The Australia Card
Schweik Action Wollongong
Surveillance conference papers, Wollongong, November
1995, pp. 19-20
In the early 1980s, there was considerable publicity and
concern in Australia about people and companies who evaded
tax. In 1985 at a national meeting to discuss tax, a few individuals
suggested the use of identity cards to reduce tax avoidance.
Senior bureaucrats in several government departments saw this
as an opportunity to achieve an objective they had had in
mind for some time.
The idea was that every Australian would have a unique identification
number. It would be used for taxation, national health insurance,
welfare payments and potentially many other purposes. The
Health Insurance Commission was to administer the system because
it had the most developed computing expertise. Data on everyone
in the country would be held in a central databank. As well,
it was proposed that every Australian would have an identification
card, which the government called the "Australia Card."
After being quickly developed by a committee with members
from several government departments, the scheme was backed
by the government. At first it was included among several
other taxation measures and did not receive much attention.
Because it was portrayed as a means to stop cheating on tax
and welfare payments, most people supported it initially.
A few individuals made significant criticisms. For example,
prominent judge Michael Kirby warned about the implications
for civil liberties. Information systems academic Roger Clarke
wrote several critical assessments, pointing out the possibility
for invasion of privacy due to the collation of data about
individuals from different aspects of their lives. He pointed
out that an identity number system would have little impact
on tax revenues or cheating on welfare payments. Sophisticated
criminals could easily beat the system. What the identity
card system would do best of all was increase the power of
government bureaucrats over the lives of ordinary Australians.
The Australian Labor Party held government federally. Although
Labor had a majority of seats in the House of Representatives,
in the Senate it did not. The government was determined to
press ahead with the Australia Card, but the opposition parties
in the Senate used their power to set up a parliamentary committee
to investigate the proposal. The majority of the committee
opposed the Card, but the government pressed ahead anyway
on the basis of a minority report. The Australia Card bill
was twice passed in the House and twice rejected in the Senate,
at which time one Labor Senator voted against the legislation
and resigned from the Labor Party. The Labor government used
the repeated rejection in the Senate as the basis for calling
a general election in 1987, which it won. This meant it could
call a joint meeting of the House and Senate and pass the
legislation.
While the government pressed ahead resolutely, popular opinion
moved against the Australia Card. Civil liberties groups took
strong stands against it, and civil liberties arguments became
more and more prominent. Members of the public began writing
letters. Newspapers were inundated with letters. It was by
far the biggest issue in the country, with 80 to 90 percent
of correspondents opposed to the card. There were numerous
petitions to parliament against the scheme, with a greater
total number of signatories on this issue than any other in
Australia's history. The media, which at first had generally
favoured the card, gradually became more opposed.
In September 1987, as the government moved towards passing
the Australia Card Bill, popular opposition escalated. The
Australian Privacy Foundation was set up. Among its founding
members were prominent personalities such as pop star Peter
Garrett and cricketer Greg Chappell. There were rallies in
several parts of the country, bringing together unlikely allies,
including civil libertarians, left-wing trade unionists and
conservative bankers and industrialists. There were demonstrations
in several cities. In Western Australia, an anti-card rally
attracted tens of thousands, the largest number since protests
against the Vietnam war. Many individuals, in their letters
to newspapers, announced their intention to refuse to cooperate
with the scheme.
All this pressure began to cause cracks in the government's
ranks. Many Labor parliamentarians privately pressured the
Prime Minister to withdraw the legislation.
Ewart Smith was a retired public servant (government bureaucrat)
with long experience in the law and legislation. The mounting
concerns stimulated him to investigate and then to join the
chorus of opposition by writing letters. He also closely inspected
the proposed legislation and found a technical feature that
no one else had noticed. Even if the legislation was passed,
the Act's commencement date had to be passed separately, and
the government would have been unable to get it through the
Senate. Smith pointed this out to members of the parliamentary
opposition, who raised the matter in parliament to the disbelief
of the government. Smith's assessment was supported by other
legal experts. The government took the opportunity to withdraw
the legislation. It was never reintroduced.
Around the country, many people had tremendous satisfaction
and relief at the defeat of the Australia Card proposal. Ewart
Smith was hailed as a hero. On the other hand, it was perhaps
unfortunate that the proposal was defeated in this way. If
the Australia Card had become law, almost certainly there
would have been civil disobedience and an escalating struggle,
which would have mobilised the population even more effectively
in defence of privacy protection and civil liberties.
What it couldn't achieve directly, the government achieved
indirectly. In 1988, the government expanded the uses of the
existing tax file number system. Every taxpayer is assigned
a unique number. People are not obliged to state the number
to employers, but if they don't, tax is withheld at the highest
rate -- a strong incentive to provide the number. When introducing
the enhanced tax file number scheme, the government promised
that it would be used only for taxation purposes. Yet within
two years it was being used for nearly every payment of pensions
or benefits by any Australian government agency, with the
sort of meshing of computer databases that critics of the
Australia card had warned about. In other words, the tax file
number is really an identity number. The measures that have
been implemented go a long way towards achieving what the
senior bureaucrats set out to do, except that there is no
actual card.
The Australia Card was a potent symbol. At first it was a
symbol of the government's attack on tax avoidance. But, due
to the efforts of many individuals and groups, it became the
symbol of government snooping into the lives of Australians.
The campaign against the Australia Card was an amazing success,
especially in bringing together people from different parts
of the political spectrum. The campaign also attracted a range
of experts, including Ewart Smith.
Although the campaign was diverse, it never penetrated the
government bureaucracies. Therefore, the same bureaucratic
pressures for comparing computer databases remained. Furthermore,
the campaign did not create a strong continuing organisational
base. It was, perhaps, too successful too soon. When the symbol
of what it opposed was removed, the campaign dissolved. The
enhanced tax file number scheme was introduced without much
controversy.
References
Roger Clarke, "Just another piece of plastic for your wallet:
the 'Australia Card' scheme," Prometheus, Vol. 5, No.
1, June 1987, pp. 29-45.
Roger Clarke, "The resistible rise of the Australian national
personal data system," Software Law Review, Vol. 5,
No. 1, January 1992.
Simon Davies, Big Brother: Australia's Growing Web of
Surveillance (Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 30-47.
P. Graham, "A case study of computers in public administration:
the Australia Card," Australian Computer Journal, Vol.
16, No. 2, May 1990, pp. 51-58.
Ewart Smith, The Australia Card: The Story of its Defeat
(Melbourne: Sun Books, 1989).
(We thank Roger Clarke for helpful comments. This account
is drawn from a larger study, Challenging Bureaucratic
Elites, currently being considered by publishers.)
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