Philosophy Research Seminars

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When: Tuesdays at  5.30pm, in 19:1003. All are welcome to attend.

Spring Schedule 

21 September 2010

Brett Calcott (ANU) will be presenting a paper at the UOW Philosophy Research Seminar series on Tuesday, September 21st.  

Title: Evolvability as Inductive Learning
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, September 21st in room 19.1003

Abstract: In this paper, I construct an analogy between inductive learning and (one kind of) evolvability. Roughly, the analogy comes down to this: Just as we distinguish between smart and dumb creatures, we can distinguish between smart and dumb developmental systems. By a smart creature, I mean one that, because of its prior experience, will be more apt to generate a "good" guess in response to a new situation. By a smart developmental system, I mean one that, due to its previous selective regime, will be more apt to generate a "good" phenotype when presented with a new environment. So an evolvable developmental system, like a mind that uses induction, can generate good responses on the basis of prior experience. In the talk, I fill out the vague terms in this rough analogy, give a very general outline of the conditions under which smart developmental systems can occur, and look at a simple model showing one way it might work.

For more information on other events in Philosophy at UOW, go to phil-gong.blogspot.com

10th August 2010

We're very pleased to have John Burgess (Northwestern/UOW) and Shane Waugh (UOW) presenting a paper at the Philosophy Research Seminar series on August 10th.

Title: Pluralism, Neutralism and Propositional Representation
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 10th in room 19.1003

Abstract: 
Theories of interpretation which are duly sensitive to cultural and ideological diversity are usually sufficiently sophisticated to allow for error theoretic and fictionalist approaches to the areas of discourse which require them. Although a welcome step in the right direction, this is not yet sophistication enough; an adequate general account of interpretation must acknowledge the possibility of neutralist interpretation where we can understand a narrative without knowing whether it is fact, fiction or constitutively flawed would-be fact. Not only is this resource required for an adequate representation of interpretation in everyday life, it is also required in philosophy if we are properly to grasp the significance of positions like van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, Fogelin’s neo-Pyrhhonism and Kalderon’s moral fictionalism. We here develop and defend a position we call mode-variable realism. This task requires us first to explain neutralism and to show how it interacts with more familiar modes of interpretation to produce the mode-variable realist framework. Second, we apply the framework to the three philosophical examples just mentioned.

3rd August, 2010

Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford) visiting us on Tuesday, August 3rd, to give a paper at our Philosophy Research Seminar series.

Title: A Priori Bootstrapping
When and Where: 5:30pm, Tuesday, August 3rd in room 19.1038 *Note the change from our usual venue*

Abstract: 
This paper explores a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion of the paper is that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by arguing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it is a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.

The first section of the paper set outs the problem that this sceptical paradox raises for the justification of beliefs. The second section presents reasons for thinking that any adequate solution to this problem must claim that every thinker has a priori justification for believing that they are not in a sceptical scenario (i.e., a situation in which their experiences are in some undetectable way unreliable).

The third section describes a certain belief-forming practice, which we may call the practice of taking experience at face value. Given the assumption that this belief-forming practice is rational, there is a straightforward process of reasoning—the a priori bootstrapping reasoning—that can lead any thinker to a justified belief in the proposition that they are not in such a sceptical scenario.

As is explained in the fourth section, however, there is absolutely no prospect that this argument will be able to solve the problem that the sceptical paradox raises for the justification of belief-forming practices. So the deeper challenge of solving the practice for this belief-forming practice remains. Finally, some comments are made on the significance of these arguments for the idea of a priori reasoning, and for the attempts that other philosophers have made at solving the problems that are raised by the sceptical paradox.

For more information on this and other upcoming events in Philosophy at UOW, check out phil-gong-blogspot.com, or contact Patrick McGivern.

Autumn Schedule

18th May

Joanne Faulkner (UNSW) .
Title: "Vulnerability and the Passing of Childhood in Bill Henson: Innocence in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"

Abstract: The most public responses to Bill Henson's 2008 exhibition either judged the photographs to constitute child pornography (or a prelude to child abuse), or argued for the exemption of Henson's work from that field on the basis of its status as fine art. This paper interrogates these responses by asking what opportunities were missed amid the "controversy," for critical reflection on the political significance of childhood and of art. With reference to Walter Benjamin's reflections on art in the age of new technologies of reproduction, the paper attempts to re-situate Henson's 2008 work — and particularly the most controversial photograph within that exhibition — in the context of a broader 'crisis' in the (artistic) representation of children.

For more information on this and other upcoming events in Philosophy at UOW, check out phil-gong.blogspot.com

11th May
Paul Griffiths (U Syd)

20th April 2010
Kristie Miller (U Syd)
Title: "Motion, laws and plenitude: Are there objects to which the laws of nature do not apply?"

Abstract: It is a natural to assume that the domain of the concrete objects is coextensive with the domain of the objects to which the natural laws apply, and therefore that if we can find any concrete object that is at rest and does not stay at rest unless acted on by a net force, then we have found something that violates the law of inertia. Recently, however, this assumption has been challenged. The locus of this challenge has come from a number of metaphysicians who sign up for what I will call a plenitudinous ontology. Given a plenitudinous ontology, a great number of entities seem to be ones that violate one or other law of nature.Friends of plenitude have responded by conceding that the entities in question do violate the laws in question, and suggesting that the correct response is to distinguish two different kinds of concrete entity: the ones to which the laws apply, and the ones to which they do not.  In this paper I advocate an alternative strategy according to which when the laws are properly understood, no concrete entity in the plenitudinous ontology ever violates those laws.

22nd, February 2010, 5pm in 19:1003
Brie Gertler (University of Virginia): "The extended mind and the status of standing beliefs"