- THE INCINERATOR CASE STUDY
- SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT TECHNOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS
- Routine Performance
- Accidents
- AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
- MODELS OF SOCIETY
- UNINTENDED MESSAGES
- CONCLUSIONS
Risk communication is a relatively new field of study which has been concerned
with the problems arising from the communication of scientific and technical
assessments of risk to various sections of the public.[1] These problems have largely been construed as
technical ones: how to transfer difficult material from 'experts' to 'people'
with the maximum effectiveness and the minimum loss of accuracy and content.
Perhaps because technical or practical concerns have dominated, debates which
have occurred in the literature of risk analysis have apparently had little
impact on the field of risk communication.[2]
A consequence of this is that studies of risk communication have tended to
be asymmetrical. It is recognised that members of the public and community groups
perceive risks differently from those who construct risk assessments or commission
them (if this disparity did not exist, risk communication would be a relatively
straightforward business), and it is generally assumed that expert risk assessments
are accurate and correct. This being so, the self-imposed task of risk communicators
is to disseminate various truths to an audience that is deficient in some fundamental
and obstructive way, beyond 'ignorance of the facts'. Those to whom risk assessments
need to be communicated are perceived to lack reason or be hampered by an assortment
of psychological and political disabilities - bias, special interest, ideological
commitment, and so forth. The asymmetry arises both from the implicit model
of communication at work (communication in one direction, from 'top' to 'bottom',
from the knowing to the ignorant) and from the assumption that the expert communicators
or assessors possess a series of positive attributes (rationality, disinteredness,
political neutrality) denied the public. The notion that risk assessments might
be socially constructed, ideologically-driven, and politically 'contaminated'
is rarely contemplated. Without wishing to prejudge the issue, we do believe
that the acknowledgement by risk communication analysts of some of the best
research in risk assessment would not only restore balance but also offer the
prospect of more effective communication.
An example of the 'asymmetrical' model is provided in the work of Vincent
Covello, Detlof von Winterfeldt and Paul Slovik, who have written extensively
in this area. They provide a model of risk communication as a 'message' originating
at a 'source' and being 'channelled' to a 'receiver'. Based on wide literature
surveys, they summarise the problems that can arise in each of these four aspects
of risk communication. The 'message' may contain significant uncertainties and
be technically complex. The experts and communicators themselves, the 'source',
may fail to gain the trust of their audience, fail to make clear the limitations
of their knowledge, disagree with each other and lack an understanding of the
interests and concerns of the public. The media, or 'channel', may sensationalise
the issue and distort the message. Finally, the 'receivers' of the message may
have inaccurate perceptions of levels of risk, strong unshakeable beliefs, an
overconfidence in the ability to avoid harm, and difficulties in understanding
the information.[3]
The assumption that inaccurate perceptions are to be found amongst receivers
alone is widespread; it is to be found, for instance, amongst those advising
engineers on the best ways of communicating risk messages. For example, a recent
article in ]Civil Engineering informs readers that,
While engineers may be satisfied with technical analyses of real,
statistical and predicted risk, laypeople have intuitive fears that create perceived
risk... Opposition based on perceived risk can be reduced through information
and consultation that begins early on...[4]
A similar view is taken by government regulators, who are particularly prone to
advocating the asymmetric model of risk communication. A US EPA administrator
expresses puzzlement over public fears over the wrong issues:
It is an odd fact that communities that would not object to, or would
even welcome, a manufacturer of chemicals locating nearby will offer strong
resistance to a recycling plant or an incinerator if the fatal words "hazardous
waste" are used. It is clear we cannot afford public ignorance in areas where
waste disposal facilities are required.... Not only must we raise, by direct
action, the level of sophistication of the public's thinking about risk issues,
but we must also do what we can to increase the number of people who can communicate
effectively about risk.[5]
Much risk communication is therefore purposefully undertaken to correct the public's
'false' view of risk and draw it more in line with the 'correct' view of the risk
experts. However, risk experts and government officials are not the only ones
that communicate about risk. A range of interest groups, environmentalists and
community spokespeople communicate risk either by intention or accident. Krimsky
and Plough liken risk communication to "tangled webs" rather than a "parallel
series of sender/receiver interactions".
[6]
This useful analogy of a web is used to denote the fact that there are many
types of risk communicators and possible sources of communication, which can
easily become entangled; in fact, which do so routinely. It is, argue Krimsky
and Plough, not possible to anticipate which particular risk communicator will
dominate and what the outcome will be. Behind the analogy of the web, then,
stands a rejection of the conventional account of risk communication as the
transmission of technical information from elites to the general public. Krimsky
and Plough prefer a more multi-dimensional account incorporating "cultural themes,
motivations and symbolic meanings."[7]
In this paper, we shall be applying and, we hope, extending the analogy of
the 'tangled web of communication' through a case study in which we examine
the symbolic portrayal of technology and of the relationship between technology
and society implicit in the debates over the risks surrounding a hazardous waste
incinerator proposed for the state of New South Wales in Australia. At least
three points emerge from our case study which we feel are of general interest.
First of all, we show that risk communications associated with technologies
convey a message about how technological systems work. In talking and writing
about technological and environmental risks, people make assumptions about how
technology is shaped, implemented and operated. Secondly, we show that in the
debate analysed in this paper what are counterposed by the 'opposing' sides
are, on the one hand, an 'ideal' view of technology, and on the other hand,
a 'worst case scenario' of technology. We suggest that such polarised models
of technological systems can be found in many technological controversies. Thirdly
we examine the tacit models of society that are held by the risk communicators
and how these shape the way they communicate risks.
Although we fully recognise that risk communications can come from various
parties to a dispute, our focus is upon the communications of the authorities
who sought to get the incinerator established and environmentalists who opposed
the incinerator. This focus has been adopted for three reasons. First of all,
we have thought it better in a paper of acceptable length to examine two 'sources'
in some detail rather than offer a sketchy account of many. Next, our choice
has been governed by the importance of these two groups, each powerful and vocal
(and extremely productive). Finally, as the reader will discover, the 'web'
is tangled enough with two major participant groups: further threads would make
it in all likelihood impenetrable.]
In 1987 the Australian federal government joined with the State governments of
New South Wales and Victoria to form a Joint Taskforce on Intractable Wastes.
The Taskforce was meant to facilitate a co-operative effort between the three
governments to site a hazardous waste incinerator in south-eastern Australia after
several attempts by individual states to site such an incinerator had failed because
of the strength of local community opposition.
The Taskforce originally consisted of four people. Gavan McDonell, a sociologist
and engineer who has conducted previous government enquiries, was appointed
as convenor. The other three members were Peter Brotherton, a declared supporter
of hazardous waste incineration and a member of the Australian Conservation
Foundation, one of Australia's largest environmental groups; Ray Gillham, an
industry representative and Helen Sjoquist, a town planner, seconded from the
NSW Department of Planning. When the first phase of its activities were completed
in 1988, Gavan McDonell and Helen Sjoquist left the Taskforce and Anthony Thomas,
a senior government bureaucrat from the Northern Territory, took over as convenor.
