Published in Brian Martin, C. M. Ann Baker, Clyde Manwell and Cedric Pugh (editors), Intellectual Suppression: Australian Case Histories, Analysis and Responses (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1986), pp. 1-7.
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Dr John Coulter worked for twenty years
as a medical researcher at the Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science
(IMVS) in Adelaide, South Australia. During this time he was, in his private
capacity, a leading environmentalist. He spoke out on many occasions on issues
such as uranium mining and the hazards of environmental chemicals. In addition,
Dr Coulter in the late 1970s headed within the IMVS a small mutagens testing
unit. By testing substances for their capacity to cause mutations, a good
indication of their potential for inducing cancer can be obtained.
Dr
Coulter's activities posed a threat to various vested interests, in particular
certain chemical companies and their supporters within the IMVS. For example,
in 1979 Dr Coulter gave a lecture, in his private capacity, in which he
mentioned the way the Velsicol company in the United States had handled
information on the cancer-causing properties of two of their products,
chlordane and heptachlor. After the lecture, Velsicol Australia complained about
it to the Director of the IMVS - not directly to Dr Coulter.
Dr
Coulter's work in the environmental mutagens testing unit also was unwelcome in
some places. Dr Coulter on occasion tested substances such as polycyclic
hydrocarbons to which workers or the public were being exposed. Furthermore,
sometimes he gave reports of his testing to workers or trade unions as well as
to the appropriate IMVS committees.
Dr
Coulter was dismissed from his job at the IMVS on 30 June 1980. Several reasons
were offered for the dismissal by the then Director of the IMVS. But in later
court hearings, initiated by Dr Coulter to gain reinstatement, none of these
reasons were substantiated. Therefore it seems a reasonable inference that Dr
Coulter was dismissed not because of any deficiencies in his job performance,
but because his environmental activities were found objectionable by certain
people in positions of power.
The
Coulter case has much more detail and further ramifications, some of which are
described in later chapters. But this basic outline illustrates most of the key
features of what we call suppression of intellectual dissent or, more briefly,
intellectual suppression.
First,
a person or group, by their public statements, research, teaching or other activities,
threatens the vested interests of elites in corporations, government,
professions or some other area. Typically this is by threatening profits,
bureaucratic power, prestige or public image, for example by providing support
to alternative views or by exposing the less attractive sides of the powerful
group.
By
speaking out on environmental issues, Dr Coulter provided support for community
groups opposing policies of uranium mining companies, government departments
and other powerful interests. By providing information about the hazards of
environmental chemicals directly to workers, he provided support for workers
and also undercut the power of employers to the extent to which it was based on
a monopoly of information about health
The
second feature of suppression cases is an attempt by a powerful individual or
group to stop or to penalise the person or activity found objectionable. This
may involve denying funds or work opportunities, blocking appointments,
blocking tenure, blocking promotion, blocking courses, blocking publication,
preventing free speech, dismissal, harassment, blacklisting, and smearing of reputations.
These are examples of what we call direct suppression. Indirect suppression occurs when people are inhibited from making public statements, doing research
and the like because of the implied or overt threat of sanctions or because of
a general climate of fear or pressures for conformity.
Dr
Coulter was directly suppressed by being dismissed. At the same time, the
activity of testing for environmental mutagens was directly suppressed by the
closure of the testing unit which he had headed. Indirect suppression is harder
to pinpoint. But it is probably responsible for the rarity with which
professional scientists speak up on social issues, and in the scarcity of
scientific research, such as environmental mutagens testing, which is both
directly useful to workers and community groups and which is made available to
them.
There
are several other typical features of suppression cases. For example, when
complaints are made about a person's activities, they are usually made not to
the person concerned, but to her or his boss. This occurred when companies
complained to the IMVS about Dr Coulter's public statements. The companies'
responses were to the source of power over Dr Coulter, namely the IMVS, rather
than to the source of the information in question, namely Dr Coulter himself.
Another
typical feature of suppression cases is a lack of any substantive reasons given
for the action taken. In societies in which freedom of speech and inquiry are
formally subscribed to, suppression is seldom justified by saying outright that
public criticism or critical teaching is being penalised,
"Acceptable" reasons usually are given: that a person has not been
doing a satisfactory job, that a proposal is not a high enough priority to
warrant funding, and so forth. In many cases such reasons are entirely correct;
they are not the suppression cases we are concerned with here. We are concerned
with the cases in which the suppression is entirely or in part a response to
the expression of intellectual dissent, and in which other explanations for the
suppression do not stand up to scrutiny.
