Table of contents

1. Introduction: mapping the literature on scientific and technical controversy
2. Scientific controversy as political controversy
3. Scientific controversy as a by-product of technocratic politics
4. Historico/narrative approaches
5. Fact/value approaches to controversy
6. Closure studies
7. Contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)
8. Conclusions and overview

Introduction: mapping the literature on scientific and technical controversy

The material in this paper originates from a Doctoral thesis,[1] and lectures presented in the University of Wollongong Science and Technology Studies Department undergraduate subject 'Scientific Controversies' in 1993. During the preparation of this material, I noted that there was an absence of overviews of the literature, sufficiently clear or detailed, to guide the uninitiated through the subtle, but philosophically important, differences between the main currents of academic thought on Scientific and Technical Controversy (STC). The following 'map of the literature' has been designed to try to fill this gap and also to raise awareness of some of the valuable intellectual possibilities that can arise from a critical cross-fertilization of differing theoretical approaches, something which rarely occurs at present.

Taking as a relevant sample, the literature which specifically advertises that one of its main concerns is the study of STCs, six main approaches were identified:[2]

• scientific controversy as political controversy

• technocratic politics

• historico/narrative

• facts/versus values

• closure studies

• contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge.

Studies were able to be pigeon-holed on the basis of their relationship to the following three criteria:

• the models and choice of analytical tools used to describe and explain STCs and why they occur;

• what broader principles the analyst hoped to draw to the readers attention from the study of STCs; and

• the actual choice of subject matter within any given STC or set of STCs, or what types of STCs come to be emphasised in actual studies.

It should also be acknowledged from the outset that this review has been shaped by a 'post-Kuhnian'[3] orientation towards understanding science. Post-Kuhnian approaches can be characterised by their scepticism for 'grand' philosophical theories of scientific method and their concern with relating scientific knowledge to its social context. Of the approaches to STCs to be surveyed, 'Sociology of Scientific Knowledge' (SSK) -influenced approaches capture a post-Kuhnian ethos best. Because of this, I will discuss their strengths and weaknesses in more depth than other approaches to STCs. It should, however, be noted that this does not exempt SSK from criticism nor acknowledging the merits of alternative approaches.

The choice of broad multi-factoral criteria was made to avoid the tendency displayed by some post-Kuhnian orientated studies in STS to place too much emphasis on epistemological questions at the expense of investigating the broader links between the micro-social shaping of knowledge claims and macro-social contexts. Whilst any discussion of STC involves considering epistemological questions, focusing on epistemology exclusively can blur some important distinctions between the different political implications of various epistemologies and studies which may not explicitly address epistemological issues. The following commentary will examine the epistemological views of various approaches to STC but will place such discussion in the context of the broader categories noted above.

It is important to anticipate a criticism, following from the above, that such an approach is flawed because it makes comparisons between approaches with fundamentally different views about the epistemological status of science. In response, it could be argued that such a criticism takes the 'boundary maintenance' rhetoric used by competing approaches to STCs on face value. In fact, one of the sub-themes that appears in the following survey is the importance of evaluating approaches STCs according to both their programmatic rhetoric and also the types of issues and subject matter actually emphasised in practice.

Before proceeding with this review of the literature, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss one of the few recent attempts to overview the study of STCs: Martin and Richards (M & R), 'Scientific Knowledge, Controversy, and Public Decision-Making'.[4] Despite their considerable status and important contributions to the field their paper displays a number of defects which weaken its value as an accurate and reliable overview of the literature.

M & R frame their overview in keeping with their aims of enhancing public participation in scientific decision-making and divide up the literature with a strong concern for the stated political aspirations of various studies of STCs. Four loosely bounded 'ideal type' categories are identified: Positivist; Group Politics approach; the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) or Constructivist approach; and, the Social Structural approach. The implications for public decision-making concerning science and technology of these various approaches are compared and contrasted and an 'integrated approach' recommended.

From the start, this approach is weakened by a lack of discussion explaining the criteria by which their 'ideal' types have been chosen. This lack of theoretical reflexivity also helps explain a further problem which involves the mis-classification of some important contributions to the STC literature. Two important examples of this involve M & R's mis-classification of certain studies as 'positivist', and other studies as 'social structural'. In the first example, M & R take the work of Engelhardt and Caplan[5] as an exemplar of Positivist approaches which supposedly separate the 'social' from the 'scientific' in the study of STCs.

A continuing controversy is considered actually to be two controversies cognitive controversy (a controversy over knowledge) and a social controversy (a controversy over non-scientific issues) (Engelhardt and Caplan, 1987). The cognitive controversy can be settled by the supposedly tried and true scientific method, whereas the social controversy may persist indefinitely.[6]

This represents an over-simplification of Engelhardt and Caplan's position. Whilst Engelhardt and Caplan do display a positivist pre-occupation with scientific method (which I will comment on and critique at a later point) described under the heading of 'strict sound argument closure', their approach does offer some potential to consider the social contingencies involved in the construction of scientific knowledge claims. They do this by introducing the notion of 'broad sound argument closure': this involves acknowledgment by the analyst of the way participants in STCs frame what is 'social' as opposed to what is 'epistemic' (scientific). So whilst it is true that such approaches to STCs ultimately separate out the 'social' from the 'scientific' at the level of analysis of 'strict sound argument closure', there is considerable room at the level of analysis of 'broad sound argument closure' for studies of STCs to investigate many similar concerns to approaches such as SSK.

Another example of mis-classification involves the location of STC writers such as Dickson and Nelkin into the so-called 'group politics' approach:

This approach to scientific controversy concentrates on the activities of various groups, corporations, citizens' organizations, and expert panels. Essentially the controversy is dealt with as any other form of politics in the pluralist interpretation of liberal democracy: a process of conflict and compromise involving various groups contending in a political marketplace.[7]

This categorization is puzzling. In numerous places Nelkin explicitly discusses how STCs constitute a distinctive new form of politics. She is particularly preoccupied with reliance across the 'complete spectrum' of political views; with the legitimation of decision-making by technical experts; and with the effective decline in the scope of democratic decision-making as political issues are redefined as technical.[8] Dickson, like Nelkin, is concerned with the rise of technocratic rationality and its shaping of STCs. Dickson quite openly acknowledges his debt to writers concerned with the distinctive shaping of modern politics by science and technology such as Mumford, Ellul and Habermas. Dickson has also regularly attempted to attach his concerns with technocracy to Marxist writing on 'social class' and 'the labour process'.[9] M & R's characterization of Dickson as a political pluralist is clearly inadequate.