Incineration is viewed by the authorities, particularly the Waste Management
Authority of NSW (the Authority is the government body currently responsible
for managing and regulating waste in NSW), as the only safe means of disposing
of hazardous organochlorine wastes which they refer to as "intractable wastes".
These are mostly stored at ICI's Botany site in Sydney, although small quantities
of discarded organochlorine pesticides and PCBs are stored outside of Sydney.
The authorities have been under pressure to do something about these stores
of wastes from sections of the community, the media and the environment movement.[8]
Some environmentalists support the establishment of an incinerator for this
purpose, but a significant number are opposed. Greenpeace Australia has played
the most prominent role in opposing the proposed incinerator; it has the resources
to allocate a paid campaigner to the issue and has access to a wide information
base through its international network of offices, campaigners and researchers.
Greenpeace has a worldwide policy of opposition to incineration for two reasons.
Firstly, the organisation believes incineration is unsafe because the emissions
from the stack, leachate (liquids that leak out of buried waste) from the residues
and other leakages during handling of the wastes can damage the environment
and public health over the long term.
Secondly, Greenpeace argues that providing an "end-of-pipe" disposal solution
will only encourage industry to continue generating these wastes: "In relation
to hazardous waste management, industry and government have a clear choice.
They can either follow the incineration path or the clean production path."[9]
Greenpeace, Australia argues that "intractable" wastes in Australia should be
stored until they are no longer being generated and "safer" alternative technologies
for treating the stockpile have been developed. It argues that with enough political
commitment and funding this could be achieved within about five years.[10]
Supporters of the incinerator argue that there is no time to wait for such
developments which they say could take ten or twenty years and even then they
might not be satisfactory substitutes for incineration. They promise that generation
of "intractable" wastes will be prohibited by law within the next few years.
The incinerator would only have to operate for ten years to get rid of the stockpile
and then it could be closed down and the problem solved once and for all. This,
they argue, is far preferable to letting the wastes be stored for an indefinite
period awaiting technological developments.[11]
The Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste worked for three years and was disbanded
in 1990. During that time it conducted a public consultation process and came
up with a short list of sites for the incinerator. These are are all in rural,
sparsely populated areas of NSW, hundreds of kilometres from Sydney. Some of
these sites have been ruled out by the NSW government for environmental and
other reasons but there remain seven sites on the short list. Residents at each
of these remaining sites oppose the incinerator because they are concerned about
the impact it will have on their health, their environment, their agricultural
produce and the reputation of the area.
In 1991, in a further attempt to distance the decision-making process from
itself, the governments appointed an "Independent Panel on Intractable Waste"
to examine alternatives to incineration, to decide whether to go ahead with
a hazardous waste incinerator, to decide where it should be located and to oversee
the preparation of environmental impacts studies. In the meantime the debate
over risks continues. As we shall show, the Waste Management Authority is attempting
to persuade concerned residents and the wider public that the risks associated
with the incinerator are minimal and therefore acceptable while Greenpeace Australia
is campaigning against the incinerator, arguing that the risks are too high.
Although environmentalists and the government authorities have essentially
drawn on the same body of knowledge and literature, they have assembled diametrically
opposing arguments by selecting differing "facts" and by highlighting some aspects
of the literature at the expense of others. An indication of the chasm between
the two is suggested by the definitions each employ of the 'hazardous waste
incinerator'. The Waste Management Authority of NSW which is charged with building
and operating the incinerator describes a hazardous waste incinerator as "an
industrial facility which safely converts intractable wastes into harmless components."[12]
Greenpeace, Australia, the foremost critic of the proposed incinerator, takes
up this use of the words 'safely' and 'harmless' by proposing that "even the
most modern incinerators pump out persistent and bioaccumulative toxins and
spread them onto the land and into the air and water."[13]
There would appear to be little room for dialogue, and still less for compromise,when
the basic definitions of the technology in dispute are themselves controversial.
That, perhaps, is the point: the controversy is about basics.
Closer attention to the arguments points to the fact that the main difference
in the arguments between the two sides arise because Greenpeace emphasises a
'worst case' scenario and talks about what can go wrong with an incinerator,
while the Waste Management Authority emphasises a 'best case' scenario and highlights
how well an incinerator could operate in ideal conditions. Each side has employed
a different, if not totally conscious, model of how technological systems work.
We suggest, therefore, that the risk messages being conveyed by each group embody
symbolic communications about the nature of science and technology as well as
the intended communications about risk.
The model used by the government supporters of the incinerator is the traditional
'naive' one that a technological system can be built and operated to behave in
an ideal way. The Joint Taskforce stated that;
Excellent design and the best equipment must be complemented by the
establishment of the necessary systems and procedures and the requirement for
unfailing compliance with them.[14]
This view that every part of a technological system and everyone associated with
it can be expected to unfailingly follow carefully defined rules in which uncertainties
are peripheral has traditionally been fostered as part of the process of legitimation
of technologies.
[15] It carries two assumptions
which we shall now consider: 1) a facility such as an incinerator will routinely
achieve the performance that it was designed to achieve; 2) there will rarely
be any significant deviation from routine operation, which is a way of saying
that accidents will seldom occur ]
The most common measure of performance of an incinerator is the Destruction and
Removal Efficiency which is based upon the measurement of certain preselected
chemicals emitted during trial burns in optimal conditions. The aim is to measure
what proportion of the waste material fed into the incinerator remains, undestroyed,
in the gases going out the chimney. This measurement is normally expressed as
a percentage. The proposed Australian incinerator will be designed to achieve
99.9999% efficiency and it is assumed that it will operate at this efficiency
throughout its lifetime.
[16]
Destruction and Removal Efficiency is a measure that embodies assumptions
of ideal technology in two ways. Firstly it is measured during optimal conditions
when the feedstock, feed rate, fuel and operation of the incinerator is carefully
controlled. In 1985 the Science Advisory Committee to the US Environmental Protection
Agency (US EPA) noted that;
Research on the performance of incinerators has occurred only under
optimal burn conditions and sampling has, on occasion, been discontinued during
upset conditions which take place with unknown frequency. Even relatively short-term
operation of incinerators in upset conditions can greatly increase the total
incinerator emitted loadings to the environment.[17]
Secondly, by ignoring the formation of new chemicals from partial destruction
of the wastes or chemical recombinations of molecules, the Destruction and Removal
Efficiency measure carries with it another assumption about ideal technology.