Often
it is difficult to "prove" conclusively that suppression of
intellectual dissent has actually occurred. Only occasionally do suppressors
openly admit their motivations and actions. Therefore the number of cases of
suspected suppression is much larger than the number of cases in which
suppression can definitely be said to be involved. Suppression can be strongly
suspected whenever the formal reasons offered for penalising a person or
activity are demonstrably inadequate. If the performance of a dissident - a
person whose activities provide some challenge to prevailing views or interests
- is not significantly worse than that of other individuals who are not
dissidents and who are not punished, this is strong evidence of suppression.
For
example, other scientists in the IMVS whose scientific performances were less
impressive than Dr Coulter's were not dismissed. This suggests that
explanations for his dismissal based on poor scientific productivity are
suspect.
Suppression
of intellectual dissent is only one kind of suppression. Also possible, and
common, is suppression instigated because of a person's political affiliation
or activity, ethnic origin, sex, sexual preference, age, religion, occupation,
personality or superior competence. All these forms of suppression are vitally
important. But to limit the treatment in this book we have focused mainly on
intellectual suppression. For example, blocking of a person's appointment to a
job because of her sex would not count as suppression of intellectual dissent,
but blocking of a person's appointment because of her outspoken feminist views
would fall into this category.
We have chosen to distinguish
suppression from repression[1], reserving for the latter term
Suppression
is a general term, and both censorship and discrimination can be considered as
types of suppression. In this book the unqualified use of the term suppression
will refer to suppression of intellectual dissent.
Although
suppression in any individual case is often difficult to demonstrate
conclusively, we think the available evidence suggests that suppression is a
widespread occurrence. How common is it? In some circumstances, suppression is
the rule rather than the exception. For example, in authoritarian societies
such as military dictatorships and communist regimes, suppression of dissident
views is standard policy. In many countries in which routine repression occurs
- torture, imprisonment and murder - such violent means of smashing dissent are
essentially a supplement to routine suppression, such as firing dissidents from
government employment and censoring the media.[2]
Although
suppression is sometimes the initial, nonviolent aspect of attempts to deter
and penalise dissent, with violent repression reserved for the more
recalcitrant cases, the distinction is usually more complex. Suppression is
essentially an expression of political power in circumstances in which knowledge
and information rather than brute force is paramount. The very concept of
"intellectual dissent" assumes the existence of a group of people who
produce and distribute information, and of a standard set of ideas from which
dissent can be made. Although suppression of intellectual dissent has occurred
for thousands of years, it is especially characteristic of modern industrial
societies with a high degree of literacy, in which communications and mass
media are well developed, and in which the standard organisational form is
bureaucracy.
Modern
industrial societies are held together less by force than by common acceptance
of the status quo. Of course, "common acceptance" may not be
representative of the best interests of everyone: opinions can be shaped or
manipulated through schooling and advertising, and perceptions of what is
socially possible are shaped by the current distribution of social power and
the existing social institutions. Those who are in the best position to shape
perceptions of reality are those in powerful positions: elites in government,
in government bureaucracies, in corporations. Intellectual dissent usually
means dissent from the established policies or practices of elite groups. The
most effective way for these groups to maintain their privileged and powerful
positions is by shaping people's perceptions, by making the existing
distribution and use of power in society seem reasonable, beneficial and
inevitable. If everyone saw things in these ways, there would be no need for
direct suppression. It is usually only when individuals or groups criticise
this state of affairs that elites resort to suppression.
Does
suppression really matter all that much? Would not society carry on much the
same with or without an extra amount of open dissent? We believe that
suppression has important consequences for society. In some spectacular cases
the stakes are enormous. A. Ernest Fitzgerald was sacked because he exposed
cost overruns in United States military contracting. The overruns, which were
being obscured by misleading accounting practices, which Fitzgerald revealed,
amounted in the case of the C5-A transport aircraft to US$2000 million.[3] John
Bradley lost his job because he tried to expose shortcomings in the computer
system used in the US missile tracking early warning system. At stake was the
conventionally assessed security of the US people against nuclear attack.[4]
The
success of either dissent or suppression also may decide whether millions of
people are exposed to harmful drugs or environmental chemicals, whether
dangerous defects in everyday consumer products are corrected, whether funds
are diverted from the poor and the
It
is important to make one point clear. We and most of the other contributors in
this book do not wish to draw any conclusions about the motivations of those
people who carry out suppression. Almost everyone has the best of intentions.