Apart from these problems an important question is: how well does M & R's own work fit in to their prescriptive overview of the literature? In the concluding part of their paper they describe the need to go beyond any of the single approaches. They identify and they prescribe the need to develop 'integrated approaches' to the analysis of STCs. Integrated approaches involve the mixing and matching of styles of analysis depending on the analysts' aims. Ironically, the approach adopted in most of M & R's own work follows a different pattern. Rather than pick and choose between approaches their work proceeds by first critiquing Positivist styles of analysis, taking SSK approaches as a pre-condition for their later consideration of broader politics. Both M & R (particularly Martin) have previously argued that the adoption of SSK-styled epistemology intrinsically challenges the dominant political power structures in contemporary western society and facilitates better public participation in STCs (see further discussion pp.50-51). This theme, quite central to their other work, is not explicated in relation to their promotion of so-called integrated approaches. As I will argue in my conclusion, integrated approaches may have certain benefits but require a more consistent and carefully argued rationale than that offered by M & R.

Overall M & R's brief overview of the STC literature does not adequately capture the important differences between writers who problematize science and technology as raising novel political questions (technocratic politics) and those who emphasise continuity between politics of science and technology and politics more generally. Their approach also fails to credit the potential diversity between approaches which share positivist epistemologies and, ironically, fails to give adequate credit to the value of the contributions made to the study of STCs by their own predominantly SSK orientated case studies.[10]

Scientific controversy as political controversy

Although disputes among experts sometimes expand to involve a more diverse mix of participants, often scientific and technical controversies are initiated by those without technical backgrounds. In these cases, technical experts may only be called late in the disputes when additional resources are sought to add strength to a position. The role played by other parties, such as government, is influenced by the subject of the controversy and the form the controversy takes.

JC Petersen & GF Markle in 'Controversies in Science and Technology' in DE Chubin & EW Chu (eds.), Science Off the Pedestal: Social Perspectives on Science and Technology, Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, 1989, p.7.

In 'scientific controversy as political controversy' STCs are interpreted as the by-product of political conflict. In such approaches things like the micro-politics of the scientific sub-cultures are only given attention so far as they might reflect broader 'political realities' as the analyst deems fit to define them. Of the numerous possibilities for analysing STCs as political controversies, most studies can be considered as falling into three main categories:

• studies drawing from pluralist/liberal political models emphasising the importance of the formation and operation of social movements;

• Marxist and structural political models emphasising social class inequalities and the role of capitalist corporations, ideology, and the state;

• gender politics studies drawing from feminist studies of science which analyse controversies through the lens of gender inequalities and the status of science in a patriarchal society.

A good example of the first category can be drawn from the resource mobilization theory concerned with the study of the politics of social movements as put forward by Petersen and Markle.[11] In a 1989 review article 'Controversies in Science and Technology' they argue both that controversies are 'an inevitable product of Western democracy [and] that science and technology cannot neatly be demarcated from other social institutions.'[12]

This vision of STCs as being essentially political in nature raises doubts about the pertinence of forms of analysis that emphasise controversies as mainly being the by-product of expert knowledge based disagreements. This approach also argues that there are limitations in approaches that view STCs as the by-product of social problems flowing from the impacts of inherent features of modern science and technology. In relation to the former point, Petersen and Markle highlight the importance of the initiation and shaping of disputes by non-experts:

Although disputes among experts sometimes expand to involve a more diverse mix of participants, often scientific and technical controversies are initiated by those without technical backgrounds. In these cases, technical experts may only be called late in the disputes when additional resources are sought to add strength to a position. The role played by other parties, such as government, is influenced by the subject of the controversy and the form the controversy takes.[13]

In relation to both points, but especially the latter, Petersen and Markle present an allegory to illustrate why it is plausible to consider political forces as the key to understanding why some scientific/technical issues become controversies rather than others. They ask the reader to imagine a Martian, trained in science policy, shortly after her arrival on earth. While taking a cab from the rocket port, she notes the lack of safety factors of the taxi-cab and other automobiles. She also observes the obvious social and environmental problems involved in the use of fossil fuels.

Surely, she concludes, fossil fuels and auto-safety must be two of the most controversial science related issues in contemporary America.[14]

Petersen and Markle point out that, of course, this is not the case. Yet both issues should, we might expect, be scientific/technical controversies. This leaves us with political questions about why controversies occur. It is not enough to look to intrinsic features of technology and science and their relationship to society.

How did our expert go wrong? Why do some issues related to science and technology develop into public disputes while, others, of seemingly equal or even greater importance, do not?[15]

In short, Petersen and Markle emphasise that STCs are best explained in political terms. They appeal to theories of 'resource mobilisation' within studies of the dynamics of social movements. In such an approach, it is assumed that in contemporary society there are numerous grievances: as such controversies could develop at almost any time and in relation to numerous issues. The reason that controversies do not arise this way, is that the vast majority of the populace lack resources to turn grievances into controversies. Because of the unequal distribution of social power in contemporary society, one of the few contexts where such resources are able to be attached to grievances is through the functions of social movements. In such contexts, of particular importance are the role of social movement professionals (or issue entrepreneurs) and the co-opting and influencing of elites. Under the pressure of political efficacy, social movement activities re-cast specific technical scientific disagreements in terms of social/political value questions. This suggests that STC is foremost political controversy, shaped, guided and instigated by social movements.

Petersen and Markle raise a number of examples of specific controversies to support their claims. They discuss, for instance, how cultural and political differences between the US and Great Britain led controversy over oestrogen replacement therapy to take on a totally different character in each respective national culture, the difference being both in the nature of the politics involved and the way knowledge claims were linked to them.[16]

Overall, whilst social movement approaches to controversy accept that the study of STCs can be valuable in exposing the social choices sometimes obscured in scientific decision-making and that controversies provide a form of technology assessment,[17] they still maintain that STCs fit into a continuum of science, technology and society - that they are social political controversies ahead of scientific technical controversies sui generis.

As well as 'social movement politics', another example of 'controversy as politics' can be found in some Marxist orientated studies. Whilst there is no overarching programme of Marxist studies addressed directly to the problem of STC, some hints of what such an approach might look like can be found in the work of Levidow[18], Figlio,[19] Young,[20] and the Radical Science movement.[21]

Levidow, for instance, analyses the STC surrounding the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island. Beneath technical disagreement over what constituted safe exposure levels for 'fall-out', and contradictory interpretations of what levels local people were already exposed to, a more important force at play was the way 'authorities' came to define the crisis in the first place. Rather than acknowledge that, potentially, all radiation exposures were harmful to the public, debate came to be conducted in terms of potential exposures relative to other measurements, such as medical x-rays and forms of background radiation.

This fetishism of 'millirems per person', appealing to a negative 'possessive individualist' attitude towards possible damage, helped the state to perform its crucial tasks: to contain the immediate threat of popular disturbance, especially a break in production, as well as general distrust in the government itself; and to protect the nuclear industry from subsequent attack for the health hazards inherent in it. Thus the industry was able to congratulate itself afterwards for having prevented a core meltdown; in this way the state was able to protect capital's interest in nuclear power.[22]

According to Levidow this so-called 'ideology of safe levels' operated at two political levels. At the first superficial political level, the state could mis-represent what actually constituted safe exposures. For instance, power companies experts argued that exposure from the accident was no more than a dental x-ray. This, of course, sparked a heated STC. There were a number of other experts willing to argue that exposure 'in reality' was more like 3 to 10 dental x-rays or greater. Whilst this challenged the trustworthiness of the authorities, this STC was still 'operating' at a superficial, politically-captured level.

