technological rationally as essential to impose order and thus progress beyond what is effectively framed as disorder. The means through which Whiteness tends to normalise and reinforce existing power relations to define what is – and what leads to – progress, specifically discursive frameworks, are of importance to the consideration of community calls for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre to be established at Kuradji/Sandon Point. Both the contrast to, and the reflection of, the hidden assumptions implicit in the Stockland residential proposal are of significance for such a consideration. The privileging of White knowledge, norms, interests, and values above those of Aboriginal Australians, especially its invisible nature, is central to this.

The Technological Bluff
The discourse that equates scientific and technological rationality, specifically technological advancement and implementation, with progress – and effectively defines and limits the achievement/advancement of progress to technological means – is critically analysed by Jacques Ellul, a pioneering philosopher of technology, in his last book. He gives this discourse the label of the technological bluff.22

To understand Jacques Ellul's concept of the technological bluff, it is useful to first briefly examine his concepts of technique and technology. Technique Ellul defines as ‘the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity’.23 In contrast, technology is defined as discourse:

American usage has implanted in our minds the idea that the word technology refers to actual processes... But in a strict sense technology is discourse on technique...24

This strict sense is clarified further, with a clear distinction made between technology as discourse and the (technical) processes through which technology comes into existence. In defining the technological bluff, Jacques Ellul states
I am not referring to technical bluff. I am not trying to show that techniques do not deliver what they promise, that technicians are bluffers. I am talking about technological bluff, about the gigantic bluff in which discourse on techniques envelop us, making us believe anything and, far worse, changing our whole attitude to techniques...

The bluff consists essentially of rearranging everything in terms of technical progress, which with prodigious diversification offers us in every direction such varied possibilities that we can imagine nothing else. Discourse on technique is not a justification of techniques (which is not necessary) but a demonstration of the prodigious power, diversity, success, universal application, and impeccability of techniques.  

Generally, the technological bluff refers to the discourse that sustains western paradigms – i.e. promoting, normalising and conveying the inevitability of White ways of thinking as progress. Thus '[a]s a result of the technological bluff, technique is seen as the only chance for progress and development in every society', and invisibly reinforces the hidden assumptions intertwined within this paradigm. It spreads, promotes and normalises the vague and broad notion that technique is the inevitable and sole source of progress.

This implies that the technological bluff is hegemonic in nature. This is indicated in the following extract:

the proliferation of techniques, mediated by the media, by communications, by the universalisation of images, by changed human discourse, has outflanked prior obstacles and integrated them progressively into the process. It has encircled points of resistance, which then tend to dissolve. It has done all this without any hostile reaction or refusal, partly because what is proposed infinitely transcends all capacity for opposition (often because no one comprehends what is at issue), and partly because it has obvious cogency that is not found on the part of what might oppose it.

The ability to normalise existing power relations, and the dynamic/challengeable yet dominant position of the technological bluff, specifically illustrate its hegemonic nature. This is further exemplified:

Its very ordinariness ensures it success... Ordinariness gives reassurance. The genius of technique... is to produce the most reassuring and innocent ordinariness. This is what we are studying under the title of the technological bluff.
The notion of not being able to *imagine* anything other than a technological means to progress (through its *ordinariness*), and the *prodigious power, diversity, success, universal application, and impeccability of techniques*, raises a number of significant questions for White ways of knowing and seeing the world – and the implications will be considered and examined in relation to the calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre for Kuradjii/Sandon Point.

The above extracts imply that central and fundamental to the technological bluff, and its hegemonic nature, is consent. Consent as a basis for Jacques Ellul’s concept can be seen in the following

> The image, then, is not of oppression, but of submission by society as a whole in hopes of a greater good.\(^29\)

**Gene Sharp’s consent theory of power**

Consent, specifically its centrality to ability to exercise power, and the role it plays in disputes, was the focus of an empirical study of non-violent actions undertaken by Gene Sharp. A number of writers have analysed, evaluated and commented on the outcomes of this study, with Brian Martin succinctly describing ‘[t]he essence of Sharp’s theory of power’ as:

> [P]eople in society may be divided into rulers and subjects; the power of rulers derives from consent by the subjects; non-violent action is a process of withdrawing consent and thus is a way to challenge the key modern problems of dictatorship, genocide, war and systems of oppression'.\(^30\)

Of the many examples used by Gene Sharp to support his consent theory of power is one that clearly delineates between consent achieved through *obedience*, and consent achieved through physical *coercion*:

> If, for example, a man who is ordered to go to prison refuses to do so and is physically dragged there (that is, if he is coerced by physical violation), he cannot be said to obey… But if he *walks* to prison under a command backed by *threat* of physical sanction, then he in fact obeys and consents to the act, although he may not approve of the command. *Obedience thus exists only when one has complied with or submitted to the command*.\(^31\)

This illustrates the achievement of consent through specifically overt means. Consent can also be achieved through means not as overt as this with:
The overwhelming percentage of a ruler’s commands and objectives [only being] achieved by inducing the subject to be \textit{willing} for some reason to carry them out.\textsuperscript{32}

The central means to \textit{induce} a level of \textit{willingness} (consent) is the normativity and inevitability of the \textit{commands’} outcomes.\textsuperscript{33} These notions raise a number of significant questions for an examination of the calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre at Kuradji/Sandon Point.

As the role of normalising specific modes and ways of thinking and acting is central to hegemony, consent (or obedience) can become an unconscious activity. Thus, within the context of this discussion paper – specifically the framework of hegemonic Whiteness – Brian Martin’s succinct description of Gene Sharp’s theory of power can be re-written and extended to more clearly indicate its applicability:

Discourse in society may be divided into dominant (hegemonic) and marginalised; the power of the dominant discourse derives from the consent of proponents and extends through to unconscious (partially unwilling) supporters.

It is the unconscious, hidden assumptions that are the focus of this consideration of the proposed Aboriginal Cultural Centre at Kuradji/Sandon Point. To further illustrate the applicability of this re-written description, it can be correlated with the work of Michel Foucault, with consent central to the exercise of power:

\begin{quote}
Power is exercised over those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what their choices will be.\textsuperscript{34,35}
\end{quote}

Yet Michel Foucault’s ‘disciplinary perspective on government contrasts sharply with the representation of governmental power as a function of consent’.\textsuperscript{36} Can this be congruous with Gene Sharp’s consent theory of power? The answer can be seen in Michel Foucault’s account of contemporary western societies in which we learn to accept, and become moulded by, the disciplinary techniques and procedures of government. Thus, there is a correlation between Gene Sharp’s consent theory and Michel Foucault’s work on power.

\textbf{Calls for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre as mediated}

Consideration of the applicability and effectiveness of the cross-over in the theoretical approaches initiated by Antonio Gramsci, Jaques Ellul, Gene Sharp and Michel Foucault to (non-Aboriginal) community calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre at Kuradji/Sandon Point is central to this paper. The hegemonic nature of Jaques Elluls technological bluff – mediated through the
privileged position of White ways of knowing and seeing the world – is at the core of this analysis. The hidden assumptions underlying technology as both the only imaginable means to achieve progress, inevitable through its maintenance of existing power relations, and the implicit ability to induce consent, are central to this.

Hidden assumptions packaged within the community proposal include notions of technology (and the application of rational, ordered science) as progress – or more precisely the only means to progress. Through the development of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre, the primitive, inefficient, and disordered state of artefactual materials (i.e. in situ) could be encompassed and homogenised in a more suitable modern interpretive state within a concise, climate controlled and dirt-free building. Such a process mirrors other such displays – whether packaged or represented differently. This includes the isolation and display of historical items and also imitates and reinforces as normal/acceptable the practice of relocating human remains (and other materials) of people from other (non-White, primitive) cultures to museums.

The institution of the museum – and the long history associated with the establishment and operation of such facilities – creates an aura of ordinariness around them. This has led to an unconscious acceptance of them as an integral part of society. A cultural centre is essentially a specialised museum, and thus a part of this institution. The establishment of new facilities (i.e. cultural centres) – alongside and integral to the growth of (modern) society – has not only become normal, but commonsense. It is also more than inevitable: it is essential to progress. Consideration of other (primitive) cultures has become subsumed within dominant discourse that, in itself, indicates the malleable borders of hegemony. This clearly illustrates the power of hegemonic Whiteness.