This is that the wastes are either completely destroyed, down to their simplest
components, or they remain intact. The Science Advisory Committee to the US
EPA has also been critical of that Agency's dependence on the concept of destruction
and removal efficiency because it "does not fully address either partial oxidation
or chemical recombinations which may create new toxic compounds." Because of
this, they warn, it is an incomplete measure which is "not useful for subsequent
exposure assessments."[18]
The Waste Management Authority of NSW quotes the design specification of a
Destruction and Removal Efficiency of 99.9999% as an advantage of the proposed
incinerator; in several places its literature portrays what is undoubtedly an
ideal process. For example, the incinerator is described as follows:
It is an industrial facility which safely converts intractable wastes
into harmless components - water, carbon dioxide, inert ash or slag and common
inorganic salts like sodium or calcium chloride.[19]
It would be wrong, all the same, to characterise the supporters of the incinerator
as ignoring the problem of dealing with the products of incomplete combustion.
Instead, they characterise these products as a normal and familiar (and therefore
predictable) part of the technological system which can be controlled to the
point where they are insignificant. The Authority points out that all combustion
processes, including home heaters and car engines, create "minute traces" of
these products which are generally accepted (and are, of course, familiar).[20]A
member of the Joint Taskforce argues along these lines that, if one were to
oppose the incinerator on the grounds of the potential danger of its by-products,
consistency would appear to require us to oppose all of these other
incineration processes, which are very much more polluting as well. Even public
transport would probably have to be restricted to rickshaws, pedicabs and yachts.[21]
The Taskforce also argued as follows:
High temperature treatment, modern, advanced flue gas scrubbing and
neutralization reduce these quantities to the point where many of them are virtually
unmeasurable when they leave the stack.[22]
The Waste Management Authority has concentrated on one class of these products,
dioxins and furans, and argued that "the calculated maximum emission" of these
from the proposed incinerator will be 1/30 gram per year as compared to 1/4
gram for an average bushfire.[23] This figure
is based on the standards the Authority proposes to set for the incinerator
and reflects a further confirmation of the model that the control of complex
technological systems is simply a matter of appropriate design and rule setting.
The Waste Management Authority has largely ignored other pathways of toxic
waste into the environment apart from the stack, stating that other waste products
from the incineration process "will not be toxic and will be safely disposed
of on-site". They argue that because the incineration process will operate under
a slight vacuum "any leak would always be inwards rather than outwards."[24]
Handling and transport are viewed, like the rest of the technological system,
as operating ideally and according to rule: "with proper containment, supervision
and adherence to the Transport Code, the wastes can be transported safely and
efficiently."[25]
When the Waste Management Authority discusses emissions from the proposed incinerator,
it only deals with routine emissions that are discharged as a result of normal,
accident-free operations. No mention is made of emissions that could occur during
upset conditions or as a result of an accident; the unstated assumption is that
accidents will seldom occur. Similarly, much of the research and development in
the last few years into incineration technology has focussed on reducing routine
or `normal' emissions from the stack, particularly dioxin emissions. Mark Tweeddale,
Professor of Risk Engineering at the University of Sydney and a specialist in
risk management, has commented that,
management of environmental protection still concentrates on steady-state
emissions (eg from stacks), and gives little attention to recognition and management
of risks to the environment from abnormal and unexpected mishaps.[26]
Various accounts have been given of technological systems and of why accidents
happen. The sociologist of science Brian Wynne gives several examples to show
that real operating systems do not follow the rules by which they `officially'
operate even at the best of times. Indeed, as he writes, with reference to technological
systems, "if the rules were followed to the letter, the system would grind to
a halt."
[27] One example he gives is of the failure
of the Challenger space shuttle which exploded spectacularly when the O-ring seals
failed. The seals had been shown to be faulty in previous flights although it
had not caused any accident. So, what of the logic of those who knew about this
but allowed the shuttle launch to take-off? Wynne presents it as follows:
This component shows behaviour which is abnormal according to our
original design-performance rules; however in several launches it has shown
less than adequate performance without incident; its failure has been apparently
within acceptable bounds (which we have made up under negotiation from experience
as we went along).[28]
According to Wynne the experts came to accept O-ring damage and leakage as
the new normality; failure itself was redefined. Any technological system requires
the "continual invention and negotiation of new rules and relationships" in
order to operate smoothly. The simple view, that there should be no deviation
from the formal operating rules would, Wynne says, paralyse many technologies
if it were fully enforced.[29]
Trevor Kletz, a chemical engineer who has written many books and articles
in engineering magazines about accidents and how they happen, describes several
situations which support Wynne's hypothesis. One, for example, is of a serious
explosion in a factory handling high pressure ethylene. A badly-made joint leaked
and the ethylene was ignited by an unknown cause. Until that time poor joint-making
had been tolerated because it was believed that all sources of ignition had
been eliminated. Kletz puts this failure down to a lack of communication between
this factory and others under the same ownership where this assumption would
have been questioned.[30]
However in the naive view of technological systems that is normally portrayed
to the public, accidents are labelled as 'human error' as if they involved drastic
departures from normal rule-bound operating practices, and as if to exonerate
what Wynne describes as a supposedly separate mechanical, non-social part of
the system. So, the following two assumptions appear to be built into the design
of technological systems: 1) that organisations can operate with perfect communication
and 2) that expert people are not prone to distraction, illogic or complacency.[31]
It is this view of technology that the Waste Management Authority literature
appeals to and relies upon. A formal risk assessment has not yet been done for
the proposed incinerator. However the Waste Management Authority and government
officials seem confident of the results of such assessments and have not felt
it was necessary to wait until these assessments are done before communicating
about the safety of the incinerator. ]
Greenpeace, which has made public its opposition to the proposed incinerator
[32]
has lain considerable emphasis in its publications on the things that can go awry
with incinerators. The organisation's campaigners have analysed the same body
of literature employed by the authorities supporting incineration: including scientific
articles and government reports. The database, as it were, is the same, but in
recovering it, Greenpeace has sought to uncover uncertainties and throw into question
the naive view of technological systems and replace it with one that portrays
complex technological systems as unpredictable and uncontrollable, as will be
shown below. To the rule-governed behaviour invoked by the Waste Management Authority,
Greenpeace counterposes a version of Murphy's law - "Watch out because everything
that can go wrong, is likely to go wrong".
Greenpeace stresses departures from the ideal. They point out that "no anti-pollution
control devices achieve full particulate removal."[33]
Moreover the types of problems that are associated with incinerator technologies
are listed along with the types of failures that might lead to upset conditions.