Even that critical commentary, effectively calling the authorities liars, did so within the authorities' own fetishized terms of reference; it disputed quantitatively the government's ultimately meaningless comparison of two different processes: infrequent 30-second exposures to a section of the jaw, and an 'equivalent' total concentration of exposure to more cancer-prone parts of the body spread over several days. The official claims were not merely quantitatively false in content but also ideological in form representing the (largely hidden) organic damage as some finite, familiar thing popularly associated with good health ...[23]

The second deeper (qualitative) political level that the controversy 'operated' at involved the symbolic power of the abstract category of 'safe levels'. This category was constructed and deployed by the state and the forces of capital so as to shape the controversy to suit their own interests.

Through the scientific terms of reference it invoked, the state was able to represent the low-level radiation exposure as 'part of the facts of life'. This not-uncommon feature of the nuclear industry - an inherent contradiction between the economic profitability and public acceptance of nuclear power - thus became a merely contingent conflict: the monitoring of 'safe level'. In this way the state could appear to be protecting people from the excesses of the industry while really protecting capital's interests in nuclear power: a sophisticated exercise in managing the contradictions inherent in the nuclear industry.[24]

In Marxist approaches then, STC can be analysed not merely in the narrow terms of the expert disagreements but, rather, in the context of the social relations of capitalism in which scientific/technical terms are negotiated and given practical meaning. As Levidow points out, quoting Marx from the Grundrisse:

... even the most abstract categories - despite their validity for all epochs (precisely because of their abstractness) - are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historical relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations.[25]

This does not necessarily indicate that the natural world is some kind of social construct, but rather that the negotiations of the meanings and implications of scientific/technical knowledge will be refracted through the social reality of the class relations of bourgeois society. STC then can be read as one of the numerous forms of class politics.[26]

In a similar vein, Figlio discusses the medico-legal debate surrounding the so-called 19th Century miners' disease, Nystagmus, putting the issue as follows:

I shall analyse the appearance of the observers of the disease and the socio-economic and political meaning of the disease, as mutually constitutive aspects of the same history. As a social event miners' Nystagmus has a history at one with the emergence of the social space within which its observation could occur. In this latter sense, the pre-existence of the disease as a 'natural' object which attracted medical scrutiny and characterisation - the growth of medical knowledge - is beside the point historically.[27]

Similar to Marxist approaches discussed above, feminist orientated studies of STCs are not unified as to the specific details of how STCs should be best studied. Part of this diversity can be accounted for by the vigorous but recent flood of interest in 'the science question in feminism'.[28] Feminist epistemologies of science reflect this diversity. Whilst some approaches have adopted biological essentialist perspectives emphasising the need to reshape science to incorporate the intrinsic biological cognitive attributes of women,[29] others have incorporated sociological and biological ideas together into what Harding has described as 'feminist standpoint epistemology' which is based on the argument

that men's dominating position in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated position provides the possibility of more complex and less perverse understandings.[30]

Other feminist positions have been more interested in locating and deconstructing the ways gender relations shape the epistemology of science in more specifically situated terms with care for the detailed historical and social contexts in which scientific knowledge is being constructed.[31] Others yet again, have been less interested in the epistemological deconstruction of science, being more concerned with (liberal political) issues surrounding the levels of participation of women in science and ensuring a fairer representation of the historical contributions of women to science.[32]

Apart from broader concerns with the degree to which, and in what ways, science can be seen as a form of patriarchal knowledge, and concern with the involvement by women in, and shaping by women of, science and technology, there have been a number of controversial areas of modern science and technology which have been subject to feminist styles of analysis ahead of others. Medical and psychiatric knowledge, in particular,[33] have constituted sites where the construction of women's bodies and women's behaviour by patriarchal society could be made especially visible:

... the concern with gender analysis of scientific knowledge can be traced back to the women's health movement that developed in Britain and America during the 1970s. Regaining knowledge and control over women's bodies - their sexuality and fertility - was seen as crucial to women's liberation. Campaigns for improved birth control and abortion rights were central to the early period of second wave feminism. There was a growing disenchantment with male medical theories and practices.[34]

Other areas of science such as new reproductive technologies, environmental debates and peace studies have also figured prominently in feminism/science discourse.[35]

Overall then, in 'controversy as politics' approaches to STC, disagreements can be accounted for, and explained, in numerous ways. Typically themes which arise involve:

• the shaping of controversies and their outcomes along lines of class, race, gender, etc.;

• the capture of technical and scientific experts into political programmes;

• the mobilisation of resources by social movements, etc.;

• analysis of the strategies which interest groups and participants adopt to attempt to 'win' controversies.

In such explanatory schemes epistemological issues surrounding science do not always need to take a 'high profile' nor be consistent between similar modes of political analysis. For instance, all of the following epistemological positions can be shown to be consistent with putting political analysis foremost in the manner described above:

• emphasise the shaping of knowledge claims as the by-product of 'political epistemological' factors, according to the analyst's version of political epistemology, i.e. Marxist or feminist, etc.;

• adopt a 'realist epistemology' but acknowledge the inter-weaving of science and political questions in practical contexts, i.e. the important subjects of controversies and disagreements are unlikely to be amenable to simple epistemological analysis by their very nature;

• re-define epistemological questions by putting them in to the background by emphasising, in the context in question, intrinsic problems of uncertainty. Best political practice, in the context of uncertainty, replaces epistemologically based concerns which are pre-occupied with 'knowledge closure' above practice.

Overall, in the 'STC as political controversy' approach, the key processes observed in scientific/technical disagreements will chiefly be those reflecting either the capture of scientists to pursue what are political aims of social interest groups, or the shaping of scientific/technical claims by the demands of class or gender forces. In these approaches, controversies are seen as the outcome of problems in social and political structures, hence they can be viewed in the light of being positive things bringing to air implicit political conflict that may otherwise be concealed.

From a 'post-Kuhnian' perspective, these approaches to STC display a weakness in frequently failing to evaluate the more detailed content of scientific disagreements. Scientific disagreements tend to be seen as symptoms of problems located 'elsewhere'. The politics of science are too easily 'read off' politics generally. This can mean that, at times, political analysis starts 'long after' a great deal of politics has already occurred concerning negotiating/constructing the content of scientific/technical knowledge claims. Whilst such approaches might capture political aspects of the knowledge claims in question in relation to, for instance, class and gender biases, they might easily miss the more micro-political shaping of claims specific to particular times and places, sub-cultures and knowledge contexts.