Intertwined within the absorption of a consideration for other cultures into White ways of knowing and seeing the world, and the normativity of museum-like (i.e. cultural) centres, is the inducement of consent for their establishment. This inducement can be multi-levelled. It includes submission based on the hope of a greater good or that no feasible alternative being imaginable – a direct result of the hegemonic nature of the technological bluff. It is here that the community calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre are primarily located.

Consent, and the hegemonic basis of decisions/proposals to relocate artefactual material for protection, is clearly visible in numerous other contemporary examples. In many countries artefactual material stumbled across by western society is relocated to specific locations/establishments with the implied aim of protection (and/or scientific assessment). Discourse that often surrounds such plans for relocation rarely even fathoms, let alone considers, leaving the materials in-situ. Rather, relocation for protection is not just inevitable it is seen as essential (for protection) and thus commonsense.

Relocation consented to through submission/obedience, based on a belief in the inevitability and
commonsense of development as the sole means to progress, is clear in the case of the Aboriginal Cultural Centre proposal. Many of those who support or have adopted the proposal – specifically those actively supporting the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy – have done so based on the notion of (technological) development as inevitable. The establishment of a cultural centre fits squarely within this discourse and is thus an acceptable and unquestioned option. This is counter to the option of leaving the Kuradji/Sandon Point area as is (i.e. doing nothing), which is not fathomable on many levels. Doing nothing cannot lead to progress as there is not any improvement. Leaving the area in its primitive, inefficient, and disordered state (of nature) within which it is currently perceived is not in any way suitable, or even possible. The perceived impeccableness of technology, and its universal application, clearly envelopes, negates and transcends such a (im)possibility.

What if the design of the proposed Aboriginal Cultural Centre comprised a theatre/introductory hall with non-intrusive guided walks through the area? Such a design could have the specific aim of visitors actively viewing areas and materials of Significance in-situ (real-world situation) with out the threat of damage. This still imbibes the same underlying notions as a contained facility. Whilst such a proposal may reduce the level of homogenisation of a stand-alone cultural centre, it is still mediated through hegemonic Whiteness and based on the same hidden assumptions outlined.

**Conclusion**

This consideration of the community proposal for the establishment of an Aboriginal Cultural Centre at Kuradji/Sandon Point clearly illustrates the applicability and effectiveness of the theoretical approaches overviewed to this specific case study. In contrast to this proposal being aimed at supporting the actions of the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the discourse, and underlying assumptions, surrounding the notion of a cultural centre are clearly mediated through hegemonic Whiteness. Implicit in this discourse are notions of technology not only as progress, but the only chance for progress. Progress, in this instance, is the protection of artefactual materials – and this is deeply linked to the specific context of the community (alternative) proposal for the Kuradji/Sandon point area.

As illustrated, divergence or resistance to White ways of knowing and seeing the world, are subsumed via technological bluff. The normativity and ordinariness of the proposed cultural centre – directly resulting from the discourse on technique – provides reassurance: the technologies embodied within a cultural centre will provide the only means for protection of artefactual material. The normativity and ordinariness of technology providing such solutions provides the reassurance necessary for consent, thus clearly illustrating that consent is implicit in the hegemonic basis of the discourse surrounding the proposal for an Aboriginal Cultural Centre. This specifically illustrates that the works of Antonio Gramsci, Jaques Ellul, Gene Sharp and Michel Foucault – specifically the significant cross-over, despite the apparent diversity – are clearly applicable and effective in considering and analysing this case study.
Whilst the actions of the community at Kuradji/Sandon Point may have impacted on discourse surrounding Aboriginal Australians, Significance and (to a lesser extent) progress have these impacts transcended hidden assumptions behind Whiteness? Does impacting on the malleable boundaries of hegemonic Whiteness – this malleability being a clear indication of its power – provide for a challenge to Whiteness? We are left with the question of how do we transcend Whiteness? How do we ‘contribute to the process of theorising ways in which White race power and privilege might be undone’?  