But no probability is attached to these problems and failures so that any reader
lacks a notion of just how likely they are to occur. Greenpeace Australia argues
as follows:
In real-world operation even the most modern and well-maintained incinerators
deviate from ideal performance. These deviations - called combustion upsets
- vary in severity and duration, ranging from explosions and flameouts to minor
perturbations in small portions of an incinerator for brief periods of time.[34]
The concept of Destruction and Removal Efficiency (discussed above), which
is more typical of optimal operating conditions, is also criticised by Greenpeace
both because the concept fails to take account of the products of incomplete
combustion and because it is an inaccurate measure. Destruction and Removal
Efficiency measurements, the organisation claims on the basis of references
to scientific papers, "have been found to be highly inconsistent and unpredictable
over periods of time"[35]. Other scientists referred
to by Greenpeace have cautioned against assuming an incinerator is operating
typically during a trial burn because "complex mixtures of chemicals including
metals, halogens and other elements" are more typical of routine hazardous waste
incinerator feeds. They argue that such deviations have a significant impact
on the environment and claim that incinerator equipment and pollution control
devices grow less reliable with advancing age.[36]
Greenpeace, Australia also emphasise fugitive emissions "during routine storage,
handling, and transport" and accidental spills during transfer and transport.
For them such incidents are the norm rather than the exception. They point out
the failures and controversies surrounding the worst performing hazardous waste
incinerators in other countries as examples of what could happen. They do not
differentiate between older and newer technologies in this context or differing
legal standards. Whilst the Waste Management Authority claims that people living
near incinerators have no complaints Greenpeace quotes individuals said to live
near such incinerators and their claims of ill-health as well as clusters of
cancers or eye defects from areas surrounding such facilities.[37]
Greenpeace, Australia highlight the uncertainties and lack of knowledge surrounding
hazardous waste incineration. In one of their publications they have a whole
chapter on "Unknowns and Uncertainties in Incineration Technology".(38) In another
they claim;
Published scientific literature, industrial papers, and United States
Environment Protection Agency (US EPA) research reports refer repeatedly to
the general paucity of critical information on hazardous waste incineration
processes, performance and impacts on public health and the environment.
The rudimentary toxicological information about high-dose exposure to those
few individual chemicals which have been identified in stack gas emissions
gives no indication of the potential effects of long-term, low-dose exposure
to the diverse mixture of chemicals released from incinerators.[39]
Their emphasis on the uncertainties is partly aimed at countering the claims
of government authorities that incinerator technology is "proven" technology;
they say that in fact the technology "has not been shown not to have harmful
effects." Greenpeace focus on the possible products of incomplete combustion
and how little is known about them and talk about their "potential" impact on
health and on the global environment. "Of the thousands of individual PICs that
may be formed, approximately 100 have fully been identified." They give long
lists of chemicals that have been identified as products of incomplete combustion
in a range of incinerators.[40] The chemical
names are mostly meaningless to the lay public but the sheer quantity of names
such as "ethenylethylbenzene" and "trichloro-fluoromethane" can give a lay audience
the impression of great quantities of dangerous chemicals.
For Greenpeace, the mere identification of these chemicals in the emissions
and ash is enough to condemn a facility. This is because they do not accept
the concept of threshold levels of chemicals. In other words they do not accept
that there is a level of exposure which does no harm.
Carcinogenic and mutagenic effects for any chemical are thought to
follow a no-threshold model by which even one molecule of a carcinogen or mutagen
can initiate mutations and replications leading to disease (Kamrin 1988, Epstein
1989). Some reviewers have suggested no-threshold models for specific neurotoxic
(OTA 1990), developmental (Shane 1988), and reproductive (Shane 1988) effects
associated with exposure to any synthetic chemical.[41]
The debate over the risks of hazardous waste incineration has tended to focus
on technical factors and neglect social and political factors. Both the Waste
Management Authority and Greenpeace have tended to do this although they have
divergent views of the social institutions who would be responsible for running
and regulating an incinerator. Such views implicitly shape their discourse as
we will show. This neglect of the social dimension is typical characteristic of
the public face of technological controversies and to some extent reflects the
desire of governments and experts to limit debate to areas that give mainstream
groups advantage over their opposition in terms of access to information and public
credibility.
[42] The willingness of Greenpeace
to go along with this indicates firstly, their dependence on mainstream scientific
literature; secondly their powerlessness in terms of their ability to set the
agenda of the debate; and thirdly, their dependence on an international research
and information base which is unable to concentrate on the local social context.
In the case of the Waste Management Authority, their neglect of the social
dimension, their assumption that past record of the regulatory institutions
is irrelevant, implies that they believe these institutions will behave ideally.
The Waste Management Authority has consistently argued that "The incinerator
will be designed to meet the toughest standards in the world for such facilities."[43]
In doing so they have employed an idealised model of legislation which downplays
the social context of its implementation. In fact the implementation of standards
requires an on-going interaction between competing interests such as the regulatory
authority and the regulated, the nearby community and the government as well
as other interested parties. It generally involves adaption, compromise and
negotiation. Wynne argues that to ignore these social forces and their ability
to shape the regulatory process is to relegate "downstream actors or "implementers",
and associated organizational complexities, to the role of the merely mechanical
(decision-less) enactment (or obstruction) of policymakers' "decisions" or rules."[44]
In the Australian context the implementation phase tends to be all important
because of the wide discretion granted to the regulatory authority. Regulatory
procedures and standards tend not to be specified in the legislation but are
left open for the government regulators, such as the State Pollution Control
Commission in NSW, to develop and enforce as they feel is appropriate. Standards
tend to be established as guidelines or objectives and are not legally enforceable.
Even where they are legally enforceable, they are set in negotiation with those
being regulated. Standards that are expensive or onerous to achieve are unlikely
to be enforced by Australian authorities.[45]
For these reasons the equation of standards with actual performance is an idealisation.
The Swedish incinerator has often been invoked as an example of what can be
achieved and as a model for the proposed Australian incinerator. The Waste Management
Authority argues that background levels of dioxins and furans in the milk of
cows living near the Swedish incinerator are lower than the national average
and that dioxin levels in human breast milk in women in Sweden have shown a
progressive reduction during the lifespan of the hazardous waste incinerator
facility in that country.[46] In like fashion,
the Joint Taskforce has pointed out that the risks from incinerators in Sweden
were tens of thousands of times less than the the risks from the pollution caused
by car exhausts, wood-burning stoves and industries in Sweden.[47]
The choice of the Swedish incinerator as a model involves a number of interesting,
related assumptions. First, that the levels of dioxin in Sweden are causally
related to the performance of their incinerators, especially the hazardous waste
incinerator. Secondly, that the difference between the performance of incinerators
in different countries can be accounted for by differences in technology rather
than differences in social context. And third, that technologies are transferable
from country to country without adaption to social context. The authorities
have assumed that an Australian incinerator would perform as well as the modern
Swedish incinerator which has a better environmental record than many other
incinerators in Britain or the US. They argue that the reason incinerators operate
poorly in the US and Britain is because they use outdated technology and Australia
will not have that problem because it will be adopting the most up to date incinerator
technology.[48] No credence is given to the possibility
that the socio-political context in Sweden may lead to such factors as more
careful operation and tougher regulation of their incinerator than occurs in
the United States or might occur in Australia.