Scientific controversy as a by-product of technocratic politics

... a ubiquitous question woven throughout the variety of disputes over science and technology is who should control crucial policy choices? Reflected in this question is the fear that complex technological advances with far reaching consequences have changed the nature of the decision-making process, that scientific approaches to public policy have encroached on the traditional political models, and that deference to scientific knowledge threatens democratic principles reducing public control of crucial policy choices.

D Nelkin, 'Controversies and the Authority of Science', in HT Engelhardt & AL Caplan (eds.), Scientific Controversies, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987, p.291.

'Technocratic Politics' approaches identify scientific-technical disagreements as the by-products of politics, but not politics broadly understood. Rather, they are examples of the special political questions intrinsic to, and shaped by, qualities of modern science and technology. In particular, there is concern with the roles of scientific/technical knowledge in influencing what are seen as qualitative changes to the nature of modern social structures and politics. Within these approaches, the roots of most technical and scientific disagreements can be found in unresolved difficulties surrounding the attempt to define the 'legitimate' boundaries between science, technology and society.[36]

The boundaries between science technology and society become blurred for numerous reasons:[37]

• science is increasingly drawn upon as a source of rationality and legitimacy for decisions in modern society;[38]

• science and technology have increasingly come to mediate day-to-day life experiences - as such there is a growing material dependence on the opinions of scientific and technical experts;[39]

• there is a growing tendency for scientific-technical explanations and styles of reasoning to spread into previously intangible areas of human life;[40]

• in political or social disputes there is an irresistible tendency for many disputes to come to be defined in technical terms with scientific 'facts' converging with political 'values' - this situation creates political complexities as attempts to separate scientific 'facts' from political 'values' founder because of the tendency for biases to be built into, or in fact even be necessary to, the process of collecting and interpreting data in science required for policy purposes.[41]

Problems with defining the boundaries between science, technology and society are amplified by the emergence of persistent areas of conflict which are perceived to be intrinsic to modern science and technology.[42] These include:

• Fear of Risk. The growth of invisible, uncertain, unfamiliar, as well as involuntary and 'delayed threat' risks. Recombinant DNA technology and nuclear power exemplify these new kinds of risks. Institutionalised scientific disagreement and uncertainty mean that increasing evidence, rather than allaying fears, promotes difficult value questions in relation to acceptable levels of risk, often challenging the trustworthiness and responsibility of public institutions.[43]

• Fear of Misuse. The growth of applications of science with uses beyond their initial intended ones which may lead to harmful consequences, for instance, the potential for genetic engineering to be used in the hands of fascist governments to promote eugenics.[44]

• Moral and Ethical Concerns (flowing from the first two points above). These are expressed in the classical Faustian-Frankenstein themes: should science research some areas at all? are there fundamental ethical concerns, natural laws, which should limit scientific research?[45]

• Questions of Equity. A typical problem of new technologies is the redistribution of social costs and benefits. For instance, high tension powerlines or the construction of new airports may benefit large parts of the population but simultaneously impose costs on specific groups which may experience little or no direct share of these benefits. Also there is the related issue, given the huge social and economic costs of scientific research and development, of how goals and directions should be decided.[46]

• Freedom of Choice and Individual Rights. These involve the tendency for decisions made about new technology to demand universal compliance. 'Everyone must experience the effects of the decision' - for instance, should individuals have the right to use banned or scientifically dubious medications?

Governments impose regulations on the assumptions that individual choices have social costs or that individuals may fail to make rational choices on their own behalf.[47]

The 'intrinsic' difficulties surrounding modern science and technology noted above, plus the legitimatory functions of science and technology noted earlier can come together to produce ambivalence and profound cognitive dissonance. Within STC, experts, and the knowledge they 'represent', quickly come to take on ambiguous roles. Nelkin describes the situation succinctly:

... for they [experts] serve as a source of authority in disputes that are partly based on mistrust of precisely the kind of expertise that they themselves have come to represent.[48]

STC studies working in this framework frequently set about exposing the problems involved in the so called blurring of scientific/technical and social values. This has often involved describing the ways scientific/technical decision-making disenfranchises those without scientific/technical expert representation or those unable to, or unwilling to package their responses to scientific and technical developments in scientific and technical terms. Attention has also been payed to the growth of 'state sanctioned' decision making processes such as public inquiries where scientific, technical and legal 'experts' reframe political decisions into scientific/technical ones.[49]

In short, a theme in many of these studies is the threat to democracy if the political values embedded in technical and scientific disagreements are not acknowledged. To quote Nelkin again:

... a ubiquitous question woven throughout the variety of disputes over science and technology is who should control crucial policy choices? Reflected in this question is the fear that complex technological advances with far reaching consequences have changed the nature of the decision-making process, that scientific approaches to public policy have encroached on the traditional political models, and that deference to scientific knowledge threatens democratic principles, reducing public control of crucial policy choices.[50]

The 'subject matter' of' technocratic political' approaches tend to be things like the processes of scientific and technical decision making in controversial, frequently public, debates.[51] The content of the respective positions in such debates may be analysed to explore the political implications of; the re-descriptions of 'political concepts' as 'scientific concepts'; the role in decision making of experts and expert bodies; the political agendas of expert groups; the capture of expert groups for political purposes; and the form and quality of public participation in such debates. Many of these subjects are similar to those examined in 'controversy as politics' approaches. However, unlike the 'controversy as politics' approaches, here political viewpoints are contextually filtered through the prior problematic of the 'technocratic societies' inevitable blurring of the boundaries of science and society. Hence the idea that such controversies are 'special'; that science and technology filter particular concerns in specific ways that need to be explored as valuable in their own right.

A variety of epistemological positions are possible in technocratic politics approaches:

• There can be a degree of indifference about entering into 'micro epistemological' debates concerning the nature of scientific knowledge. Such indifference can be justified by noting that more important issues surround the understanding of the complexity of the mixing of social/technical concerns and knowledges which are intrinsic to scientific/technical controversies. As touched on previously, such mixtures of science, politics, facts-values are not taken as anomalous. Rather they are seen as a part of the condition of modern scientific technical society, something requiring analysis in its own right and not re-description via the analyst.

• Some studies, notably the work of Wynne,[52] Albury[53] and Rip,[54] do address epistemology squarely. Nevertheless, their emphasis is not on exploring the intricacies of scientific knowledge construction in situ alone, which is often done in more micro epistemologically preoccupied approaches, but rather to explore what should be the appropriate political practices involving scientific/technical disagreement, acknowledging from the outset, as central, the unique position and symbolic significance of modern science as a source of epistemological authority for contemporary knowledge claims. The exploration of the construction, and implications, of scientific authority becomes as, or more important, than the preoccupation with the construction of specific knowledge claims at a micro level. Overall, in a sense then, the major epistemological preoccupations of 'technocratic politics' approaches could be described as 'macro epistemic', i.e. the broader significance of the way that the authority of science is used in the construction of knowledge claims.

