Antisurveillance
Brian Martin
Surveillance conference papers, Wollongong, November
1995, pp. 14-15
(Abbreviated from an article published in
Anarchist Studies, vol. 1, 1993, pp. 111-129)
Surveillance is essentially a problem of unequal
power. The usual reform solutions, such as codes of professional
ethics, laws and regulations, give only an illusion of protection.
Another approach is to promote grassroots challenges to
surveillance aimed at replacing social institutions that
create a demand for surveillance. An institutional change
programme provides help in choosing directions for present-day
antisurveillance campaigns.
The key issue is the surveillance of the less powerful by
the more powerful. Keeping a close watch on others is not
inherently bad. For example, it makes sense to keep a close
watch on small children to make sure that they do not get
hurt. What makes the close watching in this situation acceptable
is the trust implicit in the relationship. What is normally
called surveillance then applies to cases when either there
is a substantial power difference or a lack of a trust relationship,
or both. A large powerful organisation is able to collect
data on individuals because it is powerful and becomes more
powerful because of the data.
A note on terminology: a focus on privacy directs
attention to the individual whose privacy is invaded; a focus
on surveillance directs attention to the exercise of power
and to the groups that undertake it. For these reasons, antisurveillance
is a better rallying point than privacy.
Reform solutions
One way proposed to protect privacy is to ensure that all
the people who have access to information collected about
members of the public -- such as computer administrators,
police, government bureaucrats, telephone technicians and
personnel managers -- deal with it in a "responsible" fashion.
Yet even if every single person with access to confidential
data were absolutely trustworthy -- which is far from the
case -- this would not prevent problems. There are enormous
bureaucratic pressures to extend the use of data about individuals
for, from the organisation's point of view, very sound reasons.
For example, the tax office wants to collect data to ensure
that all pay their fair share of tax, so that enough money
is available for essential public spending. Police see surveillance
as necessary to protect the community from serious crime.
Almost all surveillance is carried out by well-meaning people
with what they believe are the most worthy ends in mind.
Another way of opposing surveillance is for governments to
pass laws and establish agencies and systems to protect privacy.
Laws, regulations and privacy commissions can allow citizens
to see and correct files held on them; they can outlaw certain
practices, such as sharing of databases; they can ensure that
privacy considerations become a factor in policy making; they
can establish organisations to keep tabs on technical developments;
they can impose penalties on violators of people's privacy.
Nevertheless, the whole approach is fundamentally flawed.
One big problem is that the path of legal regulation assumes
a trade-off between privacy and other benefits, such as profit
or bureaucratic efficiency. In the balance, privacy usually
comes off second best. There are clear and direct advantages
to corporations and government departments in expanding their
capacities to gather and manipulate information on citizens.
By contrast, there are few powerful groups with any direct
interest in protecting the privacy of the "ordinary citizen."
The result is that privacy concerns are routinely squashed
by the steamroller of surveillance.
It is risky to rely mainly on governments to provide protection
against surveillance when governments themselves are responsible
for much of it, through taxation, police, military and spy
agencies. In practice, the main role of laws protecting privacy
may be to give the illusion that the problem is being dealt
with.
Institutional change
Here are some radical approaches to eliminating surveillance
by eliminating the institutional capacity or need for it in
the first place. By necessity, this is just a summary account,
but it should be sufficient to indicate the general approach.
Dangerous technologies. Surveillance has been justified
by the need to protect against the dangers of technologies.
One way to eliminate the surveillance is to eliminate the
technologies. For example, military spying is needed to protect
against unauthorised access to nuclear and other weapons.
The solution is to abolish these weapons. One of the earliest
objections to nuclear power was the tendencies towards a police
state inherent in a nuclear society. The solution is straightforward:
abolish nuclear power.
A more commonplace dangerous technology is the car. The danger
of traffic accidents has engendered a multitude of traffic
regulations. Far from cars enjoying "freedom of the road,"
they actually do more than any other technology today to put
people on police files. The solution is to move towards a
society in which cars play a much smaller role.
Medical records. Records of a patient's medical treatment
can, in the wrong hands, be used to embarrass or discriminate
against them. Instead, let patients keep their own records.
Prisons. Prisons are the ultimate in surveillance.
The prisoner is both constrained and observed. There are several
ways to reduce the number of prisoners and hence the extent
of surveillance. One is to abolish victimless crimes, such
as for vagrancy and drug use. Another is to increase social
equity, so that there is less incentive for crime. The ultimate
aim should be to replace prisons by a range of methods and
policies genuinely oriented towards rehabilitation.
Workplaces. Workers are monitored on the job by management
to maintain output but also to keep workers under control.
The alternative is for workers to control their own work collectively.
This includes semi-autonomous work groups which decide the
way they will do a job within the general framework decided
by management. It includes collectives, in which all workers
as a group make the crucial decisions about what to produce
and how to carry out their jobs. It includes workers' control
-- usually associated with larger organisations -- in which
workers make the basic decisions about their enterprise and
work, using decision-making methods including voting, delegate
systems, and rotation through managerial positions.
Spy agencies. Organisations such as the FBI, MI5 and
KGB are responsible for some of the most objectionable snooping.
They escape serious scrutiny by claiming the higher needs
of "national security." There is a simple solution to surveillance
by spy agencies: they should be abolished. What about defence
secrets? These should be made obsolete by abolishing the military
and replacing it with community-based methods of nonviolent
defence, which require little or no secrecy.
Government services. Data is collected by governments
to make sure that recipients of services are genuine. This
applies to unemployment benefits, child support schemes, pensions
for disabled people, war veteran benefits, education support
schemes, health benefits, and the like. Keeping detailed data
on recipients is considered essential to prevent cheating.
One solution is to provide basic services free to anyone
who wants them. This applies today to services such as public
parks and public libraries. Why not also to food, shelter,
health services, etc.? The basic principle is that services
for identified individuals are replaced by collective provision,
for which there is no need for individuals to be identified.
Surveillance due to private investigative agencies, commercial
databases and the system of taxation could also be eliminated
by developing radical alternatives.
From vision to strategy
This institutional change programme is radical, going to
the roots of the problem of surveillance. It is hardly a practical
proposition, though, to implement these solutions through
a short, sharp campaign. What use, then, is the programme?
First, it draws attention to the way that surveillance is
deeply embedded in today's social institutions and is becoming
more and more pervasive. The real idealism is to imagine that
the problem can be solved by legislative and regulatory measures
by the very institutions that are responsible for the problem.
The radical agenda should warn against investing too much
energy or hope in reform efforts, which may give only an illusion
of protection.
Second, the programme provides an additional argument to
challenge and replace hierarchical social structures. Alone,
the problem of surveillance is not enough to question the
value of nuclear power or the power of bosses. But surveillance
is an important factor which should not be neglected in a
focus on environmental impacts or the exploitation of workers.
Third, the programme highlights the range of triggers for
surveillance: "national security," marketing, protection against
dangerous technologies, provision of welfare. There is no
evil agency that is responsible for all surveillance. The
debate over surveillance concerns different conceptions of
the good.
Fourth, the programme of radical solutions provides a direction
for campaigns today. While it is impossible to introduce collective
provision or to abolish spy agencies overnight, it is quite
sensible to examine campaigns to see whether they aid the
capacity for community self-reliance and whether they weaken
rather than strengthen the power of the state.
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