Wynne argues that although social assumptions shape expert risk analysis this
is not done deliberately to bias the outcome. Rather it is "more a reflection
of the structural role of scientists in the decision-making system, along with
the narrowness of scientific education."[49]
This raises the question of the extent to which the models of technology and
society being portrayed through risk communication are consciously and deliberately
chosen to further the communicator's interests or conversely the extent to which
they reflect "less conscious 'deeper' identifications with different social
institutions, cultural styles"[50]Might not these
models be unreflectingly accepted by the communicators who have been socialised
to accept particular versions of reality without too much reflection?
In terms of the portrayal of technology, it is unlikely that the engineers
so prominent in the Waste Management Authority are unaware of the discrepancies
between how a technological system is designed and how it operates in the real
world, and, what follows from this - the scope there is for accidents. The Institution
of Engineers, Australia has openly recognised that engineers have tended to
portray an idealistic view of what they can achieve. A paper circulated to engineers
at the end of 1990 titled 'Are You At Risk? Managing Expectations' came up with
this intriguingly-worded piece of wisdom:
We know (or should know) that our models are limited in their ability
to represent real systems, and we use (or should use) them accordingly. The
trouble is that we are so inordinately proud of them that we do not present
their limitations to the community, and leave the community with the impression
that the models are precise and comprehensive...[51]
This (veiled) admission notwithstanding, anyone concerned to promote an unpopular
or controversial technology often finds that the naive view of it is far more
reassuring than a more realistic image. What follows is that in risk communication
with the public, there is a strong, indeed irresistible, temptation to employ
the more naive model. However, perhaps the same cannot be said for social models
since engineers are not more critical about the working of society, and perhaps
a good deal less so, than other middle-class professional members of society.([52]In
Australia, engineering education lacks any sociological/psychological training
and often it is students who lack people-oriented skills that choose engineering
as a career.[53] Engineers are often criticised for neglecting
the human dimensions of their designs, for not taking account of how people
behave under stress and how long it takes people to process information, to
respond to that information.[54] Moreover, engineers
and bureaucrats as public servants are likely to take a more optimistic view
of how reliable and trustworthy government institutions are than outsiders would.([55]
Whilst the Waste Management Authority and to a lesser extent Greenpeace, Australia
neglect the social control aspect of the incinerator, the communities likely
to be affected do not. Wynne has shown, through a number of case studies, that,
the public make rational assessments of risk based on the ways in which those
risks are controlled; "this includes institutional judgements of the performance,
attitudes, openness and overall 'social demeanour' of the relevant industries
and regulatory bodies" [56]People make these
judgements by looking at the past behaviour of the firms and government authorities
involved.
This is certainly true in this case as well. The natural inclinations of many
of the people living in targetted areas is to assume that government authorities
are trustworthy and to align themselves with the conservative government rather
than with "greenies". Rural people in NSW have traditionally voted conservatively
and have often conflicted with environmentalists over their use of agricultural
chemicals. Their level of trust in the government has probably been higher than
the average for the population as a whole. Many have found the alliance with
Greenpeace difficult. Those leading the campaigns against the incinerator have
used Greenpeace for information but have preferred not to have Greenpeace representatives
speak at their rallies and public meetings for fear of alienating their local
communities.[57]
Despite these inclinations these communities have united strongly against
the proposed incinerator and have come to distrust the authorities who are trying
to site the incinerator. They are more inclined to take on Greenpeace's version
of the incinerator than the government's. This can be partly explained by the
tendency of those who are most likely to be affected by a technology, being
more concerned about what might go wrong than with what might go right with
it. But this tendency has been reinforced by the unintended and inadvertent
communications of the government itself which have conveyed messages about both
the safety of an incinerator and the institutional behaviour of the organisations
responsible for constructing, operating, monitoring and regulating a hazardous
waste incinerator near them.
The decision to site the incinerator in rural NSW hundreds of kilometres from
the main source of the waste in Sydney conveyed a powerful message to rural people
that the incinerator was too dangerous to be sited near so many people in Sydney
and this was the message that spoke loudest to them.
[58]The Taskforce has tried to explain the decision
as follows:
The Taskforce is convinced that there is no technical reasons why
the incinerator cannot be sited in the same way as any other industrial plant
of a similar type. This has been done successfully overseas. However, it is
likely that the public in general would prefer the distance separating the facility
from residential areas to be greater than would be acceptable for more familiar
industrial plants of a similar type. This is likely to rule out its location
in a congested, fully-developed industrial area.[59]
Other siting criteria also communicate hazard to the community. The Taskforce
said that within a buffer zone of about 1 km radius, "there should be no supply
offtake of urban or town water, supply, for irrigation, or for intensive agricultural
purposes."[60] It has also stated that for a
combination of technical and perception considerations it is essential the site
"be away from environmentally sensitive areas such as wetlands, national parks
and significant streams and lakes".[61] The people
of Corowa, seven hundred kilometres from Sydney, were particularly incensed
when their area was chosen in October1990 by the Taskforce as the preferred
site for an incinerator since the location was less than 2 km from the Murray
River, one of Australia's major waterways supplying drinking and irrigation
water to three states. "Is the Murray not a significant waterway?" they asked
government officials at an angry public meeting. The failure of those officials
to give what locals considered to be an adequate answer to this and other questions
communicated more to the audience than all the purposeful, reassuring statements
they made all evening.[62]
When the government finally backed down on Corowa as a site in November 1990,
stating that it was unsuitable due to its proximity to the Murray River and
a large number of wells [63], it too communicated
more, to the people living near other nominated incinerator sites, about the
dangers of an incinerator than any environmentalist's conscious statement could
have done. The contradiction between official statements of reassurance and
other less conscious statements of risk does nothing to reinforce trust in the
government.
Otway and Wynne say of this type of inadvertent communication; "This tacit
organizational `body language' may trigger quite legitimate inferences about
risks and their management, which are more powerful than any carefully designed
formal communication."[64] In fact the Taskforce's
three-year public consultation process ended up conveying to targetted local
communities the impression that they were to be sacrificial lambs and that the
government and its bureaucracy could not be trusted to do the right thing by
them.
The Taskforce sought to direct and shape the debate and for this purpose it
hired the firm Community Projects P/L, which had already smoothed the way for
other controversial projects. The Taskforce publicly stated that "By providing
a framework for public involvement, the form and direction of this involvement
can be managed in the public interest." [65]
Before nominating any preferred sites for the incinerator, the Taskforce and
its consultants attempted to gain broad public support for the incinerator in
principle. The Taskforce endeavoured to have the public debate about the incinerator
take place without input from the people who would be most directly affected,
the local residents. It stated that it wanted to achieve "active public recognition
that the proposal is in the public interest" by limiting "destructive conflict"
and ensuring that the concerns of vested interests and affected individuals
"do not frustrate the public interest."[66] Support
was particularly sought from environmental and community interest groups. Then
local councils were approached. Some Councils did express interest on the basis
of information given to them by the Taskforce and without referring the question
to the broader populace but as soon as these areas appeared on a public short-list
of sites, public reaction was hostile and all Council support was withdrawn.[67]
The conducting of the consultation process by the Taskforce before the selection
of a site was a way of attempting to control the risk communication process,
socially constructing the debate and denying access to it of the people to be
targetted. When the Taskforce went out to invite submissions from local residents
in country areas, its carefully worded messages cleverly left out the word incinerator.