From a 'post-Kuhnian' perspective, 'technocratic politics' approaches to STCs have a number of strengths and weaknesses. Their weaknesses involve the tendency for an uncritical dichotomy of technocratic versus humanistic to be used in analysis. In exploring the dilemmas in scientific controversy of the 'blurring of the boundaries' of the scientific/technical versus social/humanistic, 'technocratic politics' approaches ironically themselves often risk 'blurring the distinction' between the technocratic humanistic dichotomy as, on the one hand, a participant's resource, whose meaning is subject to negotiation according to the specific context of its use, and, on the other hand, an analyst's resource, as an over-arching theory of society and knowledge. This can mean that whilst technocratic politics approaches correctly identify the importance of technocratic rhetoric and the unique legitimatory role of science in contemporary western culture, there can be a risk of assuming an overly simplistic linkage between technocratic rhetoric and actual practices and knowledge claims, rather than carefully documenting such linkages as they unfold in situ. Further, the analyst may risk introducing, a priori, without the benefit of detailed explanation, theories of what constitute technocratic versus humanistic categories of thought.

Overall, the technocratic versus humanistic dichotomy may be useful to consider when analysing scientific controversies as long as it is taken as an important part of the rhetoric of participants in controversies. Whilst the way participants deploy such categories may in fact be one of the central forms of legitimatory rhetoric that can be observed in many scientific controversies, the analyst nevertheless should avoid the tendency of introducing 'unexplicated' theories involving humanistic versus technocratic world views against which to measure/judge participants' claims.

Aside from the difficulties noted above, technocratic politics approaches to controversy do provide a number of useful observations.

Most importantly they attempt to identify some of the features common to STCs. These involve specific observations about repeated patterns of social concern in relation to the introduction of new science and technology, such as fear of risk, problems of equity, etc., and the more general observations of the broader cultural significance of modern science as a belief system - that is, problems of cognitive dissonance when experts disagree, the use of scientific/technical rhetoric to legitimise political claims, etc. The importance of the broader cultural significance of science and its implication for the study of controversy is easily overlooked in some of our other approaches. For instance, in 'controversy as politics', consideration of the image of science as a special form of legitimation tends to be subordinated to considerations of more general politics. Similarly, in sociology of scientific knowledge approaches, the need to explain the heterogeneity and localised nature of the politics behind the construction of science as practice, risks losing sight of the more general homogeneous discourse of science as legitimatory representation.

It is extremely important to incorporate into the analysis of controversy a recognition of the broader cultural significance of science as a belief system. This is particularly true if we consider the growth of numerous knowledge-making contexts and 'hybrid experts' operating between esoteric specialist research sites and the public. These key sites are rich in the use of rhetoric and negotiation of both specific scientific knowledge claims and more general claims about science as a belief system.

Historico/narrative approaches

Told in the form of a riveting medical detective story, Currents of Death is a meticulously researched and dramatically written warning about the most pervasive - and covered up public Health Hazard Americans face: the pernicious effect of our continuous exposure to low-level alternating-current electromagnetic fields.

Inside dust jacket, P Brodeur, Currents of Death, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1989.

The category 'Historico narrative approaches' encompasses the numerous accounts of scientific disagreement which do not specifically locate themselves within any kind of obvious theoretical framework. This category includes things like journalistic exposés, some government reports and some quasi-academic histories. Obviously studies in this category do have implicit causal models and theoretical viewpoints. These will tend to be drawn from accessible intellectual resources relatively familiar to popular culture.[55] Reflection on these 'intellectual resources' will not be one of the deliberate aims of such studies; rather such resources tend to be used as tools of convenience, a means to a narrative end.

There is usually less scope for investigation of the general nature of science or society in such studies. The specific controversy in question is the central subject. Such studies are frequently justified on the grounds of providing information to the public. Often, if there are lessons to be learned, they are equally specific, though in some journalistic contexts the lack of theoretical consideration of science tends to lead to the treatment of controversies as anomalies resulting from the breach of scientific norms, or forms of fraud. Whilst this genre of account of controversy is readily recognisable, it is difficult, as noted, to systematically analyse all the potential approaches offered. In short, philosophy and sociology of science and politics tend to take a 'back seat' relative to attempts to convey a sense of what happened and its significance.[56]

Because such forms of analysis rely on the implicit ideal of 'telling it like it is', there is normally no acknowledgment of the implicit philosophy of science embodied in the analysis. It is not surprising then that so many of these types of studies do not adequately address the dimensions of scientific controversy which involve participants negotiating the meaning of science, both in general and in the specific context of argument. Because these dimensions are ignored there is a tendency to proceed by supporting one side of a controversy and exploring the sources of 'bias' and 'error' in the other.

If there is any potential strength in such approaches it lies in their potential to focus on the dynamics of scientific controversy outside of narrow expert contexts, and in not being bound to theoretical interests that, in some of the other approaches, can lead to the elucidation of theoretical models taking precedence over the exploration of the specific historical features of any given controversy.

Fact/value approaches to controversy

... intelligent people on both sides of the controversy search enthusiastically for new problems diligently preparing charges and rebuttals, testing the strength of their arguments in open debate ... Unfortunately, technical controversies are usually chaotic and therefore we fail to achieve the potential benefits available to us ... in most controversies adversaries never confront one another.

A Mazur, 'Scientific Disputes over Policy', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., p.281.

In 'fact/value' studies the foremost concern is with the idea that technical and scientific controversies are pathological problems in modern society which need to be addressed and remedied. This is to be done by exploring ways of separating out the scientific from the political and social value components of controversies. Taking the work of Allan Mazur as representative of this approach, its key features can be identified as follows.[57]

Scientific and technical controversies have a number of background causes. Not unlike 'technocratic politics' approaches there is the acknowledgment that some intrinsic features of modern technology may stimulate controversy. For instance: strangeness of new technologies; problems of 'voluntarism' and 'compulsory adoption'; and the challenges of redistributions of costs and benefits.[58] Whilst significant these factors, or any coherent anti-science sentiment, are not the most important sources for scientific controversies.[59] More important sources for controversy can be located in the two following complementary scenarios:

• where immediate personal threats of negative by-products of new science or technology are perceived by groups or individuals (or less often, but still important, warnings about such threats are made within the ranks of scientific technical communities), and when such threats and warnings are brought to the broader public via the mass media;[60]

• full blown controversies occurring when the specific concerns noted above are linked to broader social and political issues and the political identifications of participants - to capture this last point, Mazur asks the reader to 'visualise the nuclear power controversy as a surfer riding successive waves which are larger national issues'.[61]

At a more specific level, there are a number of explanations given for the occurrence of controversies. Mazur explains this by examining the specific ways knowledge claims are politically shaped in the context of controversies. These explanations fall into two related categories:

• the conflation of facts and values; and

• ambiguity surrounding knowledge claims, i.e. the demand for certainty and the concomitant invasion of interests and biases when the area of science in question is, in reality, uncertain.[62]

These two points may be expanded on as follows. There are a number of ways relevant facts and values are problematically mixed in scientific controversies:

• by the rhetorical device of stating factual hypotheses in irrefutable, untestable terms - for instance, the often asked question 'can it be proved something is not a risk?'; and

• by phrasing hypotheses in vague probabilistic terms.[63]

The second theme, the role of ambiguity, is closely related to the difficulties of separating 'facts and values'. Ambiguities actually provide one of the entry points for confusion over 'facts and values' in debate in the first place. Ambiguities flow from situations involving complex problems of the state of the art which involve perceptions, which are difficult to articulate specifically, and questions which require judgement where there are no formal guides to procedure. These situations are typically like the following:

When it is necessary to make a simplifying assumption and many are reasonable, which simplifying assumption should be made? When data are lacking on a question, how far may one reasonably extrapolate from data of other sources? How trustworthy is a set of empirical observations?[64]

Under these conditions of ambiguity, experts readily fall into the trap of using two polemical strategies to satisfy scientific peers, the public and government bodies:

• the rejection of discrepant data: this involves the denial of the validity of an opponent's data often for pedantic reasons - rather than on strictly scientific grounds which might find the data reasonably acceptable;

• the presentation of alternative interpretations: this occurs when both parties agree on the data but argue it may be interpreted in completely different ways with totally different decision making consequences - for example, the debate over 'linear' versus threshold doses for harmful effects of ionizing radiation.[65]

Out of this polemic and failure to admit the limits of scientific knowledge - failure in a particular context to 'agree to disagree'[66] - scientific positions tend to polarise as controversies proceed.[67] In fact the positions of disputants take on the qualities of ideologies as they become entrenched, modified and related to particular decision making paths.

Added to the phenomena of polarisation and ideology formation, there are a number of other factors contributing to the failure of disputes to be resolved. These include:

• failure even to attempt to mediate a dispute to start with;

• the slowness of this process even if it is attempted;

• the pressure of non-experts (who fail to comprehend the real issues) on experts;

• lack of trust in political and administrative process;

• experts once involved needing to engage in 'face-saving', defending scientific positions which in other contexts would have been relinquished.[68]

Like 'controversy as politics', fact/value approaches often study the dynamics of social movements and the motives of disputants. They also frequently make specific recommendations of how to 'resolve' controversies. This latter point has come to be a dominant theme in some studies. In fact it is often noted that, in abstract terms, 'controversies' have potentially positive aspects. For instance, Mazur argues that controversies, carried out properly, can become an effective means of 'technology assessment'. Ideally, this would occur when

intelligent people on both sides of the controversy search enthusiastically for new problems diligently preparing charges and rebuttals, testing the strength of their arguments in open debate.[69]

Part of the aims of 'fact/value' analyses, then, is to suggest how the appropriate potential of controversy can be realised in the face of the real world situation where controversies all too readily become intransigent and harmful. As Mazur puts it:

Unfortunately, technical controversies are usually chaotic and therefore we fail to achieve the potential benefits available to us ... in most controversies adversaries never confront one another.[70]

Policy proposals, logically following from the above, involve suggestions of how to separate facts and values, how to specify the limits of scientific knowledge in any particular context, and how to answer any particular question and clarify particular scientific viewpoints.

This broad set of proposals works within the background assumption that there is an important division between scientists-experts and society generally. Ideally, scientists should be left to handle 'scientific/technical' questions and the public (society) 'value' questions. In regard to these issues, one pragmatic proposal Mazur feels should be developed is the use of science courts.[71]

Science courts were originally proposed in 1976 by a White House Task Force on anticipated advances in science and technology headed by Arthur Kantrowitz. They were originally designed to work through three phases of problem solving:

• identifying significant questions of science and technology associated with the controversial public policy issue in question, leaving ethical/political questions for subsequent consideration;

• establishing an adversary proceeding to be presided over by scientists/judges where scientific experts would testify and scientific advocates would cross examine them; and

• the judges issuing their decision on the scientific facts pertaining to the disputed technical question.[72]

Overall then, the fact/value approach is pre-occupied with identifying and analysing the ways social/political values enter into science during STC and the way such values can be removed, i.e. clarification, testing, the creation of expert referees, the discipline of adversary procedure. Following from the assumption that the ultimate causes for controversy do not emanate from within science but, rather, from the supposed invasion of politics into science, fact/value approaches argue that in the appropriate environment science should be able to apply its own corrective, which is to let experts 'fight it out' amongst themselves. In such contexts the only 'real' role for the social scientist, or members of the public, is to make sure that scientists 'play' by their own stated rules.[73]

'Fact/value' approaches to understanding controversy would appear, then, to adopt a straight-forward 'realist' epistemology. Whilst this is correct in the main, there are, nevertheless, attempts in this literature to acknowledge, even if only to a subtle degree, the importance of social context in the construction of scientific claims. Mazur, for instance, anticipates the objections of some philosophers that 'fact/value' dichotomies imply a naive realism. The separation of 'fact/values', he argues, can be thought of in contextual pragmatic terms; it does not have to be pedantically pure.

All that is required is a separation of blatant evaluative and normative statements from statements of fact. Values which are shared by all the contending interest groups or values which are too subtle to affect practical decisions, may be intertwined in the statement of fact without causing a problem.[74]

In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of 'fact/value' approaches, the questions surrounding the philosophical and practical viability of separating 'facts' from 'values' become crucial. From a post-Kuhnian vantage point, this desired separation of 'facts' and 'values' is philosophically implausible (see later discussion of SSK). Similarly, in 'technocratic politics' approaches, separating facts from values is also seen as a difficult if not impossible task because of the historical considerations of the legitimatory role of science and technology. Further, whilst some realist philosophers of science still argue for the possibility of the separation of 'facts' from 'values', this work normally relies on sophisticated, philosophical re-descriptions of activities of scientists and not the types of primarily sociological/political analysis prescribed by scholars such as Mazur.

Not all aspects of 'fact-value' approaches can be seen as negative though. Some 'fact-value' approaches permit and encourage the analysis of the rhetoric participants use in their attempts to separate what, for them, are facts and values. Mazur's work on rhetoric and argument provides a number of valuable insights into the strategies used by competing groups in scientific controversies. 'Fact-value' studies have also provided insights in to the ways competing social interest groups come to have different concepts of facts and values in the first place.

Closure studies

One of the tasks of this volume is to suggest distinctions among the various ways in which controversies are brought to a conclusion: by negotiation, by political procedure, or by the means supposedly more usual in scientific controversies, namely the appeal to facts and observations.

H Engelhardt & A Caplan, 'Introduction: Patterns of Controversy and Closure: The Interplay of Knowledge, Values and Political Forces', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., p.2.