Many of those who carry out suppression genuinely believe they are acting on
proper grounds, such as ensuring top quality scholarship or preventing harmful
public statements. Others carrying out suppression may justify it by appealing
to what are for them higher goals, such as maintaining professional decorum or
organisational efficiency. Rather than focusing on psychological motivations
for suppression, we prefer to emphasise the social dynamics of the process,
including mechanisms, contexts, power relationships and opposition to it.
Where
is suppression most frequent? Indirect or institutionalised suppression - in
which a climate of fear or threat of penalties inhibits dissent - is most
common in authoritarian societies and organisations. For example, in communist
countries significant open dissent from the line of the Communist Party is sure
to cause repercussions, and will, among other things, severely limit potential
career advancement. More generally, bureaucracy is an authoritarian form of
social organisation: internal dissent is discouraged, and dissent to a public
audience is usually severely penalised. The prevalence of bureaucracy has been
increasing steadily in the last several hundred years, and as bureaucracy
spreads so the market for dissenting ideas gradually shrinks.
It
is no coincidence that the form of social organisation in which bureaucracy is
most dominant and pervasive, namely communist regimes, is also where suppression
of intellectual dissent is most rigorously enforced. But the importance of
bureaucracy, and of suppression, has greatly increased in Western societies
too. Government bureaucracies and large corporations (also organised in the
form of bureaucracy) are the most important, but other parts of society are
also bureaucratised, including churches, trade unions and academia. This means
that intellectual activity is more and more done by professionals working for
large bureaucratised organisations. Independent intellectuals are ever rarer,
as are the channels by which they can express their opinions to more than a
minority.
In
these circumstances, intellectual dissent from within the ranks of intellectual
workers plays an ever-increasing role. Dissidents may be found at any level in
the flow of information. Journalists, writers, artists, librarians,
secretaries, lawyers, engineers and computer programmers all play vital roles
in the flow of information in modern industrial societies. Companies and governments
can muster enough of their own experts to promote their own interests. On
issues such as uranium mining, it rests to a considerable extent on
professional intellectuals, such as John Coulter, to help present contrary
views on a technical level. And if activities such as mutagen testing are to be
done in the public interest, it often depends on individuals such as Dr Coulter
to carry them out within a bureaucratic work setting and to make them available
to a wider audience.
Although
suppression is an important phenomenon in modern industrialised society, its
significance has been generally overlooked in the West. The finger is often
pointed at communist and other repressive governments, but the same problems at
home are not seen in a coherent framework. Most often suppression is seen - if
suppression is acknowledged at all - as an occasional abuse rather than a
systematic occurrence. And periods such as the late 1940s and early 1950s, in
which suppression became rampant - called in the United States the McCarthy era
- are seen as a sort of aberration rather than a temporary accentuation of an
ever-present problem. It is because the systematic discussion of suppression
has been avoided in the West that we focus on suppression in the so-called
"Free World". The problem is as bad and usually worse in communist
countries and military dictatorships, but at
Most
of our case histories involve academic or scientific institutions. We chose
this focus for several reasons.
First,
academic institutions play a central role in the flow of information in modern
industrial society. Not only are they primary centres for the creation and
integration of knowledge, but they pass on that knowledge through teaching.
They also play a major role in the training and certification of other
information professions.
Second,
although suppression is generally more frequent in government bureaucracies and
corporations, well documented cases of suppression in these areas are less
frequent than in academic organisations. This is partly because there are fewer
mechanisms in corporations and state bureaucracies by which to openly oppose
suppression, and less access to information to expose it.
Third,
science and academia are often said to be havens for dissent, under the
protection of scientific freedom and academic freedom. By illustrating
suppression in these areas, we hope to show by implication the pervasiveness of
suppression in other areas in which intellectuals are employed. Finally, our
own experiences are mainly in science and academia, and this experience gives
us greater feeling for the operation of suppression in these areas.