For example in a letter to various media outlets the Taskforce asked them to
broadcast a message inviting submissions. It stated "An Independent taskforce,
set up to advise the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victorian Governments
on the Minimisation and Management of Intractable Waste, is seeking public comment
on its latest findings and recommendations..."[68]
When community groups in Corowa (the first site chosen by the Taskforce for
the incinerator) received letters similarly worded inviting them to a public
meeting, few bothered to attend, not realising it had anything to do with a
hazardous waste incinerator being put in their neighbourhood. Corowa residents
claim that invitations were sent to business groups, community service groups
and councillors but not to local environmental groups in town.
When the site was announced, their claims that they had not been consulted
were denied by the Taskforce which pointed to these invitations and media announcements.
However the damage was done. The people of Corowa and of the other shortlisted
sites felt that they had been excluded from the consultation process and that
this facility was being hoisted on them involuntarily.[69]
There is also some evidence that messages of reassurance inadvertently communicate
insincerity and dishonesty. The contradictions and incongruities that arise
from the need to reassure rather than openly inform, some of which were covered
in the previous two sections, are easily picked up by those who are likely to
be most affected and are amplified by opponents. For example, the government
supporters were not averse to beating up the dangers of storing the wastes whilst
downplaying the dangers of transporting them:
intractable waste, either stored or dispersed represents an unacceptable risk
to us all, either through the danger of food chain contamination or the risk
of uncontrolled warehouse fires.[70]
Yet when discussing transport they claimed that the amounts of waste to be
moved would be "extremely small, compared to the enormous quantities of hazardous
new products" safely transported each day.[71]
It is only when these materials become "wastes" that they are suddenly
perceived as environmentally threatening and a safety or transport hazard. This
is a fallacy. Wastes are no more (and frequently less) hazardous than original
products.[72]
Neither side is altogether consistent. Greenpeace is not averse to invoking
the concept of the ideal technological system. "For hazardous wastes currently
held in storage (e.g. Australia) treatment systems must be developed that do
not emit any toxic, persistent and bioaccumulative compounds into the surrounding
environment."[73]Yet Greenpeace could afford
to be inconsistent because it was not asking the local residents to rely upon
it, but rather supplying arguments that they could use if they wished.
An idealised portrayal of a technology is easily discredited and only has
appeal to those who want to be reassured. The Councils who put forward expressions
of interest in the incinerator on the basis of the glowing reports of the Taskforce
ambassadors only needed to realise that there was another side to the story,
that safety issues were not so clear cut as had been portrayed, to feel duped.
In this context reassurance can backfire and be interpreted as salesmanship
or even dishonesty and trust is destroyed. When questioned over his about-face
on the incinerator on ABC Radio, Shire President, Keith Barber, claimed that
he had accepted a Taskforce report about the incinerator but had subsequently
become aware of opposing expert views about the incinerator's safety. He argued
that the Shire Council had not been given enough information.
Almost all writers on the topic of risk communication stress the importance
of trust.[74] Most also recognise that the acknowledgement
of uncertainties is an important element of this. Hance and his colleagues advise
that "Learning to say "I don't know" may be one of the most difficult risk communication
lessons."[75] However, as they also point out,
trying to cover up uncertainties leaves government authorities extremely vulnerable,
especially if there are environmentalists ready and eager to uncover them. Thus,
a real dilemma for communicators. As Krimsky and Plough point out, making scientific
uncertainty explicitly can "reinforce anxiety and reduce the public's confidence".[76]
However, if the opposition is going to do it anyway, the frank admission of
uncertainties is more likely to foster trust in the communicators.[77]
The focus for most people studying risk communication has been on the ability
of the communicator to instil trust in the communicator.[78]The
aspect that is too often forgotten and yet far more important, if a technology
is to be accepted, is the need for the public to trust the people who will construct,
operate and regulate the technology. A US study has found that people surveyed
about their reactions to a technology frequently made the point that even if
the technology was flawless, "the people executing the plan and managing the
technology would inevitably create serious problems."[79]
A history of unsafe industrial practices, chemical spills, problem coverups
and poor regulation will communicate more to a community than any technical
presentation, no matter how honest and credible. A Sydney environmentalist who
favours the establishment of an incinerator in principle but has doubts about
how it would be operated in practice points out:
Conservationists ... believe that governments themselves are creating
fears about waste and other chemical issues by their unnecessary secretiveness,
poor record of control and failure to initiate a genuine process of consultation...
On a range of technical/public health issues, both state and federal governments'
responses to problems involving chemicals has been weak, indecisive and unconvincing.[80]
The old adage that actions speak louder then words, needs to be considered
with respect to risk communication.
Harry Otway has made the distinction between two kinds of risk communication.
One is used to persuade people to accept policies or technologies and their associated
risks; "in essence it encourages passive compliance with the intentions of those
providing the information. It is fundamentally manipulative." The second, a more
ideal form, is aimed at fulfilling the information needs of the audience so as
to enable them to make their own decisions.
[81]
However, much of the interest in risk communication has come from frustrated government
officials and others who have experienced difficulties in siting facilities such
as hazardous waste treatment plants.
[82]
Government and industry experts, seeking to reassure the public, promote an
idealised image of technology. They prefer to portray technology as predictable
and controllable. The social institutions and structures within which the technology
is embedded are left out of their estimation of risk because they don't see
them as relevant. They assume that they will perform their roles perfectly.
As a result, the case studies of poorly performing incinerators in the US and
Britain presented by Greenpeace are explained away in terms of outdated technology
and loose emission standards. They are dismissed as irrelevant to the Australian
incinerator which will utilise the latest technology and the strictest standards.
In this scenario, past mistakes and bad experiences are not relevant, and
there is no need to discuss the record of the existing Australian institutions
in either the area of operating or regulating technological systems. The world
that they want to create is one of order where everything is under control,
where the authorities can be trusted to do the right thing. Krimsky and Plough
point out that,
A scientist speaking to a community about the health effects of a
hazardous waste site is part of a political ritual that aims to evoke confidence
and respect. The technical information in the message is secondary to the real
goal of the communicator: "Have faith; we are in charge."[83]
The environmentalist argument which promotes a view of technological systems
which are unpredictable and uncontrollable undermines that goal and so comes
under bitter attack:
NSW Environment Minister Tim Moore today advised people to ignore
ridiculous scare-mongering statements about the proposed high-temperature incinerator...