The fifth framework for understanding controversy could be described as 'closure' studies. This category captures the bulk of the work emanating from the so-called 'Hastings Project', an undertaking which involved more than 30 scholars, and addressed 'the character of scientific disputes with a heavy ethical or political overlay'.[75]

Conferences and research groups in this Programme met between 1978 and 1982. Materials and papers from these meetings were re-worked between 1982 and 1984 and finally published as a series of essays edited by Engelhardt and Caplan, published in the large 1986 volume titled Scientific Controversies. Most of these essays were preoccupied with the context of closure. As Engelhardt and Caplan explain:

One of the tasks of this volume is to suggest distinctions among the various ways in which controversies are brought to a conclusion: by negotiation, by political procedure, or by the means supposedly more usual in scientific controversies, namely the appeal to facts and observations.[76]

It is true that some of the essays from the Hastings project fall within the other categories, namely Mazur's 'fact/value' approach,[77] Nelkin's 'technocratic politics',[78] and Mendelsohn's approach,[79] which comes close to the sociology of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, most of the essays focus on closure in the same way, broadly sharing the following key assumptions.

According to closure studies, scientific controversies arise for a number of reasons. As a background assumption, it is acknowledged that controversies are typical in the history of science. This, in part, explains their usefulness as a site for addressing the more general question of evaluating conceptual developments in science.[80] Further, not unlike Popperian views of scientific discovery, the psychology of the origins of controversy are taken to be equally as varied.[81] Building on this analogy it is argued that this is one of the reasons the study of closure is important. The act of attempting to falsify or test hypotheses can be seen as an integral part of the process of closure.

In spite of the variety of possible background causes for controversy it is argued that there are four contexts in which controversies which resist closure have most commonly arisen. These contexts entail:

• different appreciations of the evidence at stake;

• the involvement of competing social groups with opposed political visions;

• large amounts of public involvement stimulating disputes to become more complex; and

• disputes having become highly differentiated, involving numerous sub-controversies.[82]

Overall, as controversies are seen as a normal part of science, identifying their causes is valuable in allowing a better appreciation of

the ways in which the inner logic of scientific investigation, predicated upon a concern with evidence and reasoning on the basis of evidence involves values and political concerns.[83]

and in providing a site to examine

the extent to which the movement of science to more ample and secure knowledge claims is shaped and directed, or impeded by forces external to science, such as the values and political forces of the scientists' cultural milieu.[84]

Controversies occur as both a normal part of scientific development in the sense of the psychology of discovery, but are also the by-product of outside pressures.

At a more specific explanatory level, closure studies explore the following propositions:

• They stipulate that their main concern will be scientific debates with heavy political or ethical overlays. This stipulation does not limit study unduly, though, as many scientific controversies fit into this category, especially considering the contemporary importance of scientific legitimacy in public policy making.

• It is assumed that science, ethics and politics are marked by controversy with different patterns of reasoning and modes of resolution. For instance, it is argued that scientific/technical controversies are generally resolved by appeal to facts and reasoned arguments, while in the case of politics, negotiation is seen as central and with ethics there is a mixture of the above.

Flowing from this, the discussion of controversies involves separating out not only the various ingredients, i.e. forms of reasoning and resolution, but also the different sub-controversies involved in any given debate.

Following on this emphasis of individuating the specific controversies within any given debate, there is the need to map the distinctions between different ways such controversies are closed. In their opening essay to the collected Hastings papers, Engelhardt and Caplan attempt to synthesise the different approaches to closure suggested within the Hastings project. These various forms of closure are basically unintelligible unless they are understood in the light of the fundamental dichotomy between 'sound argument closure' and other forms of closure.

'Sound argument closure' primarily refers to closure on the basis of 'rational' argument. A degree of complexity enters into closure studies at this point: for whilst the dichotomy between sound argument and other forms of closure (not dissimilar to 'fact/value' distinctions noted earlier) is maintained, there is a strong aversion to turning controversy studies into a form of logical reconstruction of science on the basis of current scientific standards (whatever such things might be). Controversies should always be placed into their appropriate historical context.

The rules for acquiring evidence and drawing conclusions, however, change in science over time. One must, as a consequence, qualify scientific controversies with a socio-historical subscript to identify a scientific controversy with a particular scientific community, its rules for selecting evidence relevant to a debate, and its rules for reasoning on the basis of such evidence. That is, a scientific controversy becomes identified with a particular scientific community, understood as a group of stake holders in a scientific debate who at a particular point in history share common rules of evidence and inference.[85]

This concern with historical context should not, however, be confused with the notion of historical context as it appears, for instance, in contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge studies. Importantly, it is not taken to imply the need for epistemological relativism, i.e. the socially contingent basis of scientific knowledge claims. Historical context with simultaneous scientific realism is given in closure studies by appealing to the idea of two forms of sound argument closure: sound argument in the 'strict sense' and sound argument in the 'broad sense'. The former sense is the ideal of 'what would occur on the basis of rules of evidence and inference unconditioned by the history or culture of the participants'.[86] Engelhardt and Caplan hint that such arguments would be those which could be imagined to come from 'the ultimate scientific community', something not necessarily achievable but which could be appealed to as an 'ideal type' from which to judge deviations against its norms and reasoning.

One appeals to that community as an intellectual possibility in criticising actual communities and their rules of evidence and scientific reference. The scientific community best able to make true knowledge claims is thus an intellectual standpoint from which one both justifies and criticises the deliverances of any particular community.[87]

The second sense of sound argument closure, in the 'broad sense', moves from the 'ideal' to the 'pragmatic'. These arguments are ones that involve appeals to rules of evidence and inference, that are 'as far as can be determined by the participants, correct and undistorted by the presuppositions of the participants.'[88]

Historically contextual arguments in relation to sound arguments in 'the broad sense' can be made according to deviations observed in the behaviour of participants measured against the participants own stated or constructible rules. At the same time at something of a 'meta-level' the standards of the participants themselves, in the first place, can be judged against ideal sound arguments in the 'strict sense'. From the analyst's viewpoint, 'strict sound argument closure' is seen as being prescriptive whereas 'broad sound argument closure' is seen as descriptive.[89]

'Bouncing off' these notions of sound argument closure, four other forms of closure are identified. These are all forms of closure other than those which appeal to reasoning on the basis of 'sound arguments'. These forms of closure can be briefly described as follows. They include:

• abandonment - when a controversy closes through lack of interest;

• force - where closure is achieved via coercion and there is no appeal to reasoning or negotiation, one side merely prevailing by political force;

• consensus (puzzlingly this is not to be confused with negotiation) - this is meant to capture shifts in belief systems with origins outside of the controversy which may lead to a controversy closing;

• negotiation closure - this is a procedure whose outcome is agreed to close an issue, aside from whether sound argument closure can be achieved - in a sense, this refers to consensus about the means to solve a controversy rather than over the conclusion of the means.[90]