One option is available through Jacques Ellul’s ‘active pessimism’ – by becoming able to see ones nonfreedom, one can become free: 

we can be free when we can take our distance from the whole affair and reflect on the situation of nonfreedom. When one can see personal nonfreedom, one is free. One can do something to change the circumstances, only when one realizes that it is impossible. One cannot extricate oneself by talk, but to know the fact is the beginning of the way out.  

Notes:  

3 Angela Maree Pratt, p 10.  
5 Michael Organ 1990, Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines 1770-1850, Aboriginal Education Unit, University of Wollongong, p. 343.  
7 Heavy seas exposed this burial site and a number of others in the 1950s and 1974 in the fore-dunes. During the 1970s, up to 8 burials were exposed during the laying of sewer pipes by the Water Board (a state government authority, now known as Sydney Water). Sydney Water vehemently denies the existence of these burials despite local Aboriginal people relocating them a short distance away in the early 1980s.

the Water Board (now Sydney Water) was constructing sewer pipes at Kuradji/Sandon Point. Anecdotal evidence, vehemently denied by Sydney Water, exists regarding up to 8 burials discovered at this time. In the early 1980s local Indigenous people relocated these burials a short distance away.


9 The dating of this burial site was estimated based on deposits underlying an adjacent midden site – no direct attempts were made to date either material from the burial pit or the Kuradji itself (see Kerry Navin & Kelvin Officer, 2001, p. 8). Thus this burial, and another site of Indigenous Significance (dated without a detailed investigation) at Kuradji/Sandon Point, could be significantly older. Based on detailed archaeological investigations at the two oldest dated Aboriginal sites on the south coast of NSW – Bass Point and Burril Lake, which both have similar characteristics, Aboriginal use of the Kuradji/Sandon Point area may have begun up to 20,000 years ago.

10 This is supported by Richard Fullager, the archaeologist who conducted the excavation of the Kuradji. See Richard Fullagar & Denise Donlan 1998 and Richard Fullagar & Leslie Head 1990, McCauley’s Beach Midden, Thirroul, NSW: Report on the Archaeological Excavation, Report to the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service.

11 Following the exhumation, the Kuradji was reburied at a non-disclosed location in the vicinity of its original resting place.

12 Both SPATE and the Community Picket – both occupied/staffed 24 hours, 7 days a week – are still running some four years following their establishment. SPATE is in the process of being rebuilt after it was destroyed in an arson attack on 19 September 2004.

13 Kevin Cleland & Mark Carelton, Land use planning for Certain Land at Sandon Point, Wollongong City, S119, Office of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, NSW Government, p. 69. This report also referred to four campsites, two middens, two Women’s areas, four burial sites and five areas containing artefactual materials.

14 See, for example, the summaries of the submissions of Rueban Brown, Alan Carriage, Illawarra Local Aboriginal Land Council, Lyle Davis, and Maureen Davis in Kevin Cleland & Mark Carelton, p. 49, 57.


17 ibid.

18 Angela Maree Pratt, p. 24.

19 Richard Dyer, p. 11.

20 ibid., pp. 9-10.

21 Angela Maree Pratt, p. 3

22 See Wha-Chul Son 2004, Reading Jacques Ellul’s The Technological Bluff in Context, Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, Volume 24, Number 6, p. 519, 539.


26 Wha-Chul Son, p. 520-21.


Culture, Place and Space

hegemonic Whiteness, the technological bluff and consent theories of power


Gene Sharp, p. 27.


This view of power and choice/consent partly addresses the criticisms raised by Kate McGuiness.

Barry Hindess, p. 116.

There are cases in which artefactual are left in situ, though this is generally the result of either the impracticality of removal/relocation, the area being of little economic value, or the location being suitable as a tourist attraction – or a combination of these. Aboriginal ‘rock art’ can be considered as one such example.

Angela Maree Pratt, p. 10

Wha-Chul Son, p. 529