[legitimate] concerns should be divorced from the hysterical lies and ratbaggery
of those who deliberately distorted the truth, in a campaign designed to arouse
hatred and fear.[84]
The resulting polarisation inevitably follows from the original formulation
put forward by the promoters of the technology. It is reinforced by the media
which is unable to discern which technological portrayal is 'correct' and prefers
to report the story of the conflict, in a way everyone can easily understand;
a conflict between a responsible government doing its best to deal with hazardous
wastes, anti-industry environmentalists and local residents expressing the NIMBY
syndrome (Not In My Back Yard).[85] Most journalists
are unable to sort out whether there is any real threat associated with the
incinerator or not and merely report brief statements from each side. For this
reason the media has not played a particularly important role in mediating the
processes of risk communication apart from the letters pages of the newspapers
and debates between protagonists broadcast over the radio. The communication
with affected communities and interested groups tends to take place in public
and private meetings, conferences, through correspondence, brochures and other
publications. The media has merely informed the wider public that the controversy
is going on and of the players on each side but little more information than
that has been provided.
From the point of view of the governments, the risk communication undertaken
by the Joint Taskforce and then the Waste Management Authority failed because
for them success is when the recipients of their risk message accept their views
or arguments. The recent appointment of an Independent Panel is a last ditch
attempt by the governments to salvage the situation with four new people who
may be able to learn from the 'mistakes' of those who preceded them.
But risk communication is better defined as "an interactive process of exchange
of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions"[86] The US National Research Council's Committee
on Risk Perception and Communication,
construe risk communication to be successful to the extent that it
raises the level of understanding of relevant issues or actions for those involved
and satisfies them that they are adequately informed within the limits of available
technology.[87]
Whilst a polarised presentation of information might not be the most ideal
way of communicating, the affected communities have had their level of understanding
of hazardous waste incineration raised in this case. At recent hearings organised
by the newly appointed Independent Panel community representatives displayed
what a great amount they have learned of the issues and technicalities involved
over the last year.[88] However, they are just
as opposed to hazardous waste incineration in rural NSW as they originally were.
The reasons for this continuing opposition are in part related to the communication
process but also to the substantive issues which the communication process addresses.
The Taskforce/Waste Management Authority communication process was flawed because
i) the portrayal of ideal technology working within perfect social systems was
not credible; ii) the effort at reassurance came across as salesmanship; iii)
inadvertent communications conveyed opposite messages from those which were
intended; iv) the failure to consult destroyed faith that the authorities were
acting in the community's best interests.
However, even a perfect communication process could not overcome the other
reasons for local residents opposing an incinerator in their area. These related
to the extent to which they can actually trust the relevant social institutions
to construct, operate, monitor and regulate an incinerator in a way that would
impose no significant costs (social, financial, emotional, health, environmental)
on them or would compensate them if they did. To judge these questions people
examine the records of incinerators overseas, contact people who live near them
for their impressions, consider the actions and past records of local social
institutions such as the Waste Management Authority and the State Pollution
Control Commission. They have found communities whose complaints are not listened
to in Britain, leaching chemical dumps in the United States, massive air pollution
in Sydney - all of which hold lessons for wary residents. The best communication
process in the world cannot replace good government.
Acknowledgements:
The research for this article was funded by an Australian Research
Council grant. The authors would also like to thank Stewart Russell and the
anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts.
Endnotes
[1. Krimsky, S., and Plough, A., 1988, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process (Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company), p.2.
2. Otway, H., and Thomas, K., 1982, Reflections on Risk Perception and Policy, Risk Analysis, 2(2), 69.
3. Covello, V. et. al., 1987, Communicating Scientific Information about Health and Environmental Risks: Problems and Opportunities from a Social and Behavioral Perspective, Risk Communication, edited by J .Clarence Davies et. al., (Wasthington D.C.: The Conservation Foundation), pp.110-112.]
4. Connor, D., 1988, Breaking Throught the `Nimby' Syndrome, Civil Engineering, December, 69.
[5. Thomas, L., 1987, Why We Must Talk About Risk, Risk Communication, edited by J .Clarence Davies et. al., (Wasthington D.C.: The Conservation Foundation), p.24.
6. Krimsky, S., and Plough, A., 1988, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process (Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company), pp. 298-299.
7. Krimsky, S., and Plough, A., 1988, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process (Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company), p5.
8. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation, 1982, Hazardous Chemical Wastes - Storage, Transport and Disposal (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service); Australian Environment Council, 1983, Management and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service); media pressure - Sydney: The Toxic Waste Dump, 1987, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March; Knight, M, 1985, New Ideas Needed to Dispose of Waste Worry, Australian, 21 February; pressure from environmentalists - Brotherton, P., 1986, National Chaos on Intractable Wastes, ACF Newsletter, November,13; Brotherton, P., 1987, correspondence to D Gascoine (DASETT) and others, 30 August.
9. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.6.
10. Cartmel, R, Greenpeace Australia, 1991, personal communication, May.
11. See for example Waste Management Authority of NSW, 1991, Intractable Waste: What are the Facts, Draft Fact Sheets 19 & 35.
12. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.5.
13. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.5.
14. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Draft Final Phase 3 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), p.A4/8.
15. Wynne, B., 1988, Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding, Social Studies of Science, 18, 147-67.
16. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.6.
17. Environmental Effects, Transport and Fate Committee, Science Advisory Board, 1985, Report on the Incineration of Liquid Hazardous Wastes, (United States Environmental Protection Agency), p.2.
18. Environmental Effects, Transport and Fate Committee, Science Advisory Board, 1985, Report on the Incineration of Liquid Hazardous Wastes, (United States Environmental Protection Agency), p.1.
19. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.5.
20. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.6.
21. Brotherton, P., 1991, HTI Issue Clouded by Mis-Information, Conservation News, February, 14.
22. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1988, Preliminary Report Part One, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), pp.7/20-21.
23. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.6.
24. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.10.
25. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority).
26. Tweeddale, M., 1989, Process Plant Safety and Risk, Chemical Engineering in Australia, 14(2), June , 13.
27. Wynne, B., 1988, Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding, Social Studies of Science, 18, 152.
28. Wynne, B., 1988, Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding, Social Studies of Science, 18, 151.
29. Wynne, B., 1988, Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding, Social Studies of Science, 18, 151-2, 157.
30. Kletz, T, 1988, The Hazards of Insularity, The Chemical Engineer,May, 47.
31. Wynne, B., 1988, Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public Understanding, Social Studies of Science, 18.
32. For example Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 1989, p.8.
33. Johnston, P., Stringer, R. & Swindlehurst, R., 1990, Hazardous Waste Incineration: A Basic Overview (adapted for use in Australia by Robert Cartmel) (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia ), p.1.
34. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.12.
35. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.8.
36. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), pp.7,9.
37. Johnston, P., Stringer, R. & Swindlehurst, R., 1990, Hazardous Waste Incineration: A Basic Overview (adapted for use in Australia by Robert Cartmel) (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.1, 4, 32-3; Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p32.