This rather convoluted schema of forms of closure is further complicated in that, in practice, in any given controversy, in keeping with the earlier observations that controversies comprise of sub-controversies, mixtures of forms of closure are possible.[91]

The conceptual tools of closure studies are historical and sociological analysis refracted through the aims of identifying the different forms of controversy within a given debate, identifying the appropriate forms of closure and speculating on the reasons for the absence of closure. And as far as the latter is concerned, there will be overarching considerations of comparing sound argument closure to other forms of closure. The latter dichotomy is important in that the analyst must deploy judgements about what constitutes valid scientific reasoning. These judgements take two forms: in the case of sound argument closure in the broad sense, this is an historically informed judgement according to a reconstruction of the scientific standards of the participants; in the case of strict sound argument closure the judgement is of what makes for valid science in ideal, philosophical terms. These judgements lead the discussion of closure into a multi-layered process of a limited 'sociology of knowledge' and 'sociology of error'. A limited sociology of knowledge is possible in that the historical sources for knowledge claims, including valid ones, are acknowledged. It should also be noted this sociology of knowledge is reminiscent of the limited sociology of knowledge of Merton - there being a pre-occupation with documenting the stimulus of social influence on the direction but, ultimately, not the content of science. A sociology of error is possible in that error and bias are investigated, both in the historical context of 'relative error bias' of 'broad sound argument closure'; that is, searching for inconsistencies within a reconstructed image of what participants should have argued within their own historically framed scientific beliefs; and, in the ahistorical context, of 'universal error' against images of 'strict sound argument closure', searching for inconsistencies in participants' beliefs relative to absolute images of scientific correct practice.

Closure studies are 'advertised' as contributing to academic discourse and public policy in the following ways:

First, at the broad level of theoretical discourse, closure studies are claimed to transcend preoccupations with 'internalist' and 'externalist' approaches to the study of science. The study of controversy via processes of closure is seen to provide a superior vehicle for understanding the processes of scientific change. The actual form of closure in any particular context is open to interpretation. Neither internalist nor externalist factors are of assumed a priori importance. Whilst sound argument closure should be the ultimate scientific arbitrator and is thus analogous to internalism, unlike internalism it is an ideal model of what scientists should have done, not one which assumes that this is what actually has occurred or will occur in any given context.

Second, it is claimed that closure studies 'expose' and highlight the multi-dimensional nature of scientific controversies: that scientific controversies are as complex as the human condition itself.

... scientific controversies are as complex as the weave of human interest and truth, fairness, and individual advantage. The understanding of controversies, and of their resolutions, requires what the humanities always require: a careful attention to the human condition.[92]

In short, the complexity of controversies encourages a need for methodological pluralism. Insights from philosophy, sociology and politics should all be used. 'A geography of scientific controversies and of the numerous pitfalls of closure must be multi-dimensional.'[93]

Third, it is argued that closure studies of scientific controversy offer valuable insights into society. This possibility is enhanced by the insistence of closure studies on the plurality and complexity of controversies.[94]

Finally, at a policy level, closure studies are claimed to provide an important instrument in clarifying the factual and ethical political dimensions of controversies, hopefully enhancing 'fairer' and 'more truthful' forms of closure. Through this appreciation of the interplay of factual and evaluative dimensions, Engelhardt and Caplan propose:

... we can better acknowledge what elements of such debates can be resolved through the discovery of new facts and what elements can only be resolved through developing means to create arbitrary standards that will fairly balance the interests of the stake-holders. There is an advantage in knowing when we can know more truly versus when we can hope to negotiate solutions more fairly.[95]

The objects of scrutiny in closure studies, in theory, are only limited by the historical circumstances of the given controversy under review. In practice, this pluralism does tend to be circumscribed. The importance of concepts such as sound argument closure refract the evaluation of the 'contents of science' in controversy through the lens of what the analyst regards as ideal science. As will be discussed shortly, more overtly 'symmetrical' types of analysis (those which assess all scientific knowledge claims as epistemologically equivalent) which do not presuppose strict sound argument closure allow a closer focus on the dynamics of the negotiations of the content of scientific knowledge claims.

Not unlike fact-value approaches, the weaknesses of 'closure studies' also revolve around their philosophy of science. The most important of these weaknesses involves the analyst's aim of specifying what the ideal scientific method standards should be, so as to identify what form of closure was or was not possible to achieve in a given debate. This difficulty becomes increasingly more acute when related back to things like 'strict sound argument closure' and 'sound argument closure'. The tension in such studies between attempting to locate controversies in their historical context whilst also trying to locate scientific method in an ahistorical sense invites contradiction. For example, it is easy to imagine the specific historical context of a controversy being lost and distorted in the process of the analyst deploying their own contemporary version of scientific method. Finally, if forms of closure are to be measured against the analyst's pre-existing model of scientific method, the methods identified as being important to participants in a given controversy are unlikely to contribute to modifying the analyst's theories of science. Closure studies, then, encounter difficulties fulfilling one of their stated aims which is to contribute to building a detailed image of the nature of science. At best, controversy studies can provide confirmation of the analyst's pre-existing theories of science.

One potential strength of closure style studies, nevertheless, is that the idea of exploring broad sound argument closure (involving the use of historical, contextually sound arguments) can be a useful heuristic device to explore differences between the stated values of participants and their actual behaviour. Certainly from the perspectives of SSK (to be discussed shortly) 'sound argument closure' is a questionable device in that it involves the analyst actively reconstituting science. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that in a less philosophically strict way, the study of STC frequently involves some reconstruction by the analyst, no matter what her/his chosen epistemological perspective, of what participants in a controversy take as scientific.

A second positive feature of closure studies is in their acknowledgment of the inter-play in any single debate of numerous sub-debates or sub-controversies. It is obvious that any rich theoretical understanding of controversy should involve identifying their multi-dimensionality. From a pragmatic point of view, closure studies, in emphasising the plurality of elements making up a controversy, help stand between the excessive attention given to external political factors, as in controversy as politics approaches, or internal forces, as in much contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge analysis, with its concerns with the micro-construction of scientific knowledge.

Contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)

... it is only by examining scientific controversies while they are in progress that the mechanism by which ships (scientific findings) get into bottles (validity) can be understood. If this process is not seen in operation it may be thought that the ships were always in the bottles, and that all scientists did was to find them ready assembled, as it were.

HM Collins, 'Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a Physical Phenomenon', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, 1981, p.45.

The final category of scientific controversy studies we will consider is that of the contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). One of the first major defining features of these studies is that they take as their 'point of departure' the related concepts of the 'under-determination' of scientific theories by the evidence and the 'theory-loading' of observation.

First, the under-determination thesis, or the Duhem-Quine thesis, can be considered. In brief, it proposes:

... any theory can be maintained in face of any evidence, provided that we make sufficiently radical adjustments elsewhere in our beliefs ... that no one single theory or theoretical hypothesis can