Our
emphasis on academic organisations should not be taken as any suggestion that
suppression problems are less important in other parts of society. Indeed, we
do not see a clear separation between bureaucracies and academia, but on the
contrary perceive close similarities. Universities are often bureaucratic in
many aspects of their operation. In addition, universities provide
"tangible services", namely the production of students with degrees,
and of publications. This process is more easily quantified and evaluated than
the
Documented
cases of suppression are in several ways an unrepresentative sample of all
cases of suppression. As mentioned before, expectations of scientific and
academic freedom mean that a disproportionate fraction of challenged and
publicised suppression cases are from these areas. In addition, only some types
of cases are readily documented: dismissals usually require justification,
whereas blockings of appointments are difficult to verify. Documented cases of
suppression overemphasise the major and dramatic events, such as dismissals and
cutting off of funding, and underemphasise problems such as blocking of
publication and subtle harassment by collegial disapproval. Documented cases
also overemphasise instances in which channels for formal redress are
available.
The
nature of science and academia, and the unrepresentativeness of documented
cases of suppression, lead to other biases. For example, there are relatively
few documented cases of suppression of women dissidents in science and
academia, since due to discrimination few women are found in science and
academia in the first place, and those who are there are mostly in lower-level
positions with less security and protection and therefore less opportunity for
resisting or publicising suppression when it occurs. We have tried to overcome
some of these biases, without being tokenistic. Nevertheless, our sample of
cases is far from ideal. We only hope that the treatments here encourage the
further study of other types and instances of suppression - and, even more
importantly, resistance to suppression.
The
documented cases here may suggest that suppression is a spectacular and
therefore fairly rare occurrence. But in practice suppression is a routine
phenomenon. When discrimination is institutionalised, as against women or
against followers of a particular way of organising knowledge, then suppression
can occur so effortlessly that it is difficult to recognise. Once debate in an area of
intellectual discourse is considered to be outside the realm of acceptability -
for example the issue of fluoridation - then instances of overt suppression may
be few. It is simply considered ridiculous to allow publication of the
unorthodox opinion or to hire supporters of the unorthodox position. But in
such cases suppression may be at work via interest groups and the squashing of
challenges to received opinion. This has been the process behind most of the
suppression of feminist critique, the subject of Cheryl Hannah's chapter: the power
of men within tertiary institutions has been used in a routine way to silence
challenges to patriarchal ideas, rather than normal academic processes being
used to do this.
Routine,
institutionalised suppression is often more important than the notable examples
of overt suppression. But it is partly by studying the more dramatic instances
of suppression, for which more information is available, that the dynamics of
routine suppression can be elucidated.
Part
One presents a set of case studies of suppression. These studies should give a
feeling for what suppression is like at the nitty gritty level of dissident
actions, harassment, patterns of action and responses. For several of the
chapters we have invited comment from the institution implicated in the alleged
suppression. If comment was received, we have invited the author of the chapter
in question to respond. We have restricted the cases to those from Australia.
To give an idea of the variety of other cases which have not been presented in
such detail, a series of thumbnail sketches of other instances of suppression
is presented.
Part
Two begins with a chapter on the common origins of suppression cases in the
vested interests embodied in the power structures in government, business and
academia. The second chapter analyses the institutionalised suppression of
feminist critique in universities. Next the role of authoritarian behaviour
patterns in state bureaucracies is examined. The final chapter addresses
academic suppression in the context of human rights.
Part
Three addresses the question of how to oppose individual cases of suppression
and more generally to oppose the institutional structures which give rise to
suppression in the course of serving vested interests. Special attention is
given to challenging suppression by obtaining publicity, and through social
action. The final chapter looks in detail at how performance is evaluated in
scientific and academic organisations, and thereby provides information for
challenging suppression of dissidents whose job performance is adequate.
One
final comment: not everything can be told about most suppression cases.
Australian defamation laws are among the most severe in the world, and are
often used to suppress free expression.[5] Significantly, most defamation cases
are brought by powerful organisations or leading public figures, the same
groups who are more often responsible for suppression than victims of it. In
most of the suppression cases documented here, there is information which
cannot be revealed because of the possibility of attracting defamation suits.
Suffice it to say that the extent and viciousness of suppression is certainly
greater than can be spelled out here.
2. On
repression see the publications of Amnesty International. On both suppression
and repression see the excellent journal Index on Censorship. A recent
bibliography and analysis of repression can be found in Thomas Plate and Andrea
Darvi, Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror (London: Abacus,
Sphere, 1983).
3. A.
Ernest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (New York: Norton, 1972). A
similar story, including dismissal of those who provide examples of waste,
occurs in various branches of local and national government in the UK. See
Leslie Chapman, Waste Away
4. Rhonda
Brown and Paul Matteucci, "The high cost of whistle-blowing", Inquiry
5. Robert
Pullan, Guilty Secrets: Free Speech in Australia (Sydney: Methuen Australia,