38. Greenpeace Australia, 1990, Say No to the Toxic Oven, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), chapter 3.
39. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.3, 5.
40. Johnston, P., Stringer, R. & Swindlehurst, R., 1990, Hazardous Waste Incineration: A Basic Overview (adapted for use in Australia by Robert Cartmel) (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), pp2, 8; Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), pp.4, 21-22.
41. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.33.
42. See for example, Nelkin, D. 1975, The Political Impact of Technical Expertise, Social Studies of Science 5, 36; Barnes, B. 1985, About Science (Basil Blackwell), p.101.
43. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p.6.
44. Wynne, B. 1987, Risk Management and Hazardous Waste: Implementation and the Dialectics of Credibility, (Springer-Verlag), pp.4-5.
45. See for example, Beder, S., 1989, Toxic Fish and Sewer Surfing, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), chapter 2.
46. Waste Management Authority, 1991, Intractable Wastes: What are the Facts?, Fact Sheet No. 10: Dioxins/Furans (draft); Waste Management Authority, 1991, Intractable Wastes: What are the Facts?, Fact Sheet No. 14: Health, Safety & Environmental Standards (draft).
47. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Intractable Waste-The Problem and the Solution, video script.
48. For example, Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, Intractable Waste - The Problem and the Solution, Information Brochure, 1990; statements at Corowa Public Meeting, 2 October 1990.
49. Wynne, B. 1989, Frameworks of Rationalilty in Risk Management: Towards the Testing of Naive Sociology, Environmental Threats: Perception, Analysis and Management, edited by Jennifer Brown, (London and New York, Belhaven Press), p.37.
50. Anonymous reviewer of this article.
51. Institution of Engineers, Australia, Standing Committee on Liability, 1990, Are You at Risk? Managing Expectations (Canberra: Institution of Engineers, Australia), p.4.]
52. See for example Kirkman, A.J. 1973, The Communication of Technical Thought, The Engineer and Society, edited by E.G.Semler, (London, Institution of Mechanical Engineers).
[53. See for example, Perrucci, R. and Gerstl, J. 1969, Profession Without Community, (New York, Random House), p.42; Eichhorn, R. 1969, The Student Engineer, The Engineers and the Social System edited by Robert Perrucci and Joel Gerstl, (John Wiley and Sons).
54. For example, personal communication with Professor Jean Cross, Professor of Safety Science, University of New South Wales, August 1991.
55. Wynne, B. 1989, Frameworks of Rationalilty in Risk Management: Towards the Testing of Naive Sociology, Environmental Threats: Perception, Analysis and Management, edited by Jennifer Brown, (London and New York, Belhaven Press), p.43.
56. Wynne, B. 1989, Frameworks of Rationalilty in Risk Management: Towards the Testing of Naive Sociology, Environmental Threats: Perception, Analysis and Management, edited by Jennifer Brown, (London and New York, Belhaven Press), p.35.
57. Personal communications with local residents living in Corowa.
58. Personal communications with people affected; "Warning on Waste Burner', Daily Telegraph Mirror, 11 May 1991, 4; Toxic tiff for Nick and Wal, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1991, 1.
59. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Disposal Options For Intractable Waste, information brochure.
60. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Draft Final Phase 3 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), pA4/3.
61. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Draft Final Phase 3 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), pA4/4.
62. Public meeting, Corowa, 2 October 1990.
63. Corowa now ruled out for incinerator, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1990, 3.
64. Otway, H. and Wynne, B.,1989, Risk Communication: Paradigm and Paradox, Risk Analysis, 9(2), 143.
65. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1989, Phase 2 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), p.2/13.
66. Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1989, Phase 2 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), p.2/13.
67. Corowa now ruled out for incinerator, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1990, 3; Keep out: Incinerator Plan Vetoed by Shires, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 1990, 8.
68. Letter published in Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste, 1990, Draft Final Phase 3 Report, (Sydney: Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments), p. A3/6. See also p.A3/9.
69. Personal communications, statements at Public Meeting in Corowa 2 October 1990.
70. Waste Management Authority of New South Wales, 1990, Australia's Intractable Waste Strategy and the High Temperature Incinerator: An Introduction and Explanation, (Sydney: Waste Management Authority), p4.
71. Waste Management Authority, 1991, Intractable Wastes: What are the Facts?, Fact Sheet No.9: Transportation (draft).
72. Waste Management Authority, 1991, Intractable Wastes: What are the Facts?, Fact Sheet No.9: Transportation (draft).
73. Greenpeace Australia, 1991, Playing With Fire: A Report on the Hazardous Waste Incineration Crisis, (Sydney: Greenpeace Australia), p.42.
74. or example, O'Riordan, T et. al., 1989, Themes and Tasks of Risk Communication: Report of an International Conference Held at KRA Julich, Risk Analysis, 9(4), 514.
75. Hance, B. et. al., 1989, Setting a Context for Explaining Risk, Risk Analysis, 9(1), 116.
76. Krimsky, S., and Plough, A., 1988, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process (Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company), p. 300.
77. National Research Council, 1989, Improving Risk Communication, (Washington DC: National Academy Press), p.12; William Ruckelshaus, 1987, Communicating About Risk, Risk Communication, edited by J .Clarence Davies et. al., (Wasthington D.C.: The Conservation Foundation), p6.
78. see for example, most of the papers in Risk Communication, edited by J .Clarence Davies et. al., (Wasthington D.C.: The Conservation Foundation).
79. Bord, R and O'Connor, R., 1990, Risk Communication, Knowledge, and Attitudes: Explaining Reactions to a Technology Perceived as Risky, Risk Analysis, 10(4), 505.
80. Short, K., 1988, Conservationists' Perspectives on Hazardous Waste, Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Committee (Sydney:Total Environment Centre), p.10.
81. Otway, H. 1987, Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy, Risk Analysis, 7(2), 127.
82. Laird, F. N., 1989, The Decline of Deference: The Political Context of Risk Communication, Risk Analysis, 9(4), 543; Otway, H. and Wynne, B.,1989, Risk Communication: Paradigm and Paradox, Risk Analysis, 9(2), 141-2.
83. Krimsky, S., and Plough, A., 1988, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a Social Process (Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company), p.6.
84. Moore, T., Minister for the Environment, 1990, Incinerator Lies Warning, Press Release, 9 October.]
85 . See for example Mealey, E. 1989, Dilemma Over Toxic Dump Site, Sun-Herald 29th January; Bailey, P. 1990, Greens Split Over Toxic Waste Burner, Sydney Morning Herald, 26th September; editorial, 1991, Sydney Morning Herald, 18th March.
[86. National Research Council, 1989, Improving Risk Communication (Washington DC: National Academy Press), p.2.
87. National Research Council, 1989, Improving Risk Communication (Washington DC: National Academy Press), p.2.]
88. This is my judgement based on attendance at the Public Hearing held in Sydney on 6th December 1991.