Power Plant Security

Regulatory Bodies

In international terms the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear power plants but leaves enforcement to individual government agencies. For example, in the US, the nuclear energy industry is one of the few industries whose security program is regulated by the federal government. Nuclear plants must meet all federal security requirements, as determined and monitored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC's security requirements are based on protecting the public from the possibility of exposure to radioactive releases caused by acts of sabotage. Similarly, in Australia, the Australian Federal Police enforce security at ANSTO.

Previous Incidents

While there has never been a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant, there have been threats or attempts to penetrate or sabotage nuclear reactor sites reported in the United States. Officials have identified several attempts to penetrate security at nuclear plants since 1978. Most significantly, in the mid-1980s, three power lines leading to the Palo Verde plant in Arizona were sabotaged, and in 1989 four people were charged with conspiring to disable three Southwest nuclear plants.

Site Security

In the US there are

• approximately 8,000 security officers at 103 plants located on 64 sites
• surveillance and patrols of the perimeter fence;
• a contingency response force;
• physical barriers and illuminated detection zones;
• intrusion detection aids (including several types of detection fields,
  closed-circuit television systems and alarm/alert devices);
• bullet-resisting barriers at critical areas.

Post-Sept. 11 Security Enhancements

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), after Sept. 11, the nuclear energy industry substantially enhanced security at nuclear plants. Security forces were increased by one-third to approximately 8,000 officers at 103 plants located at 64 sites. Furthermore, all commercial nuclear power plants met the NRC's Oct. 29, 2004 deadline for implementing more stringent security measures mandated by a series of NRC security orders. According to the NEI, overall, the industry has spent an additional $1.2 billion US in security-related improvements since September 2001.

POGO, an independent government watchdog has interviewed security guards protecting 23%, more than one in five, of the operating and one decommissioning nuclear power reactors, as well as a National Guardsman protecting the perimeter of a plant. While a few guards interviewed by POGO said their plants have had a dramatic increase in the guard force since 9/11, most of the guards interviewed believe that they are still below levels that are adequate to defeat a real terrorist attack.

Reactor Security

Reactor containment buildings designed to be impervious to catastrophes. Nuclear power plants containment buildings are built with steel reinforced concrete containment structures, coupled with multiple, redundant safety and plant shutdown systems and have been designed to withstand the impact of hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and airborne objects with a very substantial force.

Also, Since the World Trade Centre attacks in September 2001 various studies have looked at similar possible attacks on nuclear power plants - which must be considered as a possibility. One such study was undertaken by the Electric Power Research Institute. The analyses used a fully-fuelled Boeing 767-400 of over 200 tonnes as the basis, at 350 mph - the maximum speed for precision flying near the ground. The wingspan is greater than the diameter of reactor containment buildings and the 4.3 ton engines are 15 metres apart. Hence analyses focused on single engine direct impact on the centreline and on the impact of the entire aircraft if the fuselage hit the centreline (in which case the engines would ricochet off the sides). In each case no part of the aircraft or its fuel would penetrate the containment. Looking at spent fuel storage pools, similar analyses showed no breach. Dry storage and transport casks also retained their integrity.

References

1. http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/safeguards.html
2. http://www.uic.com.au/nip05.htm
3. http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020901-nukepower.html